Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty

0481733 - FLÚ 2018 RIV DE eng M - Monography Chapter
Janoušek, Hynek
Consciousness of Judging. Katkov’s Critique of Marty’s State of Affairs and Brentano’s Description of Judgement.
Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017 - (Fréchette, G.; Taieb, H.), s. 241-259. Phenomenology & Mind, 19. ISBN 978-3-11-052977-7
R&D Projects: GA ČR GA15-18149S
Institutional support: RVO:67985955
Keywords : Franz Brentano * Anton Marty * Georg Katkov * The Prague School of Brentano * Reism * Theory of Judgment
OECD category: Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

This study presents Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of meaning and Brentano’s description of judgemental consciousness. Katkov, a student of Oskar Kraus in Prague, developed an interesting account of a reistic reduction of states of affairs. This reduction is based on Katkov’s transformation of Marty’s theory of the secondary intention of statements (linguistically expressed judgements) and on a further development of Brentano’s theory of judgements. According to Katkov’s theory, all linguistically expressed judgements have to manifest two independent judgements if they are to fulfil the communicative goal of a speaker. The first judgement is a basic acceptance or negation of an object. The second is a higher-order belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation. Katkov then reduces states of affairs to the consciousness of objective validity, which consists in such a belief in correctness. In this article I first present some features of Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of linguistic communication of statements. I then offer my own short reply to Katkov’s questions. The study concludes by presenting Katkov’s reduction of states of affairs to a complex of beliefs and by questioning Katkov’s description concerning the difference between sensory perception and rational judgement. This difference motivates Katkov’s separation of a basic acceptance or negation on the one side and a separate belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation on the other.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0277237