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Second best efficiency and the English auction
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SYSNO ASEP 0364945 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Second best efficiency and the English auction Author(s) Hernando-Veciana, Á. (ES)
Michelucci, Fabio (NHU-N) RIDSource Title Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
Roč. 73, č. 2 (2011), s. 496-506Number of pages 11 s. Language eng - English Country US - United States Keywords auctions ; efficiency ; mechanism design Subject RIV AH - Economics CEZ AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011) UT WOS 000296545200013 EID SCOPUS 80053590448 DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003 Annotation We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2012
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