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Rent extraction by large shareholders: evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic

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    SYSNO ASEP0080923
    Document TypeE - Electronic Document
    R&D Document TypeR&D Presentation (audio-visual, electronic documents. Documents released only in a form readable by a computer (eg . documents released on CD only), available only via the Internet, WEB presentation.
    TitleRent extraction by large shareholders: evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic
    TitleZískávání renty velkými vlastníky akcií: důkaz s použitím dividendové politiky v České republice
    Author(s) Bena, Jan (NHU-N)
    Hanousek, Jan (NHU-N) RID
    Issue dataPrague: CERGE-EI, 2006
    Number of pages3 s.
    Publication formwww - www
    Languageeng - English
    CountryCZ - Czech Republic
    Keywordsrent extraction ; large shareholders ; dividend policy
    Subject RIVAH - Economics
    R&D ProjectsGA402/06/1293 GA ČR - Czech Science Foundation (CSF)
    CEZAV0Z70850503 - NHU-N (2005-2011)
    AnnotationUsing cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing dividends paid across varying corporate ownership structures - concentration, type, and domicile of ownership - we quantify these effects and reveal that they are substantial. We find that the target payout ratio for firms with majority ownership is low but that the presence of a significant minority shareholder increases the target payout ratio and hence precludes a majority owner from extracting rent. In contrast to other studies from developed markets, our unique dataset from the Czech Republic for the period 1996-2003 permits us to take account of the endogeneity of ownership.
    WorkplaceEconomics Institute
    ContactTomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
    Year of Publishing2007
    Electronic addresshttp://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/pb/PB9.pdf
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