Number of the records: 1  

Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default

  1. 1.
    0575063 - NHU-C 2024 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
    Engelmann, Dirk - Frank, J. - Koch, A. K. - Valente, M.
    Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default.
    Rand Journal of Economics. Roč. 54, č. 3 (2023), s. 484-511. ISSN 0741-6261. E-ISSN 1756-2171
    Institutional support: Cooperatio-COOP
    Keywords : sequential auctions * 2nd-price auctions * online feedback
    OECD category: Applied Economics, Econometrics
    Impact factor: 2.3, year: 2022
    Method of publishing: Open access
    https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448

    Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second-chance” offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids, (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default, (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.
    Permanent Link: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0344904

     
     
Number of the records: 1  

  This site uses cookies to make them easier to browse. Learn more about how we use cookies.