A note on equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model

0359998 - NHÚ 2012 CZ eng V - Research Report
Celik, Levent - Karabay, B.
A note on equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model.
Prague: CERGE-EI, 2011. 10 s. CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 440. ISSN 1211-3298
Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
Keywords : ultilateral bargaining * equilibrium uniqueness * veto players
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp440.pdf

The Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining model predicts a payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which players' equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. In this note, we present a modified version of the Baron-Ferejohn model by introducing veto players and provide a sufficient condition to obtain a truly unique SSPE in terms of payoffs as well as players' equilibrium strategies.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0197658