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Embodied Symbolism and Self-Awareness in Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of the Unconscious

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    SYSNO ASEP0508090
    Document TypeJ - Journal Article
    R&D Document TypeJournal Article
    Subsidiary JČlánek ve SCOPUS
    TitleEmbodied Symbolism and Self-Awareness in Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of the Unconscious
    Author(s) Puc, Jan (FLU-F) ORCID, RID
    Source TitleMetodo: International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy. - : sdvig press - ISSN 2281-9177
    Roč. 7, č. 1 (2019), s. 15-35
    Number of pages21 s.
    Publication formOnline - E
    Languageeng - English
    CountryCH - Switzerland
    KeywordsThe unconscious ; Embodiment ; Intersubjectivity ; Self-awareness
    Subject RIVAA - Philosophy ; Religion
    OECD categoryPhilosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
    R&D ProjectsGA15-10832S GA ČR - Czech Science Foundation (CSF)
    Method of publishingOpen access
    Institutional supportFLU-F - RVO:67985955
    EID SCOPUS85071377150
    DOI10.19079/metodo.7.1.15
    AnnotationThis essay suggests what M. Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of primordial symbolism and embodied intersubjectivity imply for the problem of the existence and manifestation of dynamically unconscious experiences. First, the paper draws attention to two distinct approaches to the unconscious in the Phenomenology of Perception. One line of argumentation proceeds from the notion of bad faith, which plays a pivotal role in J.-P. Sartre’s critique of psychoanalysis, another line subsumes unconscious thoughts under the neurological notion of body schema. Later, in Lectures on Passivity, Merleau-Ponty combines this expanded notion of body schema with his conception of “promiscuity,” which he illustrates with Freud’s case study of Dora. The paper explains how this new approach to intersubjectivity provides a basis for the manifestation of experiences against which the subject adopts defensive reactions. Finally, it is argued that this position does not equal a straightforward rejection of the notion of pre-reflective cogito and the problem of awareness of unconscious experiences thus remains open.
    WorkplaceInstitute of Philosophy
    ContactChlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360
    Year of Publishing2020
    Electronic addresshttp://metodo-rivista.eu/pub-228326
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