Theoretical models of decision-making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason

0453669 - ÚTIA 2016 RIV SG eng C - Conference Paper (international conference)
Guy, Tatiana Valentine - Kárný, Miroslav - Villa, A. P. - Lintas, A.
Theoretical models of decision-making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason.
Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (V). Singapur: Springer-Verlag, 2016 - (Wang, R.; Pan, X.), s. 185-191. Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics, 1. ISBN 978-981-10-0205-2. ISSN 2213-3569.
[ICCN 2015. Sanya (CN), 03.06.2015-07.06.2015]
R&D Projects: GA ČR GA13-13502S
Institutional support: RVO:67985556
Keywords : fairness * rationality * Ultimatum game * decision making
Subject RIV: BB - Applied Statistics, Operational Research
http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2016/AS/guy-0453669.pdf

According to Game Theory a human subject playing the Ultimatum Game should choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players (assumption of selfish rationality) [1]. However, economy, sociology and neurology communities repeatedly claim nonrationality of the human behaviour [2], following the observation that responders reject offers they find too low and proposers often offer more than the smallest amount, thus suggesting that humans’ behaviour is significantly influenced by social norms. We also assume human rationality, but our model describes a human-responder via decision process with a reward function respecting fairness as much as the economic profit. This model is positively tested against a set of original experimental data, thus providing an insight into human’s motivation as a social being.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0257058