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Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case

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    0328357 - NHÚ 2010 RIV US eng J - Journal Article
    Kováč, Eugen - Mylovanov, T.
    Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case.
    Journal of Economic Theory. Roč. 144, č. 4 (2009), s. 1373-1395. ISSN 0022-0531. E-ISSN 1095-7235
    R&D Projects: GA MŠMT LC542
    Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
    Keywords : optimal delegation * cheap talk * principal-agent relationship
    Subject RIV: AH - Economics
    Impact factor: 1.092, year: 2009

    We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication and optimal delegation: a principal-agent model with hidden information, no monetary transfers, and single-peaked preferences.
    Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0174689

     
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    0328357_IR.pdf0759.3 KBAuthor’s postprintrequire
     
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