Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object

0502057 - FLÚ 2019 RIV ES eng C - Conference Paper (international conference)
Bertran-San Millán, Joan
Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object.
Actas del IX Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Madrid: UNED, 2018 - (Saborido, C.; Oms, S.; de Prado, J.), s. 16-18. ISBN 978-84-09-06054-2.
[Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España /9./. Madrid (ES), 13.10.2018-16.10.2018]
Grant - others:AV ČR(CZ) AP1602
Program: Akademická prémie - Praemium Academiae
Institutional support: RVO:67985955
Keywords : Frege * Begriffsschrift * Grundlagen * function * concept * concept-script
OECD category: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
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I discuss Frege’s philosophical transit from Begriffsschrift to Grundlagen. I focus on the replacement of function-argument scheme with the concept-object scheme, which has received virtually no attention in historical studies. Begriffsschrift’s reception and Frege’s response to criticisms are taken in [Heck, May, 2013] as the main reason for Frege’s adoption of the concept-object scheme. I claim that there are two additional causes of Frege’s move. First, in the context of the deployment of the logicist project, Frege noticed the limitations of Begriffsschrift’s formal system and the need to establish an ontological foundation – based on the concept-object scheme – that allowed him to provide a definition of natural number. Second, the function-argument scheme provided an inadequate analysis of atomic statements. I defend that the concept-object scheme should not be seen as an extension of the function-argument scheme. What is essential to the notion of concept is its unsaturatedness, which is never attributed to Begriffsschrift’s notion of function. From this stance I argue that two features show the virtues of the concept-object scheme: first, Frege’s notion of concept sets a foundation for the principle of the priority of judgements over concepts, second, the concept-object scheme allows an adequate semantical analysis of categorical statements.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0294012