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Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation
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SYSNO ASEP 0368085 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Ostatní články Title Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation Author(s) Palguta, Ján (NHU-C) RID Source Title AUCO Czech Economic Review, Acta Universitatis Carolinae - OECONOMICA - ISSN 1802-4696
Roč. 5, č. 3 (2011), s. 324-345Number of pages 22 s. Publication form www - www Language eng - English Country CZ - Czech Republic Keywords computation-based simulations ; information ; manipulation Subject RIV AH - Economics R&D Projects SVV 263801/2011 GA MŠMT - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) CEZ MSM0021620846 - NHU-C Annotation A minimal reduction in strategic voter's knowledge about other voters' voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem about strategic voter's complete information about all other voters' preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in the number of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relative reduction in amount of information. Workplace Economics Institute - CERGE Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2012 Electronic address http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/119
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