Number of the records: 1
Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift
- 1.
SYSNO ASEP 0481510 Document Type J - Journal Article R&D Document Type Journal Article Subsidiary J Článek ve WOS Title Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift Author(s) Badesa, C. (ES)
Bertran-San Millán, Joan (FLU-F)Source Title History and Philosophy of Logic. - : Taylor & Francis - ISSN 0144-5340
Roč. 38, č. 4 (2017), s. 316-341Number of pages 26 s. Publication form Print - P Language eng - English Country GB - United Kingdom Keywords identity ; Frege ; logic ; function ; argument Subject RIV AA - Philosophy ; Religion OECD category Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology Institutional support FLU-F - RVO:67985955 UT WOS 000413765300002 EID SCOPUS 85026767695 DOI 10.1080/01445340.2017.1354173 Annotation It is well known that the formal system developed by Frege in Begriffsschrift is based upon the distinction between function and argumentas opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and predicate. Almost all of the modern commentaries on Frege's work suggest a semantic interpretation of this distinction, and identify it with the ontological structure of function and object, upon which Grundgesetze is based. Those commentaries agree that the system proposed by Frege in Begriffsschrift has some gaps, but it is taken as an essentially correct formal system for second-order logic: the first one in the history of logic. However, there is strong textual evidence that such an interpretation should be rejected. This evidence shows that the nature of the distinction between function and argument is stated by Frege in a significantly different way: it applies only to expressions and not to entities. The formal system based on this distinction is tremendously flexible and is suitable for making explicit the logical structure of contents as well as of deductive chains. We put forward a new reconstruction of the function-argument scheme and the quantification theory in Begriffsschrift. After that, we discuss the usual semantic interpretation of Begriffsschrift and show its inconsistencies with a rigorous reading of the text. Workplace Institute of Philosophy Contact Chlumská Simona, chlumska@flu.cas.cz ; Tichá Zuzana, asep@flu.cas.cz Tel: 221 183 360 Year of Publishing 2018
Number of the records: 1