Why can't a woman bid more like a man?

0423392 - NHU-C 2014 RIV US eng J - Journal Article
Chen, Y. - Katuščák, Peter - Ozdenoren, E.
Why can't a woman bid more like a man?
Games and Economic Behavior. Roč. 77, č. 1 (2013), s. 181-213. ISSN 0899-8256. E-ISSN 1090-2473
Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23
Keywords : gender * menstrual cycle * contraceptive pills * auction
Subject RIV: AH - Economics
Impact factor: 1.025, year: 2013

We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle.
Permanent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0229483