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Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining
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SYSNO ASEP 0399708 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining Author(s) Celik, Levent (NHU-N) RID
Karabay, B. (NZ)
McLaren, J. (US)Source Title Journal of International Economics. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0022-1996
Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190Number of pages 12 s. Publication form Print - P Language eng - English Country NL - Netherlands Keywords trade policy ; multilateral legislative bargaining ; political economy Subject RIV AH - Economics Institutional support NHU-N - RVO:67985998 UT WOS 000329268800001 EID SCOPUS 84888310104 DOI 10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001 Annotation In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2014
Number of the records: 1