Number of the records: 1
Coordination cycles
- 1.
SYSNO ASEP 0343725 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Coordination cycles Author(s) Steiner, Jakub (NHU-N) RID Source Title Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
Roč. 63, č. 1 (2008), s. 308-327Number of pages 20 s. Language eng - English Country US - United States Keywords global games ; coordination ; crises ; cycles and fluctuations Subject RIV AH - Economics CEZ AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011) UT WOS 000256284000016 EID SCOPUS 41649114771 DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.005 Annotation Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game. Workplace Economics Institute Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2011
Number of the records: 1