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Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model
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SYSNO ASEP 0460088 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model Author(s) Celik, Levent (NHU-C) RID
Karabay, Bilgehan (NHU-C) RIDSource Title Theory and Decision - ISSN 0040-5833
Roč. 81, č. 1 (2016), s. 33-52Number of pages 20 s. Language eng - English Country US - United States Keywords multilateral bargaining ; equilibrium uniqueness ; veto players Subject RIV AH - Economics R&D Projects GAP402/12/0666 GA ČR - Czech Science Foundation (CSF) Institutional support NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000376680100003 EID SCOPUS 84945544222 DOI 10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1 Annotation In political economy, the seminal contribution of the Baron–Ferejohn bargaining model constitutes an important milestone for the study of legislative policy making. In this paper, we analyze a particular equilibrium characteristic of this model, equilibrium uniqueness. The Baron–Ferejohn model yields a class of payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in which players’ equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. We first provide a formal proof of the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies. This also enables us to establish some important properties of SSPE. We then introduce veto players into the original Baron–Ferejohn model. We state the conditions under which the new model has a unique SSPE not only in terms of payoffs but also in terms of players’ equilibrium strategies. Workplace Economics Institute - CERGE Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2017
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