Strategic Socialism. The Updating of Cuba’s Model

Introduction

Cuba is currently undergoing an update of its political-economic model. This undertaking began following the fall of the Eastern Block and Special Period in the 1990s, especially after power was handed over to a new leader. What is a combination of planning and market in this updating? What role do the different forms of ownership play here? What does this mean in international and global contexts? These are the basic research questions formulated in more detail in this paper and to which I will provide answers.^[1]

The actualization of Cuba’s model aims to overcome the previous economic problems and limits. Some people see the new changes as a questionable update of the previous version of Cuba’s socialism, whereas others see an opportunity for a new kind of socialism that will bring economic dynamism and an increase in people’s living standards (Perez-Stable, 2011; Zabala & León, 2020). Methodologically, the changes concern several key concepts. While maintaining planning and public ownership, there is a consensus about the introduction of market and private ownership to Cuba’s economy. This opening up of space for these new concepts is welcomed by both socialists and communists who are in the process of applying these new concepts, as well as liberals who have long advocated for them. I coin the model being implemented in Cuba “strategic socialism” because it is not about scheduling everything through planning but about emphasizing strategic issues and plan, as it is apparent in key documents including also occurrences of the term “strategic” (Bases del Plan, 2017).

After this introduction, I will focus on my own interpretation in terms of the continuity and actualization of Cuba’s economic model, mainly from the perspective of economic and political philosophy and its interdisciplinary contexts. First, I will discuss Cuba’s prior socialist model and the problems it ran into, especially after the break in international cooperation with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the early 1990s. Second, I will analyse the consolidation and actualization of Cuba’s model, that is, the revitalization of Cuba’s economy in the first decade of the 21st century and the gradual process of actualizing Cuba’s model beginning around 2007. Third, I will frame this development via the codification of the changes made and those that are planned by the means of the new constitution. Forth, comparatively, I will discuss a model of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Finally, I will focus on an interpretation of international cooperation both in Latin America, especially in the framework of the two pink tides, and with other partners in the global environment. This will make it possible to understand the specific model of strategic socialism with Cuban characteristics. Since this theme is polarized ideologically, which usually prevents serious research analysis, I will focus on the substantive aspects of my topic of economic updating. In this article, I will not focus on a political system in Cuba.

1 Continuity and Transformation: The Classic and Special Periods

Cuba is a relatively small country with only eleven million citizens, but it plays a prominent role in international and global politics. The existence of a socialist system ninety miles off the coast of a major global power has brought not only confrontation but also resistance. This has allowed Cuba to maintain, until recently, essentially the same political-economic model that it introduced not long after its 1959 revolution (Gott, 2005; Hugh, 1971). It remains to be seen whether, in the near and more distant future, it will still retain the same system with only minor changes or undergo a more fundamental update.

The transformation of Cuba’s system is not some new element. From the very beginning of the new system in 1959, there has been a gradual crystallization and transformation (Ferrer, 2022; Martinez, 1990). Since the main revolutionaries sought primarily to remove the authoritarian Batista government, which was merely a proxy for the US government, the motives of the Cuban Revolution were, first and foremost, national liberationist. It also allowed to overcoming problems of colonialism and post-colonialism (Galeano, 1997). Then came a second period when the identification of Cuba as a socialist and communist country crystallized. The main reason for this was the unique gradual specification of the state’s orientation domestically and internationally, partly for reasons of inspiration and partly because of necessary international support for Cuba. As a small country defining itself against the influence of its near neighbour, the United States, it could not survive in the medium, let alone long term. The Soviet Union’s model was the strongest and most attractive for the new Cuban leadership to ally with and find inspiration because it focused on eliminating social inequalities and poverty and building an alternative system.

The Cuban government established a socialist system that, similar to the Soviet Union and its allies, promoted “a socialist state of workers” under the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba, according to the 1976 Constitution. Economically, it was a system of central planning that prioritized state ownership. Cuba developed this in a specific way that suited the country’s conditions, which were determined by its degree of development, the Caribbean context and its relationship with socialist and capitalist countries (Gott, 2005).

The last point meant permanent tensions in intelligence and military confrontation with the United States. Over the years, the Cuban system has gradually transformed in some aspects. One major change was its militarization during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, also described as the October Crisis (Crisis de Octubre), following the deployment of US missiles to Turkey and Soviet missiles to Cuba. Thereafter, de-escalation and normalization of the situation occurred.

The economic and political system that crystallized within a few years after the Cuban Revolution remained essentially the same for several decades until the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989–1991, although some partial changes can be identified at different stages. One important development included, above all, the well-known quality of medicine and education in Cuba, which was and is, moreover, able to send doctors and teachers to many countries in the developing world. According to Cuban statistics, GDP growth averaged 4.8 % between 1959 and 1985, with labour productivity growing at 2.9 % (Rodríguez, 1988). Income per capita grew at an average annual rate of 3.1 % between 1960 and 1985 (Zimbalist & Brundenius, 1989, tables 10.2, 10.6). Nevertheless, the Cuban economy was still that of a developing country. The problems were framed as challenges in an optimistic way: “More problems, more solutions, more socialism” (“Más problemas, más rectificación, más socialismo”) (Martinéz 1990).

Another period, the Special Period (Período Especial), came to Cuba after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc or, more precisely, mainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This marked the first serious economic change in Cuba in almost thirty years. The Soviet Union had previously provided Cuba with material aid, political patronage, military support and involvement in the Eastern Bloc’s trade chain, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON; Consejo de Ayuda Mutua Economica). Subsidies from the Soviet Union averaged $4.3 billion a year between 1986 and 1990 (Spadoni, 2004). Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economy in Cuba encountered a severe problem. Considering indicators with different data, the numbers from the Association of the Study of Cuban Economy (2009), for example, illustrate the gravity of the situation: Cuban imports decreased by 75 %, and Cuba’s GDP shrunk by 33 % in the three years prior to 1993.

While the Special Period was primarily tied to the previous period in which Cuba was part of the Eastern Bloc, it also already ushered in a new era of economic transformation in Cuba. The Special Period, however, did not offer real transformation; it was rather about adaptation and restriction in many areas, whether in production, trade and investment or the consumption of the population. It was mainly a response to the emergency situation caused by the breakdown of international cooperation.

Cuba could not easily replace the Eastern Bloc because the US embargo (bloqueo) made and still makes economic cooperation between Cuba and many countries impossible. It has now been over 60 years since John F. Kennedy made a presidential proclamation introducing an embargo on trade with Cuba in 1962. The US Toricelli Act (officially the Cuban Democracy Act) in 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act) in 1996 strengthened the trade prohibitions to subsidiaries of American companies and foreign companies. This embargo is in fact an illegal extraterritorial application of US law which has been criticized by most countries in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia. In June 2021, for example, 184 countries voted in favour of a UN resolution demanding the economic blockade’s cancellation; only the US and Israel supported the resolution (UN General Assembly, 2021). It is worth noting that before the revolution, the US was Cuba’s biggest trading partner. Cuba therefore first sought a replacement for the United States and then for the Soviet Union and COMECON. Gradually, it has found one in China and other countries. Of course, each of these trading entities has played different roles.

2 Consolidation and Actualization of Cuba’s Model

After the Special Period of the 1990s, Cuba’s era of economic consolidation began after the turn of the millennium. The stabilization was due to internal as well as external factors. The fact that Hugo Chávez became president of Venezuela in 1999, for example, allowed for a supply of oil and other goods to reach Cuba. Chávez also launched a gradual left-wing wave in Latin America that linked Cuba to other left-leaning countries. The fact that Boris Yeltsin’s chaotic neoliberal tenure as Russian president ended the same year was also a significant breakthrough, leading to the subsequent revitalization of Russian relations with Cuba, which had been damaged throughout the 1990s.

The first decade of the new century saw the empowerment of a number of developing countries, especially large ones whose economies were relevant on a global scale, allowing them to gain more autonomy in trade and political relations with other countries. China became a significant player in this context, joining the Word Trade Organization in 2001 and becoming a major world economy (Hrubec, 2020). Its cooperation with Cuba has gradually surpassed that of Russia and other countries. In addition, China has gradually become the main trading partner in South America. The considerable development of the Chinese economy has inspired the updating of various aspects, although Cuba wants to keep its unique model, which is based on the more traditional socialist character of its original.

In terms of domestic politics, the relevant economic updating of Cuba’s model began to come after the handover of leadership from Fidel Castro to Raúl (Torrez Peréz, 2020). The leadership change occurred in 2006, and Raúl Castro was subsequently elected to the leadership of the state, specifically as president of the Council of State and Ministers in 2008 and to the leadership of the Party in 2011. In 2007, the Cuban transformation began under the name of actualization of the economic and social model (actualización del modelo económico y social). This realization of updating of the socialist model would be undertaken especially in the next decade, in the 2010s (Espina & Ejecharria, 2020, 39), and it would subsequently bring about new social policies tasked with ensuring social justice in a new, more dynamic environment (Zabala & León, 2020). The broader contexts of this process was reflected by the special Dossier of Revista Cubana de Ciencias Sociales: Cuba at times of actualization, for example (González, 2015), which analyse its philosophical, civic, cultural, educational, and historical aspects.

The new Cuba’s model can be basically described as a combination of the initial and the new: (a) state planning and public ownership and (b) market and private ownership. This model may be coined strategic socialism due to its intention not to schedule all the details via planning but to emphasize strategic issues (Bases del Plan, 2017). While socialist planning (including its digital update) is intended to provide a primary strategic framework within which the market can operate, strategic ownership is similarly intended to be public ownership, with private ownership playing a secondary role. This interpretation is basically correct but, as I will explain later, this gradually taking shape system is more structured and has more components.

The changes mentioned above were established at the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 2011 and then completed at the 7th Congress in 2016. Three documents became central to the updating:

1. The Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution (Los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución, 2011),

2. The Conceptualization of the Cuban Economic and Social Model of Socialist Development (Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista, 2017) and

3. Bases of the National Plan of Economic and Social Development until 2030 (Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030, 2017).

By the end of the 2010s, changes had already taken place that prepared the ground for the next period in the decade to come (Perez, 2015). Internationally, 2018 was the beginning of a second left-wing wave in Latin America, which has since seen more and more countries elect left-wing governments. In the same year, there was a particularly significant domestic change, with Miguel Díaz-Canel becoming head of the state in 2018 and leader of the Party in 2021. It was accomplished via the establishment of a fourth fundamental document, namely the supreme legal norm, the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2019). The updated constitution completed the process of formulation and legal codification of the new model.

Looking specifically at the changes implemented, the rules for small private business have gradually been relaxed since the 1990s, albeit in a very limited way at first. However, even before the fall of the Eastern Bloc, there were already private owners in Cuba, notably small private farmers, though they did not play an important role. It was possible to build on these marginal factors later but in a different, more comprehensive way than simply expanding the existing one (Morgenstern et al., 2019).

Since the start of the updating in 2007, the number of public (state) sector employees has fallen from around four million to three—. Specifically, 1.389 million persons of the 3.067 million employees worked in the state budget sector (estatal presupuestado) and 1.678 million persons worked in the state corporate sector (estatal empresarial) (Espina Prieto & Ejevarria León, 2020, 39). On the contrary, in the private sphere and in cooperatives (socios de cooperativos), the labour force has increased.

The number of people working in the state sector has been declining since 2010 (Mesa-Lago et al., 2016). By 2018, it had fallen from 84 % to 68 %. Conversely, in the non-state sector, it had risen from just 16 %–32 % (Mesa-Lago et al., 2021, 8), as shown in Figure 1. In the non-state sector, in addition to the already-mentioned smallholder farmers who own small plots of land, three other groups of workers are now more relevant: (1) self-employed people (cuentapropistas), (2) independent farmers who work on state land (usufructuarios) and (3) those who work for the other groups of people mentioned in the non-state sector. In the period from 2000 to 2018, the number of self-employed increased from 2.9 % to 12.9 %, and the number of those working in cooperatives jumped to almost double, to 10.5 % in the last survey year, 2018 (Mesa-Lago et al., 2021, 7).

Figure 1:

% of the labour force in state and non-state sectors. The data is from Mesa-Lago (Mesa-Lago et al., 2021, 8).

Of course, these changes were not isolated, and were also influenced by the socialeconomic and political cycles in Latina America and beyond (Gomis et al., 2021). The Cuban actualization also reflects that it is applied in the framework of climate change and specifies its environmental policies accordingly (González, 2017).

3 A New Constitution

An important new document is the aforementioned 2019 constitution. Its conception was based on the idea of consultative participation, which envisaged various discussion meetings with many citizens. This topic became the subject of analyses that looked at how participatory consultations were possible in a country that does not claim to be a liberal democracy but considers itself a socialist democracy (Backer et al., 2020).

After many participatory discussions with citizens on the guidelines, the conceptualization and the 2030 plan, particular points and aspects of the proposed constitution were discussed at the group and community level in popular participatory meetings called popular consultation (consulta popular). This also made possible an internal critique (criticismo del adentro). The Project of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba (Proyecto de Constitución de la República de Cuba) was released online on several websites, including Granma, the main newspaper, and in a printed version in July 2018. Over the next four months, 133,681 meetings were organized, with the participation of 8,945,521 persons, 77.89 % of the Cuban population, from which many proposals for additions and amendments arose. Also Cuban citizens abroad had an opportunity to participate online (Backer et al., 2020, 234–235; Redacción, 2018). The constitution was approved by a referendum (plebiscite) on 24 February 2019. 90.15 % of the citizenry participated out of a total of 8,705,723 eligible voters: 6,816,169 persons (90.61 %) voted “Yes”; 706,400 persons (9.39 %) voted “No”; and 324,774 persons (4.14 %) cast invalid or blank votes. Subsequently, the constitution was approved by a vote in the Cuban National Assembly (Ginsburg, 2021, 303; Yaffe, 2020, 250–251).

The new constitution replaces the 1976 constitution, which had been modified several times, and includes a number of changes, perhaps the most relevant to our topic being the new structure and forms of ownership. Public ownership, called “socialist ownership of all the people” (socialista de todo el pueblo) which is under the administration of the state, continues as the dominant form of ownership. Then, there is also private ownership, which is playing an increasingly important role in the Cuban economy. Other forms complement those, with the entire ownership structure as follows (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2019, Título II, Artículo 22):

1. socialist of all the people;

2. cooperative;

3. of political organizations;

4. private;

5. mixed, or a combination of two forms of ownership;

6. of institutions and associated forms; and

7. personal, without means of production.

The aim is that public ownership of the first type should be ownership in a strategic sense. That is to say, it should relate to the main assets important to the socialist system. At the same time, the main intention of the present-day legal changes is to allow more small-scale private ownership. This is closely related to the increase in the types of employees who work in the non-state sphere, which I have already written about above.

It is also about redefining concepts of individual kinds of ownership. Indeed, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often have played more roles in the existing model than would be expected of enterprises (Fernández & Torres, 2020). These are mainly monetary and fiscal functions, both with respect to the domestic and foreign economies. Limiting these functions and leaving them to other institutions could allow SOEs to play their main role better.

Similarly, private ownership needs to be better understood. An important part of the transition was the introduction of foreign investment opportunity laws earlier in 1995 and 2014. However, foreign investment is not always private, although it may appear so based on superficial knowledge. Sometimes, it may be foreign state’s ownership or other forms of ownership pursuing interests other than private profit.

In the new model, the role of the market is subordinated to strategic planning and regulated so as to prioritize socialist justice interests and avoid putting market mechanisms and profit first. In this specific sense, we can speak of the market socialism model (which is an often used term in cases of other countries). In the new constitution, a sentence from Article 18 in Title II on Economic Foundations aptly describes the system as “a system of socialist economy based on ownership by all the people of the basic means of production as the principal form of property and the planned management of the economy, which takes into account, regulates and controls the market in the interests of society” (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 3). Similarly, we can speak of a mixed economy model that includes private ownership and public ownership is mentioned as primary here, as explained in the 2030 plan, “To guarantee the predominance of socialist ownership by all the people over the basic means of production with the aim of strengthening its determining role in the Cuban socio-economic system” (Bases 2017, 15, II, 2).

Nevertheless, Cuba does not intend to afford private property the same influence it has in the model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. It remains to be seen what effect the practice of the next few years will have on this concept, especially in the tourism sector. Indeed, tourism played an oversized role before the Cuban Revolution, but since the updating, it has had a different and only complementary role so that Cuba does not become a US casino once again, as the metaphor goes.

Overall, it is illuminating to write a comparison of the new constitution with the characteristics of the well-known concept of twenty-first-century socialism (Ginsburg, 2021), using Marta Harnecker’s description of this new kind of socialism (Harnecker, 2010, 2015). The defining characteristics of the two concepts, she argues, are consistent with each other.

For the economic updating of the Cuban system, it is important to mention the fact of the passing of the generation of leaders who themselves actively participated in the revolution. President Díaz-Canel is the first leader who belongs to a new generation of politicians and who focuses mainly on the organizational role in the Cuban economy and state (Pérez Villanueva, 2018). The role of leaders is newly institutionalized, with a greater division of roles. The new constitution revitalized the position of the prime minister and the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), which represents the National Assembly (La Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular) between sessions and is led by the speaker of parliament, while the president is not a member. In addition, a presidential candidate cannot be older than 60 years at the time of the first election and can only be elected twice.

4 Inspiration in China’s transformation

While the main socialist model during the Cold War was the Soviet model of socialism with central planning, today, the market socialism model has gained ground. For this reason, Cuba has now found a major new partner for cooperation in the People’s Republic of China, which itself has undergone a large updating transformation from 1978 to the present and which, especially after 2000, has started becoming a major world economy (Jabbour & Gabriele, 2021). Today, China is the second largest economy in the world, and is already the first in terms of GDP PPP. Although the Cuban government also finds limits to this model, it recognizes the positives. It sees that China has completely eliminated absolute poverty in the country, lifted 800 million people out of it over the last 40 years, and provided a large increase in the standard of living for the majority of the population. So-called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has become the model that inspires. Cuba takes inspiration here but, at the same time, retains its own unique specificities in its own model of ‘socialism with Cuban characteristics’.

To understand the basic elements of Chinese updating or modernization, it is important to understand the following arguments.^[2] The influential Chinese leader and reformist, who established the contemporary political-economic model in China, Teng Xiaoping knew that socialism in China had not yet developed to the extent that a purely socialist path could be followed. He mentioned that economic development needed to be completed in various spheres that had not previously been developed in China. Only then would it be possible to pursue a more socialist path. The transformation of various economic elements has been therefore part of that transitional era. In this respect, he was following Marx, who said that the previous system had to be fully developed first before it was possible to move on to the next, more elaborate system, otherwise evolution would return to the previous system (Marx, 1980). In China, on that basis, it was first necessary to complete the missing previous elements by means of a specific method (Tong, 2006). Teng Xiaoping’s theory included this principle: “We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics … that is the basic conclusion we have reached after reviewing our long historical experience” (Deng, 1984, 3). The Chinese model is not an attempt at ahistorical theory without development. It is a historical theory being developed from historical and current feasible opportunities for development geared towards the future (Wei, 2010).

From the point of view of the economic philosophy, the China’s transformation itself primarily comprised elements: the ownership and allocation of resources. First, state planning (and by extension planning at lower levels of the administration as well) was complemented by the market. Secondly, public ownership, especially state ownership, was complemented by private ownership.

As for the combination of private and public ownership, as Marx said, it is necessary to accept the temporary civilising tendencies of capital (which does not mean necessary capitalism) (Tong, 2006): “The simple concept of capital has to contain its civilising tendencies etc. in themselves; they must not, as in the economics books until now, appear merely as external consequences. Likewise, the contradictions which are later released, demonstrated as already latent within it.” (Marx, 1973). The release of capital, including private ownership, has a progressive tendency, but within it there are also limits, which are slowly manifested by contradictions and require state regulation. Later, these schisms will have to be overcome by a further stage of development.

As for the introduction of the market, Teng Xioping justified this by saying that socialism was not at odds with the market: “Planning and market forces are not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic activity.” (Deng, 1993, 373).

As for a terminological connection between the market and socialism in China, the term socialist market economy was coined in 1992. It was an approval of the fact that it was successfully step by step established by the reforms.

The core logic behind the Chinese reform and opening up of last 40 years was that international trade was not taking place between two countries employing the same system. The Western countries, on the one hand, and China, on the other, had different political and economic models. There are several main reasons underpinning the successful transformation of China’s economic system. As David Daokui Li from Tsinghua University stresses, the fact that the Chinese government had to manage in an active way the economy has been considered a relevant factor for a rapid economic development (Li et al., 2018). The socialist China had two salient features. First, as it was making significant investments in companies thanks to the rules of banks, it was reporting the large capital returns of a country. Unlike many other countries where profit was accumulated and then often inefficiently spent, China also ploughed profits into social development.

Secondly, the Chinese economy’s transformation was linked to a “big-country effect”. Scope of economy is one of determining factors. China’s model changed a small, cheap production and trading partner into a major force, following Hegel’s developmental idea of the dialectics of master and labourer via learning through the history. A complex process of practical learning through opening up is more important here than individual aspects of reform, i.e. more than comparative advantage in relation to the West and dependence on foreign capital and technologies (Li et al., 2018). The Chinese meritocratic recognition of education and work plays a role here.

China was and still is, to a large extent, important to Western countries because it provides them with cheap mass production. A small country like Cuba cannot play this role. But it can follow selected domestic aspects of the Chinese model as partial inspiration and develop it in its own way when Cuba is part of a larger international and transnational network of closely cooperating countries. Just as Vietnam has learned from China by undergoing its own doi moi transformation and established its own economic model in recent decades. The historical models of socialism in Yugoslavia, Tanzania, Ghana, Libya, and so on are also the subject of analyses of these developments.

5 International Cooperation

The specific concept of international cooperation has a long tradition in Cuba which includes liberation movements, economic trade, solidarity international aid and cooperation, and diplomacy, following José Martí and others (Granés, 2022; Huish & Blue, 2013; Mahler, 2018). At the moment, the important cooperation for Cuba is one with countries that are also contained under US sanctions and tariffs like Cuba, for example, China and Iran, in the context of the fragmentation and redefinition of the international order (Patiño Villa, 2017). Cuba is, of course, cooperating intensively with neighbouring Latin American and the Caribbean countries that have embarked on the pink tide, especially Venezuela, and also Nicaragua and other countries (Gold & Zagato, 2020). While Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia were the key countries in the first left tide in Latin America (1999–2016), after an interim period, Brazil, Colombia and perhaps Cuba seem to be the biggest leaders in the second wave so far (from 2018 on).

Hugo Chávez launched a revolutionary Bolivarian project building on the Latin American historical efforts of Zamora, Bolívar and Rodríguez in the nineteenth century. The international cooperation that followed these efforts resulted in the regional organization, ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America; Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América), which seeks left-wing cooperation and the integration of Latin America. In addition to Cuba and Venezuela, its members include Nicaragua, Ecuador and other smaller countries in the Caribbean. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, during his earlier presidency, and former President Dilma Rousseff have also cooperated with Cuba, as did former Bolivian President Evo Morález and other statespersons. In addition to ALBA, other regional organizations, such as CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States; Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños) or Mercosur (Southern Common Market; Mercado de Sur), are also important to Latin America and could play a relevant role in a second left tide.

This new tide in Latin America is also already seeking wider cooperation in the world. The BRICS organisation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is now open to forming BRICS+, that is expanding it to include other countries. Some nations are in the process of joining, while others are effectively becoming observer countries. Cuba has always had ambitions to play a global role, especially in cooperation with socialist countries but also with other developing countries around the world in order to overcome challenges of global capitalism.

As of early 2023, Cuba leads the group of developing countries, the G-77 plus China (Redacción, 2023; The Group of 77, 2020). This group has grown from its original number of 77 countries in 1964 to today’s 134 developing countries from Latin America, Africa and Asia. While the group promotes its economic and development interests at the United Nations, the Cuban leadership of the group is also strengthening other social aspects of this cooperation. Although Cuba is a developing country, it has long and intensively assisted other developing countries, particularly in the areas of education and health (including the Covid-19 vaccines). The Cuban-led group of nearly two-thirds of the world’s countries in the G-77 plus China, together with the new left tide in Latin America, are seeking to create new social tendencies and cooperation in the world as an alternative to any asocial hegemony.

6 Conclusions

In terms of economic and political philosophy and its interdisciplinary contexts, I have analysed in this text a model of strategic socialism with Cuban characteristics. This unique model was developed in specific Cuban conditions. Historically, it has evolved from an earlier model that has recently been updated. This update implements a combination of planning and market, on the one hand, and a combination of public and private ownership on the other. It is strategic socialism because it does not seek full state planning of all aspects of the economy but a strategic regulated schedule within which market activities can take place.

In order to understand the current model and its future directions, it is necessary to understand the historical origins of the Cuban socialist model and its evolution, including the problems it faced mainly after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and COMECON in the early 1990s. It includes the theme of continuity with the classical period, from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, and then the theme of discontinuity forced by the partial change in the 1990s’ Special Period. On this basis, it was possible to analyse the consolidation of Cuba’s economy in the first decade of the 21st century and, then, the subsequent actualization since 2007, after Raúl Castro’s ascension to the leadership of the country, including its fuller realization in the 2010s with the full codification of the model in the new constitution, established after Miguel Díaz-Canel’s ascension to the leadership. It is also important to understand the international and global context of this update. The updated Cuba’s model has developed in relation to this space as well as developments in Latin America, especially the two pink tides. Both Cuban domestic contexts and the Latin American and global contexts are necessary conditions for understanding the philosophy of Cuba’s actualization linked to the strategic socialism model and its future tendencies. We will see what this model will bring about.