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Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

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    SYSNO ASEP0351492
    Document TypeJ - Journal Article
    R&D Document TypeJournal Article
    Subsidiary JOstatní články
    TitleOligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers
    Author(s) Ostatnický, Michal (NHU-C)
    Source TitleCERGE-EI Working Paper Series - ISSN 1211-3298
    -, č. 413 (2010), s. 1-34
    Number of pages34 s.
    Publication formwww - www
    Languageeng - English
    CountryCZ - Czech Republic
    Keywordsoligopoly ; price competition ; price dispersion
    Subject RIVAH - Economics
    CEZMSM0021620846 - NHU-C
    AnnotationThe standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian’s (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian’s or Kocas and Kiyak’s type. The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).
    WorkplaceEconomics Institute - CERGE
    ContactTomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
    Year of Publishing2011
Number of the records: 1  

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