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Influential opinion leaders
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SYSNO ASEP 0439146 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Influential opinion leaders Author(s) Loeper, A. (ES)
Steiner, Jakub (NHU-C) RID
Stewart, C. (CA)Source Title Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press - ISSN 0013-0133
Roč. 124, č. 581 (2014), s. 1147-1167Number of pages 21 s. Language eng - English Country GB - United Kingdom Keywords two-stage coordination game ; equilibrium outcome ; expert influence Subject RIV AH - Economics R&D Projects GA13-34759S GA ČR - Czech Science Foundation (CSF) Institutional support NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000346068400001 EID SCOPUS 84915788644 DOI 10.1111/ecoj.12100 Annotation We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities. Workplace Economics Institute - CERGE Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2015
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