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Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
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SYSNO ASEP 0472319 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players Author(s) Zápal, Jan (NHU-C) RID Source Title Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
Roč. 98, July (2016), s. 235-242Number of pages 8 s. Language eng - English Country US - United States Keywords dynamic decision-making ; endogenous status-quo ; spatial bargaining Subject RIV AH - Economics Institutional support NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000381955100014 EID SCOPUS 84978230436 DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013 Annotation The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate. Workplace Economics Institute - CERGE Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2017
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