Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

0472319 - NHU-C 2017 RIV US eng J - Journal Article
Zápal, Jan
Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players.
Games and Economic Behavior. Roč. 98, July (2016), s. 235-242. ISSN 0899-8256. E-ISSN 1090-2473
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : dynamic decision-making * endogenous status-quo * spatial bargaining
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 0.904, year: 2016

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0269660