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Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters
- 1.0368801 - NHÚ 2012 RIV US eng J - Journal Article
Žigić, Krešimir
Does a 'non-committed' government always generate lower social welfare than its 'committed' counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters.
Journal of Comparative Economics. Roč. 39, č. 4 (2011), s. 533-556. ISSN 0147-5967. E-ISSN 1095-7227
R&D Projects: GA MŠMT LC542
Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
Keywords : government commitment * social welfare * optimal tariffs and export subsidies
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 1.028, year: 2011
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0203043File Download Size Commentary Version Access 0368801_IR.pdf 0 1.2 MB Author’s postprint require
Number of the records: 1