Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

0351492 - NHU-C 2011 RIV CZ eng J - Journal Article
Ostatnický, Michal
Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers.
CERGE-EI Working Paper Series. -, č. 413 (2010), s. 1-34. ISSN 1211-3298
Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846
Keywords : oligopoly * price competition * price dispersion
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp413.pdf

The standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian’s (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian’s or Kocas and Kiyak’s type. The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0191232