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Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids
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SYSNO ASEP 0461905 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids Author(s) Ettinger, D. (FR)
Michelucci, Fabio (NHU-N) RIDSource Title Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press - ISSN 0013-0133
Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502Number of pages 19 s. Language eng - English Country GB - United Kingdom Keywords hiding information ; open auctions ; jump bids Subject RIV AH - Economics Institutional support NHU-N - RVO:67985998 UT WOS 000380719300007 EID SCOPUS 84979573846 DOI 10.1111/ecoj.12243 Annotation We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2017
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