Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models

0347865 - ÚTIA 2011 RIV CZ eng C - Conference Paper (international conference)
Kuběna, Aleš Antonín
Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.
Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010. České Budějovice: University of South Bohemia, 2010 - (Houda, M.; Friebelová, J.), s. 337-380. ISBN 978-80-7394-218-2.
[28-th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics. České Budějovice (CZ), 08.09.2010-10.09.2010]
R&D Projects: GA ČR GD402/09/H045
Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z10750506
Keywords : Concentration game * pexeso * perfect players
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2010/E/kubena-pexeso (concentration game) as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.pdf

Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with ”stalemate” (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0188542