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Jesuit Probabilistic Logic between Scholastic and Academic Philosophy
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SYSNO ASEP 0508404 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Jesuit Probabilistic Logic between Scholastic and Academic Philosophy Author(s) Hanke, Miroslav (FLU-F) RID, ORCID, SAI Source Title History and Philosophy of Logic. - : Taylor & Francis - ISSN 0144-5340
Roč. 40, č. 4 (2019), s. 355-373Number of pages 19 s. Publication form Print - P Language eng - English Country GB - United Kingdom Keywords probabilistic logic ; logical validity ; epistemic logic ; Jesuits ; second scholasticism Subject RIV AA - Philosophy ; Religion OECD category Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology R&D Projects GA17-12408S GA ČR - Czech Science Foundation (CSF) Method of publishing Limited access Institutional support FLU-F - RVO:67985955 UT WOS 000472974300001 EID SCOPUS 85066985999 DOI 10.1080/01445340.2019.1615363 Annotation There is a well-documented paradigm-shift in eighteenth century Jesuit philosophy and science, at the very least in Central Europe: traditional scholastic version(s) of Aristotelianism were replaced by early modern rationalism (Wolff’s systematisation of Leibnizian philosophy) and early modern science and mathematics. In the field of probability, this meant that the traditional Jesuit engagement with probability, uncertainty, and truthlikeness (in particular, as applied to moral theology) could translate into mathematical language, and can be analysed against the background of the accounts of probability, pre-mathematical Jesuit logic, Wolff’s conceptual analysis, and Bernoullian mathematisation. The works of two Jesuit philosophers, Berthold Hauser and Sigismund Storchenau, can be related to this context. The core of their logic of (epistemic) probability is the account of negation (or ‘contradiction’) and implication (or ‘argument’), in particular, the algorithms for computing the reliability of one piece of evidence when compared to the respective counter-evidence and for computing the probability of a conclusion given the probability of its premises. Workplace Institute of Philosophy Contact Chlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360 Year of Publishing 2020 Electronic address https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2019.1615363
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