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Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

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    0423393 - NHU-C 2015 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
    Celik, Levent - Karabay, Bilgehan - McLaren, J.
    Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining.
    Journal of International Economics. Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190. ISSN 0022-1996. E-ISSN 1873-0353
    R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GAP402/12/0666
    Grant - others:UK(CZ) UNCE 204005/2012
    Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
    Keywords : trade policy * multilateral legislative bargaining * political economy
    Subject RIV: AH - Economics
    Impact factor: 2.443, year: 2013

    In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff.
    Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0229484

     
     
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