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Copyright and firms’ own IPR protection in a software market: monopoly versus duopoly
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SYSNO ASEP 0582620 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Copyright and firms’ own IPR protection in a software market: monopoly versus duopoly Author(s) Žigić, Krešimir (NHU-C) RID
Střelický, J. (CZ)
Kúnin, M. (BY)Article number 106282 Source Title Economic Modelling. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0264-9993
Roč. 123, June (2023)Number of pages 15 s. Publication form Print - P Language eng - English Country NL - Netherlands Keywords vertically differentiated duopoly ; software piracy ; Bertrand competition OECD category Applied Economics, Econometrics Method of publishing Limited access Institutional support NHU-C - Cooperatio-COOP UT WOS 001054775800001 EID SCOPUS 85163643215 DOI 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106282 Annotation In a duopoly, we study the interaction between public (copyright) and private protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Software developers offer products with differing qualities and compete for heterogeneous users, who may buy a legal version, an illegal copy, or no product. Illegal usage is punishable when caught. A developer decides whether to use private IPR protection, given the degree of public IPR protection. We analyze the impact of private and public IPR protection on the developers’ pricing, using monopoly as a benchmark. We show that monopoly pricing is not marginally affected by either public or private protection. We also show that both types of protection may affect duopoly pricing by softening price competition. Finally, we find the interaction between public and private protection in a duopoly but not in a monopoly. Moreover, strategic substitutability and complementarity can exist between the public and private IPR, depending on the strength of the copyright. Workplace Economics Institute - CERGE Contact Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Year of Publishing 2024 Electronic address https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106282
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