Number of the records: 1
Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game
- 1.
SYSNO ASEP 0348753 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game Author(s) Engelmann, Dirk (NHU-N) RID
Normann, H.-T. (GB)Source Title Experimental Economics - ISSN 1386-4157
Roč. 13, č. 3 (2010), s. 249-259Number of pages 11 s. Language eng - English Country NL - Netherlands Keywords minimum-effort game ; coordination game ; experiments ; social capital Subject RIV AH - Economics CEZ AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011) UT WOS 000280555100001 DOI 10.1007/s10683-010-9239-3 Annotation We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2011
Number of the records: 1