Number of the records: 1  

Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

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    SYSNO ASEP0331498
    Document TypeJ - Journal Article
    R&D Document TypeJournal Article
    Subsidiary JČlánek ve WOS
    TitleIndirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
    Author(s) Engelmann, Dirk (NHU-N) RID
    Fischbacher, U. (DE)
    Source TitleGames and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
    Roč. 67, č. 2 (2009), s. 399-407
    Number of pages9
    Languageeng - English
    CountryUS - United States
    Keywordsindirect reciprocity ; reputation ; experimental economics
    Subject RIVAH - Economics
    CEZAV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011)
    UT WOS000271143900006
    DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006
    AnnotationWe study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate.
    WorkplaceEconomics Institute
    ContactTomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
    Year of Publishing2010
Number of the records: 1  

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