Number of the records: 1
Opaque selling
- 1.0532768 - NHU-C 2021 RIV NL eng J - Journal Article
Anderson, S. P. - Celik, Levent
Opaque selling.
Information Economics and Policy. Roč. 52, September (2020), č. článku 100869. ISSN 0167-6245. E-ISSN 1873-5975
R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GA15-22540S
Institutional support: Progres-Q24
Keywords : opaque products * product line design * product differentiation
OECD category: Economic Theory
Impact factor: 1.558, year: 2020
Method of publishing: Limited access
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100869
We study “opaque” selling in multiproduct environments – a marketing practice in which sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important characteristics of their products hidden until after purchase. We show that a monopolist will always use opaque selling, but it is not first-best optimal to do so. However, opaque selling might be used at the constrained optimum (with the monopolist’s pricing behavior taken as given). For linear disutility costs, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer a single opaque product.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0311161
Number of the records: 1