The latest book by Tytus Jaskułowski follows a contemporary trend to analyse activities of secret services in the former Eastern bloc in a comparative perspective.1 The present work draws on extensive research in Polish and German archives, as well as on interviews with contemporary actors. Jaskułowski’s main argument is that in spite of the officially proclaimed cooperation of “brother organs”, the relationship between the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) was very tense, full of mistrust, strategizing, cynicism and uncompromising advancing of own interests. To demonstrate this, he has amassed ample evidence which convincingly underpins his arguments.

Jaskułowski analyses not only the contractual basis of mutual relations between the MfS and the MSW, but also key areas of common interest, the forms of communication at different levels of the security apparatus and particular examples of cooperation, as well as the broader context of conflicts and their solutions. Even though his analysis is focused on the era between 1974 and 1990, the first chapter describes the primary aspects of bilateral relations after 1945, as it was in these years that the “main problems, discrepancies and conflicts” (p. 22) that would shape the post-1974 era emerged. Particularly notable are the rapid growth in the MfS’s power after the second half of the 1950s and the great personal continuity that existed in the leadership of “Mielke’s empire”, which contrasts with frequent changes in the MSW’s top structures (p. 44). Jaskułowski also describes the different geopolitical situations in both countries and the implications that arose from the particular tradition of Polish resistance.

The second chapter describes the development of the “diplomacy of secret services” between the countries. It draws on an analysis of the May 1974 agreement on mutual collaboration between the MfS and the MSW, which created a basis for bilateral relations among various departments of both secret services. It emphasised exchanges of information, but did not contain any obligation of mutual support. Therefore, its success depended solely on the willingness of the specific actors to cooperate. The cooperation was to be coordinated by the departments for international relations and the cabinet of the minister. Subsequently, other agreements on collaboration among main departments were made, including numerous annexes and additional protocols, which constituted the actual content of the collaboration. These agreements were set down in German and Polish versions. According to Jaskułowski, the syntax of the Polish version offered the MSW an opportunity for free interpretation of some passages. As interesting as this fact is, a more general discussion about foreign language levels within the international departments of both countries would have been informative here. Similar agreements between the MfS and Czechoslovak State Security (StB) were full of ideological stereotypes and their language was characterized by bureaucratic rigidity, which did not allow for original interpretations.

In the second chapter, Jaskułowski has managed to gather key findings from many documents related to preparations for, proceedings and results of meetings between both ministries’ representatives. He convincingly shows that there was “no space for a neutral image of Poland” (p. 149) inside the MfS – a fact the MSW was, to a large extent, aware of. The imposition of Martial law in Poland in December 1981 was, naturally, welcomed by the MfS, but concerns about the possible infection of East German society by the “Polish virus” were far from dispelled. This was illustrated by subsequent measures taken by the MfS under the code name “Besinnung” (“contemplation”), which finds an interesting parallel in the MfS’s “treatment” of the Prague Spring “virus” in 1968.2 The situation further deteriorated after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed office, since East Germany and Poland viewed his reforms in the USSR differently. Thus, the MfS could not perceive the so-called “round tables” in Poland as anything but “a victory of the counter-revolution and evidence of the party’s final failure” (p. 158).

In the third chapter Jaskułowski analyses joint actions against foreign secret services. These primarily included monitoring and surveillance of foreigners (diplomats, journalists) who were suspected of collaboration with Western secret services. The cooperation increased considerably when both parties were convinced they would profit from it. In contrast, requests for help from the other side were administered belatedly and without sufficient care when no own benefit was seen. In a section about cooperation against international terrorism Jaskułowski even presents examples of intentional disinformation of the “brother organ”. The great frequency and scope of the MfS’s requests, which constantly irritated and burdened the Polish service, undoubtedly also impacted the interactions.

The next-to-last chapter discusses the possibilities and limits of joint actions against the domestic opposition in each country and cooperation in surveillance of citizens. Here the different social positions of the opposition and the Catholic church in each country becomes evident. Unlike the MfS, the MSW tried to involve the activities of its “internal enemy” in its own strategy and was more interested in employing a “combination of repressive and operational measures” (p. 233). Joint combat against the opposition mostly focused on exchange of information about “internal enemies”. Nevertheless, this cooperation was characterized by substantial irregularities and deficiencies. The lists of opposition members, mutually exchanged between the MfS and the MSW, were far from representative and obviously marked by many simplifications. As in other parts of the book, the added value that a more comparative perspective, for example including Czechoslovakia, would have brought to the study is evident. For example, a look at the very similar lists that the MfS exchanged with the StB might put the uniqueness of some findings into perspective. In both countries, it was the common people who were most affected by the joint activities. Jaskułowski shows that the cooperation was most intense when it came to monitoring of citizens (p. 285).

The final chapter captivatingly describes confrontations between the services. The activities of the MfS’s operative group in Warsaw and the MSW’s resident group in the GDR were miles apart from the officially promoted image of friendly relations. Analysing the political, economic and social situation was a part of the secret service’s work routine in the host country; similar activities were also performed by the MfS’s operative group in Czechoslovakia and by the StB in the GDR. However, according to Jaskułowski, the offensive character and aim of the deployment of “unofficial informers” (IM) in the GDR and Poland, as well as frequent recruitments of citizens into the foreign secret service, were exceptional when compared with Czechoslovakia, particularly in the 1980s. Here, Jaskułowski also features an interesting comparison between the secret services’ analyses of the situation in the neighbouring country. There is no doubt the MfS was more ideologically rigid and in many respects surprisingly ignorant concerning important developments in Poland. However, there were obvious limits to the MSW’s analytical activities as well, and these were not confined to overestimating the chance of France successfully blocking German reunification (p. 420), but included also underestimating the influence of the Protestant church and the independent peace movement in the GDR. In this respect, one cannot avoid a suspicion the author slightly “favours” the Polish organs to the German ones.

Jaskułowski’s book is very sound and source-based and calls for further comparisons. Its structure is logical, and its findings valuable, enriching, and revising the current knowledge about the cooperation among socialist secret services. The question remains whether the emphasis on searching for the conflict potential between the ministries is excessive, since some of their misunderstandings might have been caused by mere sloppiness and bureaucratic carelessness, which could also be found relatively often in the communication between the MfS and the StB.

Notes:
1 For example Christian Domnitz, Kooperation und Kontrolle. Die Arbeit der Stasi-Operativgruppen im sozialistischen Ausland, Göttingen 2016.
2 Monika Tantzscher, Maßnahme „Donau“ und Einsatz „Genesung“. Die Niederschlagung des Prager Frühlings 1968/69 im Spiegel der MfS-Akten, Berlin 1998.