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Unitary and Dual Models of Phenomenal Consciousness

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    SYSNO ASEP0481000
    Document TypeJ - Journal Article
    R&D Document TypeJournal Article
    Subsidiary JČlánek ve WOS
    TitleUnitary and Dual Models of Phenomenal Consciousness
    Author(s) Marvan, Tomáš (FLU-F) RID, ORCID, SAI
    Polák, M. (CZ)
    Source TitleConsciousness and Cognition. - : Elsevier - ISSN 1053-8100
    -, č. 56 (2017), s. 1-12
    Number of pages12 s.
    Publication formPrint - P
    Languageeng - English
    CountryUS - United States
    Keywordsphenomenal consciousness ; David Rosenthal ; what it is like ; unconscious mind ; theories fo consciousness
    Subject RIVAA - Philosophy ; Religion
    OECD categoryPhilosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
    Institutional supportFLU-F - RVO:67985955
    UT WOS000414884500001
    EID SCOPUS85030786055
    DOI10.1016/j.concog.2017.09.006
    AnnotationThere is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it’s becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.
    WorkplaceInstitute of Philosophy
    ContactChlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360
    Year of Publishing2018
Number of the records: 1  

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