Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

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SYSNO ASEP	0328357
Document Type	J - Journal Article
R&D Document Type	Journal Article
Subsidiary J	Článek ve WOS
Title	Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
Author(s)	Kováč, Eugen (NHU-N)_RID Mylovanov, T. (US)
Source Title	Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0022-0531 Roč. 144, č. 4 (2009), s. 1373-1395
Number of pages	23 s.
Language	eng - English
Country	US - United States
Keywords	optimal delegation ; cheap talk ; principal-agent relationship
Subject RIV	AH - Economics
R&D Projects	LC542 GA MŠMT - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS)
CEZ	AV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011)
UT WOS	000268461600001
DOI	10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.008
Annotation	We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication and optimal delegation: a principal-agent model with hidden information, no monetary transfers, and single-peaked preferences.
Workplace	Economics Institute
Contact	Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
Year of Publishing	2010

Number of the records: 1