0383967 - FLÚ 2013 RIV SK eng J - Journal Article
Havlík, Vladimír
Searle on Emergence.
Organon F. Roč. 19, Supp.2 (2012), s. 40-48. ISSN 1335-0668. E-ISSN 2585-7150
Institutional support: RVO:67985955
Keywords : emergence * mind * consciousness * emergent property * system property
Subject RIV: AA - Philosophy ; Religion

Searle's conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle’s conception of emergence. First, I try to show that Searle’s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle’s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness. At the end I try to show in what sense is Searle’s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0213747