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Influential opinion leaders
- 1.0439146 - NHU-C 2015 RIV GB eng J - Journal Article
Loeper, A. - Steiner, Jakub - Stewart, C.
Influential opinion leaders.
Economic Journal. Roč. 124, č. 581 (2014), s. 1147-1167. ISSN 0013-0133. E-ISSN 1468-0297
R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GA13-34759S
Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : two-stage coordination game * equilibrium outcome * expert influence
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 2.336, year: 2014
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased towards the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0242450
Number of the records: 1