Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

0542972 - NHÚ 2022 RIV US eng J - Journal Article
Matějka, Filip - Tabellini, G.
Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters.
Journal of the European Economic Association. Roč. 19, č. 3 (2021), s. 1899-1935. ISSN 1542-4766. E-ISSN 1542-4774
EU Projects: European Commission(XE) 678081 - INATTENTION
Institutional support: RVO:67985998
Keywords : electoral competition * rationally inattentive voters
OECD category: Economic Theory
Impact factor: 4.301, year: 2021
Method of publishing: Open access
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa042

This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0320286