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On the optimality of not allocating
- 1.0441232 - NHU-C 2015 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, Á. - Michelucci, Fabio
On the optimality of not allocating.
Economics Letters. Roč. 125, č. 2 (2014), s. 233-235. ISSN 0165-1765. E-ISSN 1873-7374
Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : auctions * mechanism design
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 0.510, year: 2014
We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0244264
Number of the records: 1