Number of the records: 1  

Efficiency and punishment in a coordination game: voluntary sanctions in the minimum effort game

  1. 1.
    SYSNO ASEP0440210
    Document TypeV - Research Report
    R&D Document TypeThe record was not marked in the RIV
    TitleEfficiency and punishment in a coordination game: voluntary sanctions in the minimum effort game
    Author(s) Le Lec, F. (FR)
    Rydval, Ondřej (NHU-C) RID
    Matthey, A. (DE)
    Issue dataPrague: CERGE-EI, 2014
    ISSN1211-3298
    SeriesCERGE-EI Working Paper Series
    Series number526
    Number of pages24 s.
    Publication formPrint - P
    Languageeng - English
    CountryCZ - Czech Republic
    Keywordscoordination games ; voluntary sanctions ; punishment
    Subject RIVAH - Economics
    Institutional supportNHU-C - PRVOUK-P23
    WorkplaceEconomics Institute - CERGE
    ContactTomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122
    Year of Publishing2015
Number of the records: 1  

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