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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter 2022

Franz Brentano on the Errors of Mach’s Positivism: Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic

From the book Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill

  • Robin D. Rollinger
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110734645-014

Abstract

As Brentano was very much concerned with criticizing positivism, he was compelled to pay particular attention to its most updated versions. The works of Ernst Mach were of special interest to him in this respect, for he regarded Mach’s philosophy as positivism in its most advanced form. His criticism of this version of positivism is moreover of great interest to us because Mach is an important link to the logical positivism that came to thrive in Vienna. In lectures, Brentano had argued against Mach’s allegedly anti-metaphysical doctrine of elements, the heart of his positivism, but after his retirement he wrote an extensive critique of Mach’s Erkenntnis und Irrtum (1905), which is the mature statement of the Machian orientation in philosophy. This contribution is an elaboration of Brentano’s critique in three different areas, namely, psychology, metaphysics, and logic.

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
From the book
Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill
Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill

Chapters in this book (30)

Frontmatter
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Comte, Mill, and Brentano on the Intellectual Status of Philosophy and Its Relationship to History
Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of “Inner Observation” and the Constitution of the “Systematic View of the Soul”
Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte: The Theory of Stages and the Psychology
Comte and Brentano: Elements for a Theory of Decline
Can We Have Scientific Knowledge About God? Brentano on Comte’s Metaphysical Skepticism
Intentionality and the Classification of Phenomena and Sciences in Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive and in Brentano’s Empirical Psychology
Brentano’s View about Natural Science and Methodological Phenomenalism. A Comparison with John Stuart Mill’s Approach
The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano
Franz Brentano’s Multifaceted View of Induction in Empirical and Genetic Psychology
Hume’s “Bundle of Perceptions” and the “Problem of the I” in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
Brentano’s Mathematical Foundation of Science
Franz Brentano on the Errors of Mach’s Positivism: Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic
On the Brentanian Legacy in Twardowski’s Views on Psychology
Descriptive and Intentional Contents. Considerations on Husserl’s Logical Investigations from Brentano’s Empirical Point of View
Brentano’s Four Phases and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy in the Light of His Relation to His Students
Brentano in Exile: The Brentano Institute at Oxford
Appendix: The Idea of Philosophy as Science in Brentano
Habilitation Theses 1866
Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy 1869
Introduction to the Concept of the History of Philosophy
On the Law of Historical Development
Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
On the Reasons for a Loss of Confidence in the Area of Philosophy
On Schelling’s Philosophy
On the Future of Philosophy
My Parting Wishes for Austria 1894
Index
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