Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids

0461905 - NHÚ 2017 RIV GB eng J - Journal Article
Ettinger, D. - Michelucci, Fabio
Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids.
Economic Journal. Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502. ISSN 0013-0133. E-ISSN 1468-0297
Institutional support: RVO:67985998
Keywords : hiding information * open auctions * jump bids
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 2.608, year: 2016

We analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0261461