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When is it optimal to delegate: the theory of fast-track authority
- 1.0377189 - NHÚ 2013 US eng V - Research Report
Celik, Levent - Karabay, B. - McLaren, J.
When is it optimal to delegate: the theory of fast-track authority.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 50 s. NBER working paper series, 17810.
Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
Keywords : trade-policy * fast-track authority * FTA
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17810.pdf
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0209419
Number of the records: 1