Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

0399708 - NHÚ 2014 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
Celik, Levent - Karabay, B. - McLaren, J.
Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining.
Journal of International Economics. Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190. ISSN 0022-1996. E-ISSN 1873-0353
Institutional support: RVO:67985998
Keywords : trade policy * multilateral legislative bargaining * political economy
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 2.443, year: 2013

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0227464