CONSTANTINE THE PHILOSOPHER UNIVERSITY IN NITRA FACULTY OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICA 14 RENDERING CHANGE IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY ANDREA JAVORSKÁ – KLEMENT MITTERPACH – RICHARD SŤAHEL (eds.) CONSTANTINE THE PHILOSOPHER UNIVERSITY IN NITRA FACULTY OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICA 14 Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society ANDREA JAVORSKÁ – KLEMENT MITTERPACH – R)C(ARD SŤA(EL (eds.) NITRA 2014 Editors: Reviewers: Mgr. Andrea Javorská, PhD. Mgr. Klement Mitterpach, PhD. Mgr. Richard Sťahel, PhD. Doc. PhDr. Vladimír Manda, CSc. Doc. PhDr. Jozef Lysý, CSc. Executive editor: Andrea Javorská Typesetting: Richard Sťahel Cover design: Matej Smorada Copyright © Ľubomír Dunaj, Tomáš Hauer, Ladislav Hohoš, Marek Hrubec, Andrea Javorská, Klement Mitterpach, Jozef Sivák, Richard Sťahel, Publisher: Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra (Slovakia) Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy ISBN EAN - - - - CONTENTS Editorsʼ Word …........................................................................................................5 Ľubomír Dunaj: To Deficits of Democratic Thinking in Slovakia ….....................................7 Tomáš Hauer: On the Relationship of Technical )mages with Their Outside The Comments on Vilém Flusser’s Philosophy of )mage .................21 Ladislav Hohos: A New Civilization Paradigm: Transformation as an Alternative to Revolution …………………............35 Marek Hrubec: )nterstate Recognition and )ts Global Overcoming ...............................51 Andrea Javorská: (istoricality of Dasein by Martin (eidegger .............................................83 Klement Mitterpach: Changing the Concepts of the Debate. Žižek (elping (eidegger Fail Better ............................................................95 Jozef Sivák: The Citizen by (usserl and the Postmodern Citizenship .................123 Richard Sťahel: Reciprocal Conditionality of Economical and Environmental Crises Tendencies of Global )ndustrial Civilization ……......................143 References ...........................................................................................................167 Index ......................................................................................................................183 About authors ....................................................................................................187 Dear readersĽ the currentĽ up to this day 14thĽ issue of Philosophica represents the second English contribution of The Department of Philosophy ĚConstantine the Philosopher University in Nitraě to the philosophy which focuses on contemporary issues and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of their representation as well as those theoretical tools which help us interpret the ways the phenomena to be discussed are discoursively presented both inside and outside academia. Philosophy has generally more or less explicitly analysed such connectionsĽ orĽ at leastĽ responded to the need to render them visible. HoweverĽ in our daysĽ most of all marked by excessive ignorance as well as interest in changes of all kindsĽ it is philosophy that perhaps selfdeclaringly pursues not only theoretically strict inquiryĽ but most importantlyĽ a study which displays the inscription of the changes on its own body and thus renders the social change in respect to one of its specialĽ though exemplary cases Ŕ on philosophy itself as the possibility not only to reflect on the society in changeĽ but also to reflect on the conceptual and thematic tendencies in rendering the change in contrast to those misperceived or excluded onesĽ andĽ last but not leastĽ as the opportunity to render its own conceptual delusions which represent a background of our common reductive schemata of change we unconsciously tend to share. The preoccupation by change today is specificĽ for it has become an issue of emergency primarily on the level of societyĽ and secondlyĽ because no matter how complexĽ it is evidentĽ that regardless of its marginalizationĽ philosophical analysis has become indispensable in formulating reasons and ways of differentiating the ways we perceiveĽ relate to or engage ourselves in the changing reality or its simulacra. Each of the contributions by authorsĽ most of whom are resident in other institutionsĽ demonstrates not only different aspects of the change in society and philosophyĽ but also focuses on different aspect of change as well as represents various philosophical affiliationsĽ although they could be outlined by Critical theory and its followers or phenomenology or phenomenologically inspired inquiries. The neglect of social-philosophical topics is viewed as resulting in Honnethian social pathologyĽ by ubomír DunajĽ who identifies it as the cause of deterioration of democratic institutionsĽ as the type of 5 pathological change exemplified among others also by Slovakia. Tomáš Hauer introduces Flusser‟s cognitive metaphor of technical imagesĽ which shows how society renders itself in its products and the practice which is no longer narrative and historical andĽ thereforeĽ after the age of textsĽ forms a new social culture. Ladislav Hohoš focuses on globalization and its effect on civilizational transformationĽ whichĽ though unavoidableĽ might occur in a way of “silent” transformations the capitalism is going through. Marek Hrubec analyses Honneth‟s concept of interstate recognition to show its limits in condition of globalization and testifies them on the idea of global state. Andrea Javorská moves within Heideggerian discourse to show one paradigmatic case of the shift between our commonsensical ideas of historical time and time which emerges as an ontological foundational structure of the articulation of change. Klement MitterpachĽ howeverĽ points to Heideggerian idea of understandingĽ whichĽ following Ţiţek‟s idea of the contemporary philosophyĽ one must learn to make effectively fail in order to change the concepts of the debate upon contemporary social philosophical issues. Jozef Sivák addresses the problem of citizenship in postmodernĽ globalized worldĽ and proposes to recapture its meaning by following Husserl‟s idea of overcoming stateĽ althoughĽ unlike in the violent manner of globalizationĽ by advancing towards humanity in the process of enculturation. Richard S ahelĽ following HabermasĽ reminds us that the antagonism of imperatives of growth and sustainability outlines the multilevel crisis which culminates in the environmental barrier that threatens all the institutional and cultural support of civilization. All these in a way indicate phenomena which can be neither eluded nor avoided once we decide to figure out connection of society and philosophy today. We believe that the ideas promotedĽ analysed and applied by the authors render the urgency of philosophical articulation of contemporary issues even more significant and significance of the phenomena constitutive of the vital society even more distinct. Editors 6 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 TO DEF)C)TS OF DEMOCRAT)C T()NK)NG )N SLOVAK)A Ľubomír Dunaj This paper focuses on three topics. First, it describes Axel Honneth‟s version of social theory, accepts his distinction between social and political philosophy and discusses concerns about the term social pathology. The main conclusion of the paper will be to claim, on the basis of Honneth‟s theory, that social pathological phenomena are capable of destroying a society‟s democratic institutions. Secondly, the critical theory of society will be defended as an adequate way of thinking about present western societies, because it can solve the antagonism between liberalism and communitarianism, and integrates the concepts of community („Gemeinschaft‟) and the concept of public reason („Vernunft‟) in a unified theory. Finally, this theory will be applied to expose deficits of the Slovakian democratic transformation after November 1989, which can be in many cases understood as pathological. Key words: social philosophy – social pathology – democracy – Slovakia – transformations November 2014 will mark the 25th anniversary of the Velvet or Gentle RevolutionĽ which is the description for the non-violent transition of power in Czechoslovakia in 1řŘř. This period of twenty five yearsĽ which is a period of an entire generationĽ is long enough in order to reflect upon whether the expectations of the peopleĽ which wanted to transform the Czech and Slovak society at the end of the year 1řŘřĽ have been fulfilled. The attention in this paper will not be focused on detailed analyses of the concrete historical or economical factsĽ but rather will point out some deficits of democratic thinking in Slovakia from the perspective of current research in social and political philosophy. 7 Ľubomír Dunaj Social versus political philosophy? Axel HonnethĽ one of the most important contemporary social theorists suggests a non-conventional interpretation of social philosophy. Because he makes a clear distinction between social and political philosophyĽ thereby understanding them as autonomous disciplinesĽ he departs from the Anglo-Saxon traditionĽ which understands social philosophy only as a subdiscipline of political philosophy ĚHonneth 2007Ľ 3-4ě. According to the definition of the traditional and the current tasks of social philosophy based on the notionĽ its tasks aim at the assessment and the explanation of such trends in the social processesĽ which “can be viewed as misdevelopments ĚFehlentwicklungeněĽ disorders or „social pathologies‟” ĚHonneth 2007Ľ 4ě. The neglect of social-philosophical topics in public discourse can generate harm or even fail to establish such qualities of individualsĽ which support their abilities to master different vital challenges and demands. Many of them then suffer from various pathological phenomena such as consumerism, commercialism, reification or alienation. Such phenomena subsequently also undermine the ability of individuals to adequately participate in public lifeĽ and thereby contribute to the reproduction of democratic institutions. On the one handĽ it disturbs the establishing of the individual as an autonomous entity. On the other hand it blocks the integration of individuals into the society Ŕ very often for instance because of an inadequate understanding of their rights. As a resultĽ the adoption of norms and expectations becomes insecureĽ which requires a democratic relation between the state and its citizens. From this approximation to classical political theory it is becoming clearĽ that the strict distinction between social and political philosophy for considerations about democracy has largely just a “working” character. If we consider the key concepts of the single disciplineĽ i.e. justice Ěpolitical philosophyě and good life Ěsocial philosophyěĽ it is not difficult to show that the necessary conditions for their implementation overlap in many spheres of social life. It means that after the overstepping of a certain degree of pathological phenomena in societyĽ the frameworks considered by political philosophy are also destroyed. The reason isĽ that there are too few citizensĽ capable of preserving a successful democracy. By contrastĽ the right to fulfil various individual aims and the generous ideal of Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 freedom is emptyĽ when it is defined only as a negative one ĚI. Berlině. It is often overlooked that in society there are many institutional or “structural” obstaclesĽ which make self-realization impossible. SoĽ for a well-functioning democracy both social and political theory and their mutual interactions are importantĽ but we must not neglect topics of social philosophy. For the society of the Slovak republic it has a special importanceĽ because we are very often confronted with a “catastrophical” assessments of democracy in Slovakia. In factĽ this kind of political regime demonstrates a high degree of stability and legitimacyĽ despite noticeable inequality and various deficits by state administration and jurisdiction. Considering what belongs to the main issues of Slovakian public discourseĽ it is the fact that there are too many critical citizens and even some influential thinkers who present almost “pathological” critique Ěin contrast to constructive critiqueě. This tendency very often either leads to a pessimistic “writing-off” of our democracyĽ or to a utopian transfiguration of the overall structure of societyĽ insteadĽ for exampleĽ of observing and considering existing legislation and cultivating a “democratic morality Ěor democratic Sittlichkeitě”. Honneth s interpretation of critical theory of society and his theory of recognition offer in my opinion the possibility for adequate grasping the character of social processes andĽ thereforeĽ provide guidance for the successful implementation of requisite social changes Critical theory as social philosophy By explaining the tradition and actualisation of social philosophyĽ Axel Honneth statesĽ that Thomas Hobbes was as the first in the middle of the 17th centuryĽ who used the notion of “social philosophy”Ľ when he “sought the legal conditions under which the absolutist state could gain the stability and authority necessary for pacifying religious wars” ĚHonneth 2007Ľ 5ě. As Honneth further explainsĽ this notion was notĽ in a strict senseĽ put into practice until a century later by Jean-Jacques RousseauĽ whoĽ in contrast to HobbesĽ was “less interested in the conditions under which civil society could be preserved than he was in the causes leading to its degeneration”Ľ because “in the hundred years that transpired ř Ľubomír Dunaj between these two worksĽ the process of capitalist modernization had made so much progress that a sphere of private autonomy was able to emerge in the shadow of the absolutist state” ĚHonneth 2007Ľ 5ě. In the nascent bourgeois public sphere Rousseau could study those kind of actionsĽ which later free up the space forĽ on the one handĽ democratic institutions andĽ on the other handĽ for capitalist commodity exchange. This in turn gave rise to a form of social life that would have been unrecognizable to Hobbes. Under the increasing pressure of economic and social competitionĽ practices and orientations arose that came to be founded increasingly upon deceptionĽ dissembling and jealousy”. Rousseau focused his attention on this form of lifeĽ and he was interested in “whether this form of life still retained the practical conditions under which humans could lead a good and well-lived life”. Thus he disclosed the matter of social philosophyĽ whichĽ unlike political philosophyĽ is no longer a search for the conditions of a correct or just social orderĽ “but instead would attempt to ascertain the limitations that this new form of life imposed on humans‟ self-realization” ĚAll quotations in this paragraph: Honneth 2007Ľ 5ě. Such definition of the subject of social philosophy contributed to Honneth‟s new interpretation of the legacy of critical theory. The description of social pathologies of reason plays the most important roleĽ since “not only the members of the inner circle but also those on the periphery of the Institute for Social Research perceive the societal situation on which they want to have an effect as being in a state of social negativity. MoreoverĽ there is a widespread agreement that the concept of negativity should not be restricted in a narrow way to offences committed against principles of social justice butĽ ratherĽ should be extended more broadly to violations of the conditions for a good or successful life” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 22ě. The thinking about this issue ties into Hegel‟s philosophyĽ and accepts the explanationĽ that the genesis of social pathologies should be understood as a result of a lack of social rationality ĚHonneth 200řĽ 24ě.1 Honneth deals with this interpretation further and states: “When this view is detached from the particular context in which it is embedded in HegelĽ “Hegel was convinced that social pathologies were to be understood as the result of the inability of society to properly express the rational potential already inherent in its institutionsĽ practisesĽ and everyday routines” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 23ě. 1 10 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 it amounts to the general thesisĽ that each successful form of society is possible only through the maintenance of its most highly developed standard of rationality”. And this connection is according to Hegel “justified on the basis of the ethical premise that it is only each instance of the rational universal that can provide the members of society with the orientation according to which they can meaningfully direct their lives” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 24ě. Why Critical Theory of Society? It is not controversial that “prevalent today is a liberal conception of justice that uses criteria for the normative identification of social injustice without the desire to further explicate the institutional framework of injustice by embedding it within a particular type of society” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 20ě. We can say that in confrontation with the two main conceptions of contemporary social and political philosophyĽ i.e. beside liberalism and communitarianism critical theory of society is exactly this kind of school of thought Ěespecially when it intersects some elements of Dewey‟s pragmatisměĽ which is able to offer a way of diagnosing and subsequently eliminating social pathologies. The Hegelian idea of the rationality of cooperative self-actualisation,2 which all members of critical theory share and which is critical to liberalism and communitarianismĽ is significant for a critical theory of society. All concepts of a rational practiceĽ which are applied by critical theoryĽ are suitable for the procedureĽ whose achievement demands a higher degree of the intersubjective agreement than is acceptable for liberalism: “to be able to cooperate on an equal basisĽ to interact aestheticallyĽ and to reach agreements in a noncoerced mannerĽ a shared conviction is required that each of these activities is of an importance that justifiesĽ if necessaryĽ the neglect of individual interests” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 27ě. By creating the “rational universal” the tradition of critical theory fills the important place of the conception of public sphere, which was inspired For better understanding of Honneth‟s interpretation of rationality see ĚDeranty 200řĽ 206ě. 2 11 Ľubomír Dunaj above all by Jürgen Habermas.3 Nancy FraserĽ another important current exponent of this school of thought provides two different understandings of the concept of public sphere: 1. “The civic republican model stresses a view of politics as people reasoning together to promote a common good that transcends the mere sum of individual preferences” ĚFraser 1řř7Ľ Ř6ě. 2. “In contrastĽ the liberal-individualist model stresses a view of politics as the aggregation of self-interestedĽ individual preferences” ĚFraser 1řř7Ľ ř7ě. Nancy Fraser emphasises that political discourse in the latter notion of public sphere “consists in registering of individual preferences and in bargainingĽ looking for formulas that satisfy as many private interests as possible. It is assumed that there is no such thing as the common good over and above the sum of all various individual goodsĽ and so private interests are the legitimate stuff of political discourse” ĚFraser 1řř7Ľ ř7 Ŕ řŘě. This means thatĽ for example ecologyĽ generally available health careĽ public school systemĽ long term sustainable consumptionĽ care for public open spaces etc.Ľ are not important but rather only private preferences. Here it is possible to see Marx‟s influence namelyĽ that we have to distinguish between “self-regard Ěowně interests” and “selfish interests” and it is important to emphasise Marx‟s claim that the rights of people should not be understood as the rights of the egoistic individual ĚChan 1řřřĽ 220ě. So we are approaching the identification of the one of the main pathologies of Slovak history after November 1řŘřĽ but we have to mentionĽ that this kind of pathology is typical for many western countries too. It is the pathology of Legal Freedom ĚA. HonnethěĽ which implies juridification ĚVerrechtlichungě in almost all areas of life. In our concrete realityĽ it means that many thingsĽ which were once regulated by informal human activityĽ must now be regulated „in a formal way“.4 See ĚHabermas 1řř1ě. Milan Kundera clearly grasped this fact in the novel ImmortalityĽ where he criticises unreasonable and unlimited view on human rights. He points outĽ that as a result of 3 4 12 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 This statement does not mean an utter questioning of law as a key regulator of social life in modern societies. MoreoverĽ if we would analyse this problematic from a global perspective Ěnot just from Western or more concrete Slovakian perspectiveěĽ it is clear that human rights standards must be improved in many parts of world. At the end of this paperĽ I will emphasize this point by way of a small illustration. My critique is oriented principally towards Slovakian affairsĽ in which we are confrontedĽ after 25 years of very turbulent transformationĽ with violations of the moral dimension of life. Of courseĽ in many ways we have copied the affairs of others Western societies.5 But some of them have been able to deal better with this difficulty than othersĽ and it seems plausible that these kinds of societiesĽ which have been able to create a high level of democratic Sittlichkeit are much less susceptible to economic problems. At the end of this part of the paperĽ I would like to provide the distinction between critical theory and communitarism. According to Honneth “no critical theorist has ever abandoned the Hegelian idea that cooperative practiceĽ along with the values attendant to itĽ must possess a rational character” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 2Řě. A transition to liberating practises of cooperation should not result from an affective bondĽ or from a feeling of affiliation or approvalĽ but from rational perspective. SoĽ “the tradition of Critical Theory thus differs from both liberalism and communitarianism by virtue of a particular kind of ethical perfectionism. To be sureĽ unlike the liberal traditionĽ Critical Theory holds that the normative aim of society should consist in reciprocally making self-actualization possible. At the same timeĽ it understands its recommendation of this aim to be the well-grounded result of a certain analysis of the human process of increasing popularity of human rightsĽ they have lost all contentĽ and now it has become a common attitudeĽ everyone towards everything: “…people in the West are not threatened by concentration camps and are free to say and write what they wantĽ the more the fight for human rights gains in popularity the more it loses any concrete contentĽ becoming a kind of universal stance of everyone towards everythingĽ a kind of energy that turns all human desires into rights. The world has become man‟s right and everything in it has become a right: the desire for love the right to loveĽ the desire for rest the right to restĽ the desire for friendship the right to friendship the desire to exceed the speed limit the right to exceed the speed limitĽ the desire for happiness the right to happinessĽ the desire to publish a book the right to publish a bookĽ the desire to shout in the street in the middle of the night the right to shout in the street” ĚKundera 1řř1Ľ 153ě. 5 Cp. ĚTaylor 1ř7Řě. 13 Ľubomír Dunaj development” ĚHonneth 200řĽ 2Řě.6 Developments in the last decades In the book Freedom‟s Right: The Social Foundation of Democratic Life Axel Honneth proposes his own interpretation of social pathology. According to Honneth we can speak about social pathologyĽ when we are confronted with a development in societyĽ which leads to undermining of rational abilities of members of society to participate in determining and deciding upon forms of social cooperation: “Unlike social injusticeĽ which consists in an unnecessary exclusion from or restriction on opportunities to participate in social processes of cooperationĽ social pathologies are found at a higher stage of social reproduction and impact subjects‟ reflexive access to primary systems of actions and norms” ĚHonneth 2013Ľ Ř6ě. We can speak of „social pathologies‟ if some or all members of societyĽ in pursuance of social reasonsĽ are no longer able to adequately understand the meaning of these practice and standards. I consider as a one of the characteristic features of the situation in Slovakia after November 1řŘř the fact that a big part of the population is not able to identify itself with the existing political systemĽ although its standards embody many ideals of European modernityĽ ideals that have been the object of struggle for many centuries. Many people in Slovakia are not able to understand the democratic political system and so they are not able to positively contribute to democratic processes and institutions. This could leadĽ even in the short-termĽ to dramatic consequencesĽ like social tremors and turbulences. In this senseĽ I consider the resignation of a large part of the inhabitants of Slovakia to bring into effect the legal standardsĽ which have been already codified in our constitutionĽ pathological. There are many reasons for this and I will attempt to outline some of them. The first reason has to do with “exaggerated” expectationsĽ which people had in the year 1řŘř. The Western liberal-capitalistic societies repreAt this point we can find some similar features between critical theory and ConfucianismĽ although in ConfucianismĽ especially in its classical formĽ is the gregarious character stronger. Confucianism can be classified as another school of thought of contemporary social philosophy. Compare for instance cp. ĚBai 2012ě and ĚBell 200Řě. 6 14 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 sented for most Slovaks the examples of perfect societiesĽ although the historical truth is that many of them have and still struggle with many socialĽ politicalĽ and economic problems. EspeciallyĽ if observed after the economic crises from 200ŘĽ which showed how fragile the capitalist economic system is. From our current perspectiveĽ we can say that this “fascination” by the West was above all connected to expectations of the kind of surplus of consumption enjoyed in the West. After certain “disillusionment” in recent yearsĽ it has become clear for many todayĽ that such a final condition of historyĽ where all is perfectly “good” and “ideal” does not exist. MoreoverĽ various deficiencies can be found in the most developed societiesĽ which are related to many factorsĽ for instance the Breivik‟s massacre in Norway. As a resultĽ I believe that for Slovak societyĽ it is necessary to overcome this deficient “black or white” worldviewĽ i.e. capitalism good vs. socialism bad Ěor the reverseě and soberly admit that human society is too complexĽ that on the one handĽ there will be still “something to do”Ľ and on the other handĽ the shortcuts and “all-embracing” solutionsĽ like the installation of the flat tax in 2004Ľ can do society more harm than good. The second reason probably has to do with an over-reliance upon the law and the convictionĽ that it would be possible to regulate all social interactions by legal means. It seems plausible to claim that many people in Slovakia accepted such positionĽ as it were the real “end of history” Ěin teleological senseě and that legal normative principles based on our socialliberal constitution by themselves Ěan sichě guarantee a just society without our personal contributionĽ engagementĽ virtues etc. Of courseĽ the opposite is true. This fact pushes us to claim a banalityĽ viz. that the concrete quality of any society or political system rises and falls on the “quality” of its people in the widest sense and especially in a democratic one. The final factor of pathological resignationĽ which I would like to mentionĽ is the experience with the establishment of new elites in the 1řř0‟sĽ which brought with it a lack of transparency and justification.7 The great story of these processes is Peter Pištánek„s novel Rivers of Babylon ĚPiš ánek 2007ě. Many of these processes were of course very similar also in other countries in 7 15 Ľubomír Dunaj IndeedĽ the privatization of national and public propertyĽ goods and resourcesĽ practices of mafiaĽ intimidationĽ and still today the flowering corruptionĽ an insufficient enforcement of lawĽ etc. have been inscribed deep into the social memory of Slovaks. Unfortunately my personal experience confirms the huge resignation to overcoming these negative aspects of our society. My job as a teacher at grammar school or at university brought me to the sad realization that many young people in SlovakiaĽ which maybe should be full of “progressive ideals”Ľ no longer care for public affairs. They are “normalised”8 very quickly and instrumentalise their behaviour very early Ŕ especially with respect to their future possibilities of consumption. Many of them do not believe in democratic institutionsĽ do not believeĽ that these institutions work as it is described in the school books of civics and historical scienceĽ which deal with the standard theory of representative democracy and socially oriented market economyĽ as well as the historical reconstruction of our path to democracy. It is really difficult to persuade people in Slovakia to the contraryĽ because in factĽ many institutions do not work adequately. HoweverĽ the pathological dimension of this situation is that instead of the vehemently demanding to fulfil our constitutional guaranteesĽ not only civil and political rightsĽ but also social rights Ŕ the majority of populationĽ as well as in the time of normalisationĽ secludes itself in “private spaces”. Instead of making the effort to lead their lives in a transparent wayĽ many people look for their own “path” to ensure their needs. Much more dangerous than various forms of corruption is another fact: a tendency toward extremism Ŕ right or left oriented Ŕ for those citizensĽ which are not able to find some “path” for saturating their needs. In my opinionĽ it is not important to analyse theoretically the right-wing extremism in detailĽ because it is very easy to disqualify every kind of extremism by arguments.9 Central and East Europa after 1řŘř. 8 In the history of CzechoslovakiaĽ normalization is the name commonly given to the period 1ř6řŔŘ7Ľ which was by sequel established after the military intervention of Warsaw Pact armies in august 1ř6Ř. This period is generally knownĽ as the “time of opportunism”. 9 But we should not underestimate itĽ all the more Ŕ because of the persistence of economic crises and with it a related increase of nationalistic or even fascist movements and parties Ělike JOBBIK in Hungaryě. 16 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 More complicated are theoretical solutions for left-wing oriented extremism. It is important to sayĽ that a simplistic critique of capitalism ĚJaeggi 2013ěĽ without sufficient heed to the complexity of economic processes as well as other social processes can have a negative impact on the claim to contribute to human emancipation and freedom. Conclusion A headline of a German newspaper points out that on the 1ř. November 10 2013 an enormous sanitarian catastrophe: 2.5 billion of people in the world do not have any access to toilets. It has a dramatic impact on their health as well as on the environment. The harmfulness of terrible sanitarian conditions is possible to quantify. Alexander KöcherĽ the author of the article Toiletten sind ein Menschenrecht ĚToilets belong to human rightsě mentionsĽ that according to data by World Health Organization ĚWHOě one gram of faeces comprises 10 million of virusesĽ 1 million of bacteriaĽ 1000 of parasites and hundreds of worm eggs. The most frequent consequences of that are diarrheal diseasesĽ from which 1Ľ 4 million of children under 5 years die every year Ŕ more than by malariaĽ measles and HIV/Aids together. Although diarrhea is not always fatalĽ it causes many other problems. Körcher points out some examples. Because of it children miss 400 million school daysĽ which meansĽ that the chances of education and ways out of poverty are limited for millions of children. Other health consequences are malnutritionĽ anaemia and growth disordersĽ which mean to a certain extent a long-life disability. It is very interesting that women suffer especially from the deficiency of toilets. The dangerĽ for instanceĽ comprises of sexual harassment or even assaultĽ because the placesĽ which substitute the toiletsĽ are very often located far from their domiciles. In remoter spots they are often in danger because of wild animals and snakes. Another problem is the absence of cultural acceptance. As a resultĽ women and girls usually go to spots “designated” for toilets after twilight. During the day they 1ř. November has been in year 2001 established as world day of toilet. Cp. WTO Ŕ World Toilet OrganisationĽ Ěhttp://worldtoilet.orgě. 10 17 Ľubomír Dunaj intentionally eat and drink less in order not to have to visit a “toilet” before twilight yet. During puberty the girls have another problem. Since the schools in these countries do not have toilets with enough of equipment Ěor they are even without toiletsěĽ many girls stay home during the period of menstruation. Those periodically missed school lessons are often not tolerated by teachersĽ so girls are often no longer allowed to attend school. Another disadvantaged groupĽ continues KöcherĽ are the poorĽ but wider parts of population are also affected. The World Bank calculated the economic damages for the countriesĽ which suffer from poor sanitary care. In India this aggregate comes to 54 billion of US dollars every yearĽ that isĽ as much as the GDP of Croatia. The subcontinent loses also 3ŘĽ5 billion per year because of medical costs ĚKörcher 2013Ľ 20 Ŕ 21ě. Of course we could continue by dealing with many other consequences of this problem. And of course for many countries it is impossible to apply the Western sanitarian solution. But my aim is different. I want to use this example to show that often just a “small” shiftĽ like a provision of hygienic toiletsĽ can from a long-term perspective bring significant transformative changeĽ which touches large segments of society. To concludeĽ I would like to make two suggestionsĽ which could bring about such transformation in Slovakia. The first is a serious increase of salaries for teachers and professors and the second is the implementation of participatory democracy in some areas of political and economic life. The first suggestion will contribute to development of creative and moral abilities of societyĽ which could support the progress of a “democratic Sittlichkeit”.11 The second suggestion will enable to use its creativityĽ for instanceĽ to control the power components of society. It is clearĽ that for a social critiqueĽ which follows a more radical Marxist traditionĽ could argueĽ that difficulties faced by current democracies and the huge increase of social injustice are associated with negative aspects of globalisation and of global capitalism. I do not have a problem with sharing this statement. But if weĽ on the other handĽ would accept the complexity of human societies and of the variety of human actionĽ behaviour and preferencesĽ it is not easy to find all-encompassing This may result into seemingly irrelevant issues. We can find thousands of themĽ as for example less aggressive drivingĽ stop at pedestrian crossingĽ no littering at the public spacesĽ fairness in elementary human interactionĽ etc. 11 1Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 solutions for all problems. ThereforeĽ the concept of silent transformations, which have been influenced by François Jullien‟s interpretations of Chinese philosophy ĚJullien 2011ěĽ would be in my view the “best medicine” for many pathological features of SlovakĽ and maybe even for other societiesĽ today. References BAIĽ T. Ě2012ě: China. The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom. London & New York: Zed Books. BELLĽ D. A. Ě200Řě: China‟s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHANĽ J. Ě1řřřě: A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China. In: BauerĽ J.Ľ R. Ŕ BellĽ D. A. Ěeds.ě Ě1řřřě: The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DERANTYĽ J.-P. Ě200řě: Beyond Communication. A Critical Study of Axel Honneth‟s Social Philosophy. Leiden Ŕ Boston: BRILL. FRASERĽ N. Ě1řř7ě: Justice Interruptus. Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition. New York & London: Routledge. HABERMASĽ J. Ě1řř1ě: The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge Ŕ London: MIT Press. HONNETHĽ A. Ě2007ě: Disrespect. The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. Cambridge ĚUKě: Polity Press. HONNETHĽ A. Ě200řě: Pathologies of Reason. On the Legacy of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. HONNETHĽ A. Ě2014ě: Freedom‟s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. Cambridge UK: Polity Press. JAEGGIĽ R. Ě2013ě: Was Ěwenn überhaupt etwasě ist falsch am Kapitalismusť Drei Wege der Kapitalismuskritik. In: JaeggiĽ R. Ŕ Loick D.: Nach Marx. Philosophie, Kritik, Praxis. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. JULLIENĽ F. Ě2011ě: The Silent Transformations. Seagull Books. 1ř Ľubomír Dunaj KUNDERAĽ M. Ě1řř1ě: Immortality. London: Faber and Faber. KÖCHERĽ A. Ě2013ě: Toiletten sind ein Menschenrecht. In: Frankfurter Runschau. 1ř. november 2013Ľ s. 20 Ŕ 21. PIŠ ÁNEKĽ P. Ě2007ě: Rivers of Babylon. Translated by Peter Petro. London: Garnett Press. TAYLORĽ Ch. Ě1ř7Řě: Hegel‟s Sittlichkeit and Crisis of Representative Institutions. In: YovelĽ Y. Ěed.ě: Philosophy of History and Action. Dordrecht: Reidel. ubomír DunajĽ Ph.D. University of Prešov Center of Competencies and Longlive learning Ul. 17. novembra 15 0Ř0 01 Prešov Slovak Republic lubomir.dunaj@unipo.sk 20 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 ON T(E RELAT)ONS()P OF TEC(N)CAL )MAGES W)T( T(E)R OUTS)DE T(E COMMENTS ON V)LÉM FLUSSER’S P()LOSOP(Y OF )MAGE Tomáš Hauer The term technical image (according to the media theorist Vilém Flusser, its first form was photography, and the last form by now have been images projected in all possible forms on screens, monitors and displays, including holograms) can be understood as a term referring to the beginning of a new age, which is coming after the age of linear writing. Historically as well as ontologically, compared to the previous tradition, these technical images mean a rupture, a breakthrough. The creating of technical images was a necessary consequence of the link connecting texts to sensuously perceptible reality, from which texts used to be abstracted earlier. Technical images have been an issue of philosophers‟ interest since the time when W. Benjamin, a German cultural critic published the essay Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit (The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 1936), which has become commonly known by now. Unlike W. Benjamin, who focused on the issue of social and aesthetic theory of the original work and its copy in the age of serial reproducibility, Flusser concentrated on the technology of reproducibility of any work in the environment of so called new media which were just emerging then. Just as Benjamin, Flusser recognized the first technically reproducible work in photography, however, unlike him (or the photography theorists such as A. Bazin. S. Sontag, or S. Kracauer), he used his analysis as a tool of prediction of the future society development. Vilém Flusser, a native of Prague and a media theorist, in his three key texts Für eine Philosophie der Fotografie (1983), has been translated as (Towards a Philosophy of Photography), Ins Universum der technischen Bilder (Into the Universe of Technical Images, 1985) and Die Schrift: Hat Schreiben Zukunft? (Script: Does Writing Have a Future?, 1987) states that technical images have become a dominant cognitive metaphor of the 21 Tomáš Hauer contemporary society and that a new social culture is being formed in connection with their creation, distribution, transfer and consumption, where people are no longer grouping around specific problems but around technical images. The new social structure needs new criteria of analysis, requires a new interpretive beginning. Flusser does not wonder how a medium is possible as such, but he deals with the consequences of the effect of one type of abstraction, namely technical images, on the contemporary society. The following text briefly analyses the dominant cognitive metaphor of Flusser‟s theory – the term technical image. Keywords: speed – technical images – apparatus – linear texts – calculation and computation I. Ontology of a photographic image What is realityĽ the truthĽ goodĽ the futureĽ justiceĽ manĽ etc. Ŕ we have been learning this from texts for a historically long period of time. Together with writing and linear alphabetĽ a new ability which could be called “conceptual thinking” has become part of our life. ThereforeĽ deciphering texts means nothing else than revealing images denoted by these texts. TraditionallyĽ learning meant to be able to read in the book of the worldĽ i.e. to learn to code the world in the texts first by using linear writing and then to learn to decipher the texts applied to reality. The metaphor of the world as a book is an old Christian-Jewish metaphor and until recently a highly prosperous one also in scienceĽ which has accepted and adopted the idea. Human effort to capture an image of reality mechanically dates back up to the 11th centuryĽ when Arabic astronomers tried to create camera obscuraĽ howeverĽ photography was not recognized as a new technical invention until the introduction of the technology of daguerrotypy on 3 June 1Ř3ř. The invention of a photographic image and its successors announced by the Parliament of ParisĽ which bought Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre‟s patent and made it available for free use in 1Ř3řĽ provoked a fiery response from the theorists as well as from ordinary users. Paul Delaroche‟s declaration that painting had died due to the invention of photography went down in history. HoweverĽ Delaroche did not regard the invention of photography itself as a tragedy; what he considered to be dead was probably just the technical aspectĽ because painting could not stand a comparison with the perfection of a 22 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 photographic image. Since the time the photography emergedĽ many theorists have tried to define its complicated nature. Photography as the first form of a technical image has many faces. In the course of its existence it has been caught in the midst of a continual conflict. On one handĽ it is supposed to be understood as objective Ŕ index presentation of realityĽ the photographic image having become a confirmation of reference to reality. On the other handĽ there are efforts to create photographs as authorial worksĽ and their effect shouldĽ in way similar to paintingĽ consist in expressing the author's subjective relation to reality. Photographic communication therefore claims a dual purpose: to embody a subjective or an objective image. ThusĽ it is only natural for the philosophy of photography to be based on this dichotomy. In his outstanding study The Ontology of the Photographic Image from 1ř45Ľ André BazinĽ a French film theorist Ě1ř1Ř Ŕ 1ř5Řě expressed his conviction that the primary purpose of art was the human effort to overcome death. Therefore the man began to create imitations of living beings which reminded him of them. According to BazinĽ the oldest works of art are mummiesĽ howeverĽ people later used also statues and paintings to resist the merciless time ĚBazin 1ř67Ľ ř Ŕ 10ě. He states that the first scientific and mechanical system of capturing reality emerged in the Renaissance. It was a perspective whose rules are based on optics and which made it possible to capture reality in a similar way as we perceive it by the sight. According to himĽ although modern man no longer believes in the identity of a model and of a portraitĽ the true image will enable him to remember itĽ thus resist the time again. The history of imaging technology is interpreted as an evolutionalĽ logical and constant developmentĽ chaining invention and events in heading to fulfil the human desire for a perfect capturing/replicating of the reality. Each technological innovation Ŕ from photography to movementĽ sound and colour Ŕ represents a more advanced developmental stage with respect to capturing the reality. A. Bazin elaborates the theory in his essay The Myth of Total Cinema. In the essayĽ he characterizes film as a neutral technologyĽ mechanismĽ which records only in a passive wayĽ and with respect to evolution it develops so that it can replicate the experience of human perception of reality. André Bazin considers the development of film to be linear chaining of events and inventionĽ each of which is only an enhanced form of the previous one. Innovation is only a 23 Tomáš Hauer formal change closely referring to the previous development. ThusĽ the myth of the total film is presented as independent driving force controlling the development of film regardless the socialĽ political or economic contexts. The very centre of Bazin‟s interest is photography due to its ability Ŕ to adjust the shortcomings of the eye Ŕ to erase the mediator and experience the reality. ThusĽ in his theory of imageĽ André Bazin asserts objectivity as the main quality of mechanical reproduction and its relation to its outside. ThereforeĽ Bazin viewed film technology as a means of widening the potential of creators of imagesĽ means to visualize reality itself more accurately and reliably. “If the origins of an art reveal something of its natureĽ then one may legitimately consider the silent and the sound film as stages of a technical development that little by little made a reality out of the original myth . It is understandable from this point of view that it would be absurd to take the silent film as a state of primal perfection which has gradually been forsaken by the realism of sound and color. The primacy of the image is both historically and technically accidental. The nostalgia that some still feel for the silent screen does not go far enough back into the childhood of the seventh art. The real primitives of the cinemaĽ existing only in the imaginations of a few men of the nineteenth centuryĽ are in complete imitation of nature. Every new development added to the cinema mustĽ paradoxicallyĽ take it nearer and nearer to its origins. In shortĽ cinema has not yet been invented!” ĚBazin 1ř67Ľ 21ě. André Bazin shows how an image of the outside world is formed automatically in photography for the first timeĽ without human creative interventionĽ in the spirit of strict determinism. All sorts of art are based on the presence of manĽ only in photography we are granted his absence. It gives us the impression of a “natural” phenomenonĽ like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of its beauty. This automatic birth has completely reversed the psychology of an image. The objectivity of photography gives it such credibility that cannot be found in any work of art. Despite any objections of our spiritĽ we have to believe in the existence of the represented objectĽ which is actually made present in time and space. For BazinĽ the determinative nature of photography represents a proof of its objective relationship to reality. “Originality in photography as distinct from originality in painting lies in the essentially objective character of photography. For the first timeĽ 24 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 between the originating object and its reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For the first timeĽ an image of the world is formed automaticallyĽ without the creative intervention of man. The personality of the photographer enters into the proceedings only in his selection of the object to be photographed and by way of the purpose he has in mind. Although the final result may reflect something of his personalityĽ this does not play the same role as is played by that of the painter. All the arts are based on the presence of manĽ only photography derives an advantage from his absence. Photography affects us like a phenomenon in natureĽ like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty“ĚBazin 1ř67Ľ 13 Ŕ 10ě. ThereforeĽ in generalĽ we expect from photography that in a way it is related to reality. HoweverĽ what about the contemporary form of technical images and their relationship to their outsideť II. Technical image and its relationship to its outside At the beginning of Flusser‟s philosophy of technical imagesĽ we encounter a cultural-sociological model where the author indicates in five stages the changes in relationship between man and the worldĽ depending on the kind of the medium dominant in the particular historical epoch. The model is that of a ladder with five rungs. The mankind has climbed this ladder step by step Ŕ from the concrete to higher and higher abstractions. It is a model of cultural history and the alienation of man from the concrete experience of realityĽ a model in which man puts agents/tools Ŕ an imageĽ textĽ technical image Ŕ between himself and the world. • First rung: Animals and “primitive” people are immersed in an animate worldĽ a four-dimensional space-time continuum of animals and primitive peoples. It is the level of concrete experience. • Second rung: The kinds of human beings that preceded us Ěapproximately two million to forty thousand years agoě stood as subjects facing an objective situationĽ a three-dimensional situation comprising graspable objects. This is the level of grasping and shapingĽ characterized by objects such as stone blades and carved figures. • Third rung: Homo sapiens sapiens slipped into an imaginaryĽ twodimensional mediation zone between itself and its environment. This is 25 Tomáš Hauer the level of observation and imagining characterized by traditional pictures such as cave paintings. • Fourth rung: About four thousand years agoĽ another mediation zoneĽ that of linear textsĽ was introduced between human beings and their imagesĽ a zone to which human beings henceforth owe most of their insights. This is the level of understanding and explanationĽ the historical level. Linear textsĽ such as Homer and the BibleĽ are at this level. • Fifth rung: Texts have recently shown themselves to be inaccessible. They don‟t permit any further pictorial mediation. They have become unclear. They collapse into particles that must be gathered up. This is the level of cal-culation and computationĽ the level of technical images ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 6 Ŕ 7ě. Linear texts thus occupied a dominant position as carriers of vital information only for about four thousand years. It is the only time we can speak of “history” in the strict sense. In the existence of mankindĽ linear texts played only a transitional roleĽ in this senseĽ “history” was only an interludeĽ an episode. “The difference between traditional and technical imagesĽ thenĽ would be this: the first are observations of objectsĽ the second computations of concepts. The first arise through depictionĽ the second through a peculiar hallucinatory power that has lost its faith in rules. This essay will discuss that hallucinatory power. FirstĽ howeverĽ imagination must be excluded from the discussion to avoid any confusion between traditional and technical images“ ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 10ě. Flusser‟s model then describes a line Ŕ an imageĽ textĽ technical imageĽ while a traditional and technical image quantitatively differ. In the following part of the textĽ we will show this principal dissimilarity. Traditional images Ěsuch as cave paintings in Lascauxě are abstractions of the first orderĽ if they abstract from the concrete worldĽ while technical images are abstractions of the third orderĽ they abstract from texts which abstract from traditional images which abstract from the concrete world. The last part of this sentence is importantĽ because it suggests that in the case of technical images Ěfrom a photograph to a computer imageěĽ we deal with abstractions of the third orderĽ not with images in the usual sense. Technical images make it possible to handle phenomena the way they can be perceived according to the apparatus programme or intention of the apparatus user. Neither texts nor traditional images “can” do this. The new possibility to provide virtualĽ fundamentally cybernetic environment for 26 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 our everydayness has become a reality. This is what Flusser conveys us in his philosophy of technical images with the urgency of his own. Technical images furnish the space of our everydayness in a similar way as an architect furnishes a room with new furniture. Technical images work by supplying a reality where it is needed. A neutral pile of pointsĽ a calculable pileĽ which must “be put together so that the world could be graspedĽ imaginedĽ understood again and the consciousness could become consciousness of itself again”Ľ is the subject of formation into technical images. “Producers of technical imagesĽ those who envision ĚphotographersĽ cameramenĽ video makersěĽ are literally at the end of history. And in the futureĽ everyone will envision. Everyone will be able to use keys that will permit themĽ together with everyone elseĽ to synthesize images on the computer screen. They will all beĽ strictly speakingĽ at the end of history. The world in which they find themselves can no longer be counted and explained: it has disintegrated into particlesphotonsĽ quantaĽ electromagnetic particles. It has become intangibleĽ inconceivableĽ incomprehensibleĽ a mass that can be calculated. Even their own consciousnessĽ their thoughtsĽ desiresĽ and valuesĽ have disintegrated into particlesĽ into bits of informationĽ a mass that can be calculated. This mass must be computed to make the world tangibleĽ conceivableĽ comprehensible againĽ and to make consciousness aware of itself once more. That is to sayĽ the whirring particles around us and in us must be gathered onto surfaces; they must be envisioned” ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 31ě. And this is what technical images are used for Ŕ putting reality together again. Our new arrangement of the worldĽ new after the end of the age of linear writingĽ depends on two things Ŕ on apparatuses and on their programmes. Technical image as an abstraction of the third order shows two qualities which differentiate it from abstractions of the first order Ěimagesě as well as from abstractions of the second order Ětextsě. The technical image is an image produced by apparatuses. “The technical image is an image produced by apparatuses. As 27 Tomáš Hauer apparatuses themselves are the products of applied scientific textsĽ in the case of technical images one is dealing with the indirect products of scientific texts. This gives themĽ historically and ontologicallyĽ a position that is different from that of traditional images. HistoricallyĽ traditional images precede texts by millennia and technical ones follow on after very advanced texts. OntologicallyĽ traditional images are abstractions of the first order insofar as they abstract from the concrete world while technical images are abstractions of the third order: They abstract from texts which abstract from traditional images which themselves abstract from the concrete world. HistoricallyĽ traditional images are prehistoric and technical ones 'post-historic' Ěin the sense of the previous essayě. OntologicallyĽ traditional images signify phenomena whereas technical images signify concepts. Decoding technical images consequently means to read off their actual status from them” ĚFlusser 2000Ľ 14ě. The affirmation that the technical image isĽ after allĽ created by manĽ is defensible only in this context. Man creates itĽ but only to the extent enabled by the apparatus programme. It is about two things: the apparatus and the apparatus programme. Both the apparatus and the programme are established in texts Ŕ scientific texts. The apparatus can only be produced according to scientific texts and the same is true about the apparatus programme. Scientific texts are basically complex concepts. And therein lies the key difference between traditional and technical images. “The difference between traditional and technical imagesĽ thenĽ would be this: the first are observations of objectsĽ the second computations of concepts” ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 10ě. Simply speakingĽ the technical image isĽ in factĽ a visualized concept. A camera as well as a photograph are the results of a complicated scientific institution. A computerĽ a monitorĽ a displayĽ etc. are the results of a very complicated instruction conveyed by scientific concepts. ApparatusesĽ like the means for creating technical imagesĽ need functionaries Ŕ creators of fictions. This reverses the original relation “man/apparatus” where man works as a function of apparatuses. He orders apparatuses what the apparatuses themselves ordered him. “Around these transmission points sit functionaries who press the keys of apparatusesĽ especially those that compute images. For these images model the behaviorĽ perceptionĽ and experience of all other functionaries. The 2Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 functionaries instruct the images about how the images should instruct the receivers. The apparatuses instruct the functionaries how they are to instruct the images. And other apparatuses instruct these apparatuses about how the functionaries are to instruct” ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 75ě. Creating technical images was the necessary consequence of linking the texts to sensuously perceptible reality from which texts were abstracted. The development of science in the twentieth century drew an abstract concept from an illustrative idea in an unexpected way. HoweverĽ if two texts become incomprehensibleĽ there is nothing more to explain. And right during this big crisis of textsĽ technical images were invented in order to make texts comprehensible again. “During this crisis of textsĽ technical images were invented: in order to make texts comprehensible againĽ to put them under a magic spell Ŕ to overcome the crisis of history” ĚFlusser 2000Ľ 13ě. The order in the contemporary society is created by technical images which work in a different way than the traditional images and require a new way of acquiring and handling. What is an image for Flusserť For FlusserĽ images are surfaces with a meaning. They refer to something in space-time continuum “outside over there”Ľ something they are supposed to make comprehensible for us as abstractions Ěas abbreviations of four dimensions of space-time continuum into two dimensions of a surfaceě. Flusser uses the term imagination for this specific ability to abstract surfaces from space-time continuum and to project them into space-time continuum again. ThereforeĽ images work by mediating the relationship between the world and man. Man “exists”Ľ it means that the world is not immediately accessible to himĽ thereforeĽ the function of images is to mediate the world for man. HoweverĽ whenever they do thisĽ they put themselves “between” the world and man. Images were supposed to be mapsĽ but they became obstacles. Instead of presenting the worldĽ they obscure it and man finally begins to live in the function of images he himself created. He stops decoding images and he projects them undecoded to the world “outside over there”. The principal consequence of this is the fact that the world suddenly appears to be a complex of imagesĽ factual configurations. Flusser calls this reversing of the function of an image “idolatry” Ěidiolatryě and describes how it takes place. “The technical images currently all around us are in the process of magically restructuring our „reality‟ and turning it into a „global image scenario‟. 2ř Tomáš Hauer Essentially this is a question of „amnesia‟. Human beings forget they created the images in order to orientate themselves in the world. Since they are no longer able to decode themĽ their lives become a function of their own images: Imagination has turned into hallucination” ĚFlusser 2000Ľ 10ě. What do technical images meanĽ if they are not pictures in the usual senseť They are models. “They are models that give form to a world and a consciousness that has disintegrated; they are meant to „inform‟ that world. Their vector of signification is therefore the reverse of that of earlier images: they don‟t receive their meaning from outside but rather project meaning outward. They lend meaning to the absurd” ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 170ě. Some technical images fulfil the visionĽ according to which reality could be fundamentally taken apart into points and then assign a concept to each point. “Apparatuses incorporate the 1-0 structure because they simulate the structure of our nervous system. ThereĽ tooĽ we are dealing with a mechanical Ěand chemicalě turning on and off of streams of electrons between the nerve synapses. From this standpointĽ digital codes are a method Ŕ the first since human beings began to codify Ŕ of giving meaning to quantum leaps in the brain from the outside. We are faced with a self-concealing loop. The brain is an apparatus that lends meaning to the quantum leaps that occur in itĽ and now it is about to turn this meaninggiving function over to apparatuses of its own accordĽ then to reabsorb what they project. So the new codes are digital basically because they are using simulated brains to simulate the meaning-giving function of the brain” ĚFlusser 2011bĽ 145ě. As traditional images show realityĽ technical images produceĽ form reality. Traditional images are mirrors of reality; reality isĽ on the other handĽ a “mirror” of a technical image or scientific concept or scientific text. The image shows one fact; technical images produce so many facts as the apparatus programme allows them. Our presence therefore differs from the age of linear writing Ěthe age of textěĽ and among other things by the fact that is characterized by the “inflation of reality” produced by technical images and technical devices. This has significant cognitive consequencesĽ because technical images do not represent or show anything of the world Ěalthough they pretend that they do soěĽ but project something on it. What is described by technical images is something thrown from inside to outside. Here we come to the essence of the problem. 30 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 “What does a technical image mean is an incorrectly formulated question. Although they appear to do soĽ technical images don‟t depict anything; they project something. The signified of a technical imageĽ whether it be a photograph of a house or a computer image of a virtual airplaneĽ is something drawn from the inside toward the outside. And it is not out there until it has been drawn out. Therefore technical images must be decoded not from the signifier but from the signifiedĽ not from what they show but from what they show for. And the question appropriate to them isĽ to what end do technical images meanť To decode a technical image is not to decode what it shows but to read how it is programmed” ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 4Řě. ThereforeĽ a technical image is a tool whose function is Ŕ as with any intermediary tools or machines Ŕ to change reality. But what is realityť Material tools Ěa power plant or a carě change material reality. A technical image changes symbolic realityĽ it changes meaningsĽ but as reality becomes reality only after meanings are assigned to itĽ a technical picture changes reality itself. Reality ceases to be a text for man and becomes an image for image. The world and things “visualized” by a technical image are things created by human intellectĽ not visualized by it. Technical paintings thus put us into a situation in which our traditional efforts Ŕ to represent reality adequately Ŕ do not make sense. Reality is a “surplus”Ľ it is produced by apparatuses and the creators of fiction. Since the beginning of every process of discovering reality is perceptionĽ a technical image is able to change the field of perception and force each individual to a particular way of perceiving reality; it allows to handle events the way they are perceived according to the apparatus programme or the intent of the person who uses the apparatus. Neither texts nor images “can” do this. Disputes about the importance of reality thus move from the level of abstraction of the second order Ětextsě to the level of abstraction of the first order Ěpicturesě and abstractions of the third order Ětechnical imagesě are the means to it. In practiceĽ this “transcript”Ľ transfer of line of reasoning from the level of text to the level of a technical image takes place wherever the electronic networks reach. TodayĽ we argueĽ we recognize we make decisionsĽ assessĽ etc. not “through" text but “through” images. Consciousness that corresponds to technical images is above history. 31 Tomáš Hauer For technical imagesĽ history is only food they live on. Simultaneous operation between an image and man leads to the loss of historical consciousness on the side of the recipient of images and as a consequenceĽ the loss of any historical action that might follow the adoption of an image. Man‟s needsĽ wishesĽ feelings and knowledge must be explained on the basis of a technical image as its source. “What we call “history” is the way in which conditions can be recognized through linear texts. Texts produce history by projecting their own linear structure onto the particular situation. By imposing texts on a cultural objectĽ one produces cultural historyĽ and by imposing texts on natural objects Ěwhich happened relatively recentlyěĽ one produces natural history. Such historicizing of conditions affects people‟s perspectives. Because nothing need repeat itself in a linear structureĽ each element has a unique position with respect to the whole” ĚFlusser 2011aĽ 5Řě. Technical images again and again translate historical events into repeated screenings. The relationship between a technical image and a manĽ the operation between themĽ is therefore a central problem for any future cultural criticism and all the other issues must be addressed from here. This is the substance of Flusser‟s message. “We must neither anthropomorphize nor objectify apparatus. We must grasp them in their cretinous concretenessĽ in their programmed and absurd functionalityĽ in order to be able to comprehend them and thus insert them into meta-programs. The paradox is that such metaprograms are equally absurd games. In sum: what we must learn is to accept the absurdĽ if we wish to emancipate ourselves from functionalism. Freedom is conceivable only as an absurd game with apparatusĽ as a game with programs. It is conceivable only after we have accepted politics and human existence in general to be an absurd game. Whether we continue to be „men‟ or become robots depends on how fast we learn to play: we can become players of the game or pieces in it” ĚFlusser 2013Ľ 26ě. Is there any future for the very “gesture of writing” thenť How to “write” in the age of domination of technical images with their perfect 32 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 creation of realityť According to Vilém FlusserĽ our option is as follows: “Writing is an important gestureĽ because it both articulates and produces that state of mind which is called “historical consciousness”. History began with the invention of writingĽ not for the banal reason often advanced that written texts permit us to reconstruct the pastĽ but for the more pertinent reason that the world is not perceived as a processĽ “historically”Ľ unless one signifies it by successive symbolsĽ by writing. The difference between prehistory and history is not that we have written documents that permit us to read the latterĽ but that during history there are literate men who experienceĽ understandĽ and evaluate the world as a “becoming”Ľ whereas in prehistory no such existential attitude is possible. If the art of writing were to fall into oblivionĽ or if it were to become subservient to picture making Ěas in the “scriptwriting” in filmsěĽ history in the strict sense of that term would be over!” ĚFlusser 2002Ľ 63ě. References BAZINĽ A. Ě1ř67ě: What is Cinemať Volume I. ĚHugh GrayĽ Trans.Ľ Ed.ě. Berkeley: University of California Press. FLUSSERĽ V. Ě2000ě: Towards a Philosophy of Photography. London: Reaktion Books. FLUSSERĽ V. Ě2002ě: Writings. MinneapolisĽ London: University of Minnesota Press. FLUSSERĽ V. Ě2011aě: Into the Universe of Technical Images. MinneapolisĽ London: University of Minnesota Press. FLUSSERĽ V. Ě2011bě: Does Writing Have a Future. MinneapolisĽ London: University of Minnesota Press. FLUSSERĽ V. Ě2013ě: Post – History. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing. 33 Tomáš Hauer doc. Mgr. Tomáš HauerĽ Ph.D. VŠB Ŕ Technical University of Ostrava Department of Social Sciences t . 17. Listopadu 15/2172 70Ř33Ľ Ostrava-Poruba Czech Republic tomas.hauer@vsb.cz thauer777@gmail.com 34 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 A NEW C)V)L)ZAT)ON PARAD)GM: TRANSFORMAT)ON AS AN ALTERNAT)VE TO REVOLUT)ON Ladislav Hohoš In its substance globalization does not really represent a natural catastrophe similar to the biblical flood as it is sometimes presented by the mass media, but its negative impacts could, under some circumstances, be of the same fatal consequences. The author suggests five possible scenarios of globalization dealing with the range of possibilities of civilizational transformation. Benjamin„s famous definition of revolution as the emergency brake indicates that the pulling of this emergency brake remains the only option, unless we manage to pull up and shunt the train: this is the dilemma of revolution or reform; however, not as an antinomy but as a dichotomy. The future is open to several alternatives. One can imagine global governance on the basis of international law, which builds on the reality of a multipolar world, or an intercultural dialogue as a means of shaping a single cosmopolitan earthly “civilization” instead of a war over hegemony. The transformation of capitalism will take place one way or another; bets are being laid on the costs. Keywords: globalization – transformation – revolution – capitalism – possible scenarios The present civilization crisis is a consequence of the victory of liberalism which originated from of the European philosophical thinking of the 17th Ŕ 1Řth century as a sign of leaving the past times. The civilization paradigm of the new times played a positive roleĽ especially by the postulate of uniqueness of human individuality and hence derived negative freedomsĽ which signified hegemony of anthropocentrism. The Enlightenment represented a cult of reason and only until recently the successes of the Euro-American civilization were confirming the triumph of rationality or 35 Ladislav Hohoš progress which used to be perceived as a linear advancement. The abovementioned also resulted in the total uniqueness of human being who was given the right to control and manipulate. The Pythagorean harmony with natureĽ an example of perfection as well as submission represented by the religionĽ has disappeared. Theocracy failed in the medieval times; today we can feel a dramatic impact of secularization. The request to build heaven on earth here and now has not been more successful and as far as intensity of violence is concerned it has been even worse. The individual of the classical social agreement is atomized and nonhistorical; in the latest patterns from the point of view of utilityĽ he is the incarnation of a rational egoist. These patterns do not solve the problem of responsibility to community and the future generationsĽ also because until the 1ř70s they had not expected the possibility of the depletion of natural resources to be exclaimed then by the Club of Rome. The mankind noticed the possibility of social devastation of human resources only after the economic crisis in the first third of the 20th century but the dominance of the concept of technocracy prevailed until the 1ř60s and maybe has prevailed as an ulterior motive till nowadays. The discussion today is at the level of communitarianismĽ especially concerning the perspective of the role of the state in relation to individual choice of quality of life. In my opinionĽ it seems to be necessary to amend radical individualism to some extentĽ because the individual and the community are mutually dependent entities. On the other handĽ we have had the opportunity to see the failures of the attempts to substitute some universal values at the cost of undervaluation of individual rights Ěe.g. the socialist collectivismě. I prefer the moderate position which approves of the moral value of individual rights as well as obligations in relation to community. We can imagine a scenario with an elite cosmopolitan minority profiting from globalization which feels no responsibility for the majority of society that is left to its own fate. The majority will accentuate its unique cultural identities Ě„the rebellion of minorities“ě because it has nothing else to command against the successful economic globalization. MoreoverĽ and this is crucialĽ it can reject the ideology of economic growth by not accepting profit and competitive strength as primary goals in the name of its own values ĚhappinessěĽ even at the cost of a certain decline in consumption and/or in the standard of living Ěthe revolt against meritocracyě; this leads to a situation where the political consensus ceases 36 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 to function or even fails. Another warning scenario is based on the fragile ephemerality of the well-being achieved in the so-called advanced countries during the post-war boom in the second half of the twentieth century: this welfare has been the basis of the unique integration of Europe. The crucial problem for the post-capitalist globalized society is how to ensure the right to minimum human dignity and a meaningful life for the ostracizedĽ who find themselves outside the compulsory employment enforced by autarchy: or should they not have been born at allť Egon Bondy points out that intensification of labour is a belief that was enforced on people only a few generations ago; even if labour was alienated in traditional societiesĽ the relationship between people and their own production was not based on inadequate toil. “The owners of the means of production counted on the workers wearing themselves out to deathĽ while another ten people were to be found starving nearby who could have taken over part of the work and earned their living. This manifests the economic reality based on a belief that production must continually grow and be even greater otherwise civilization would collapse” ĚBondy 2005Ľ 114ě. This scenarioĽ envisioned by BondyĽ is based on the exclusivity of profit motivation that leads to a situation where in the end there remains only one monopoly ownerĽ who in fact no longer needs profit or powerĽ because he can only maximize his own prestige. Since the system that models the structure of the society is a legal oneĽ the elite indispensable for the global actors Ě“symbolic analysts” Ŕ Robert Reichě might be able to work out legislative schemes which would observe the takeover of power from within and thus enable the overthrowing of supranational oligarchies. Legal science ought to formulate certain legal normsĽ fixed to such an extent that it would be very difficult to violate them; moreoverĽ the norms should become natural or customary for the rest of the inhabitants of the planet ĚBondy 2005Ľ ř6 Ŕ řřě. Bondy‟s vision may seem utopian. HoweverĽ great responsibility lies with the global power elite: if they are going to use their influence to establish such rules for the functioning of the global system that will deepen the existing inequalitiesĽ and if the future global system is going to be as blatantly unjust as it is todayĽ the crisis is virtually inevitable. David Rothkopf Ě200ŘĽ 320ěĽ analyst of the new global financial oligarchyĽ 37 Ladislav Hohoš attributes to the elites “the impulse to overreach” which has caused them dearly over the years. If they realize that it is in their own interest to do away with practices that now give everything to the rich and powerful while leaving the poor with only promises of the distant futureĽ they can dodge the fate of the previous elitesĽ “which were brought down due to their greedĽ insensitivityĽ and short-sightedness” ĚRothkopf 200ŘĽ 321 Ŕ 322ě. ThusĽ it is the problem of how to make a highly sophisticated economy operate on a different basis than global capitalism based on total marketization; this is fundamental to all major transformation effortsĽ whether evolutionary or revolutionary. J. Keller´s scenario is derived from a situation where a number of people are redundant because the market does not need them for abstract labour. ThereforeĽ those who are not able to face the risks at their own costs became clientsĽ meaning that they are not capable of equipping themselves. The result of the second phase of globalization mightĽ according to KellerĽ mean a return to pre-modern conditionsĽ to a form of unorganized barbarismĽ which he termed “postmodern refeudalization” ĚKeller 2007Ľ 176ě. The common denominator of the above-mentioned scenarios by Bondy and Keller is their consideration of the new elite Ŕ the winners of globalization who fulfil their own interests andĽ since they are successfulĽ launch the selfdestructive mechanism of the social order which they themselves established. This evokes Marx´s idea that capitalism will collapse only when it fulfils its historical mission and thus becomes a bearer for hidden immanent self-destructive mechanisms. Perceiving the crisisĽ intellectual reflection of the value and the moral vacuum are not newĽ mainly in the European cultural environment. In principle since the 1řth century resentiments have been part of the diagnosis of Western civilization. Value relativism of recent postmodernism reflects the historical tectonics in which shocks are the signals of starting global transformation. As for the period of crisisĽ the analogy of the thirties of the 20th century is not correct because it is not only the economic crisis or within partial aspects the financial crisis. HoweverĽ the mankind is confronted with a systemic civilization crisis of transformation. Under the pressure of medial reality and ideology of neoliberalism the term reality and fiction are often interchangedĽ the partial is considered as substantialĽ the prosperous is considered as permanent. Reality of fiction is reflected as a financial crisis which was caused by the 3Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 toxic assetsĽ i.e. mortgages in the USA. The crisis has been appearing in the form of different shocks and instability of the monetary system since the seventies and it was partly shifted in time after removal of the iron curtain at the end of the eightiesĽ which made partial temporary expansion of capital to the new markets possibleĽ but did not prevent the currency crisis in the nineties. Fiction of reality is gased on misinformation that after inflow of money of taxpayers in the financial systemĽ a gradual transfer to consolidation comes Ěmore precisely a temporary moderation of the symptomsě which is said to start another stability and possible growthĽ so all will be the same as before. In its substance globalization does not really represent a natural catastrophe similar to the biblical floodĽ as it is sometimes presented by the mass mediaĽ but its negative impacts couldĽ under some circumstancesĽ be of the same fatal consequences. Promotion of oldfashioned ideological schemes supported by the mediaĽ which disguise the substance of the present conflict processes generated by the class of global capitalistsĽ also has an anti-productive effect. I suggest five possible scenarios of globalization Ěthe range of possibilities includes five alternativesě:  a worst-case scenario anticipates destructionĽ e.g. atomic war or total collapse of environment; the alternative of total destruction of mankind isĽ in the „better case“Ľ destruction of the reached level of civilization or return to the barbarian manners;  a partly optimistic scenario can lead to success of temporary consolidationĽ so that transnational globalization would continue for some time on the basis of normative liberalism until the unsolved need of qualitative changes caused another crisis;  an unfavorable change could provoke the start of a new form of proto-fascism Ěrenewal of the authority based on right-wing extremismě and thus of dictatorship with the possible ecologicalideological cover; new technologies would enable total control over individualĽ thus solving the problem of controlling excessive population growth at the global level;  in an explorativeĽ i.e. optimistic scenarioĽ there would be some regulations of economy and mainly of financial marketsĽ founding new wealth creating institutions Ŕ whichĽ howeverĽ could thrive 3ř Ladislav Hohoš only at the transnational level; a cartel of elites may emerge with the purpose of saving capitalism from itself;  a scenario distant in time: a target Ěnormativeě vision of society and civilization of a new quality at the level of human society Ěa higher level of socializationě and in terms of human species Ěthe problem of trans-humanismě. There are also other systemic alternatives which are offering solutions towards the nearest future. There is an enormous asymmetry between the demand of democratic participation at the political level and the total absence of democracy in the posts or labour relations. According to D. Schweickart‟s analyses the system of Economic Democracy is a market economy but it makes ecological sustainability possible. Capitalism requires economic growth as a condition of stabilityĽ while a company must generate profit for owners. But the aim of company of Economic Democracy is to prevent the loss of its market share and therefore it can choose a less aggressive strategy than a capitalist company because the system expects social control of investment without dictation by financial markets ĚSchweickart 2002Ľ 156 Ŕ 15Řě. The problem which should be discussed within the whole community and by the whole planet lies in the questionĽ how to realize Ěin a democratic wayťě the switch to the strategy of the permanently sustainable life as the time we have at our disposal is strictly limited. Solution of the transformational crisis lies in seeking such an alternative of globalization which would meet the parameters of permanently sustainable terrestrial civilization in the widest sense of the word. In the present it is not possible to foresee how deep the transformational crisis will be: whether it will be possible to manage it at the level of structural changes with a temporary stabilization at the systemic level or whetherĽ in case it enforces some changes at the systemic levelĽ their running will be to some extent emergent. Both alternatives are wide-opened. The attribute of temporariness in relation to systemic stabilization is a relevant parameter because the economic system of capitalismĽ based on permanent extreme wasteĽ isĽ in any caseĽ permanently unsustainable in its present form. As far as the waste of the wealth creation of the relevant civilization is concernedĽ there is a law of fall of marginal profits: from the specific pointĽ every further unit invested in the input is bringing smaller production growth Ěperformanceě at the output than the previous onesĽ so 40 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 from the specific momentĽ even with the sufficient amount of units at the input the gains at the output are falling. This law can explain the extinction of the civilizations Ěe.g. the Roman Empireě when they could no longer keep the level of complexity they had reachedĽ the falling marginal profits enforced the economic processĽ i.e. a collapseĽ by which we understand a return to the normal or lower complexity Ě“barbarian manners”ě. On the grounds of his experience of the First World War and the defeat of the left in Germany in 1ř23Ľ W. Benjamin expressed his pessimism regarding the Enlightenment idea of continual social progress: “This storm is what we call progress” ĚBenjamin 1ř6ŘĽ 25Řě. Yet this very storm accumulates disasters. The hope of emancipationĽ epitomized by the revolution in Russia and followed by the formation of the Left in GermanyĽ was part of the post-war euphoria. HoweverĽ the cards of history were dealt differently. “The crisis of freedom begins not with a Bolshevik revolution but with the moment when the Socialist workers of Germany burned their own red banners in front of Kaiser Wilhelm's palace and joined in his war effort” ĚBondy 2013Ľ 2Ř3ě. Preventing the war in 1ř14 would mean thwarting armament plansĽ and this goal could only be achieved through revolutionĽ which would have been suppressed in any country with unparalleled cruelty. The ruling elites now follow the same pattern as before the World War I Ŕ naturallyĽ at a more sophisticated level and using increasingly efficient repressive techniques. Benjamin‟s famous definition of revolution as the emergency brake indicates that pulling the emergency brake remains the only optionĽ unless we manage to pull up and shunt the train: this is the dilemma of revolution or reform; howeverĽ not as an antinomy but as a dichotomy. As the use of the emergency brake always causes a giant shock wave with inevitable casualtiesĽ what seems to be a better option for humanity is to move on to the other trackĽ to use the double track to redirect the train. The issue of global civilizational crisis is associated with the dynamics of social change and transformation. Former conflicts between followers of socialism concerning the dichotomy between revolution and reform have become obsolescent. It is problematic to distinguish revolution from transformationĽ for instance in Latin America. The consequences of transformation can be more radical than those of political revolution. TraditionallyĽ revolution seems rapid and violent compared with 41 Ladislav Hohoš transformation which occurs gradually and unforced. Both elites and those marginalizedĽ as well as the excludedĽ ought to attempt to avoid the revolution in favour of “the revolutionary transformation” dealing with partial piecemeal changes ĚDinuš Ŕ Hohoš Ŕ Hrubec 2014ě. ReformsĽ originally aimed at rescuing the system from itselfĽ can gradually grow into a transformation of the entire systemĽ even if the very reform elites do not wish it themselves. The problem with these elites is that partial measures do not resolve the situationĽ only allow temporary respite: the point is to stop the train before the abyss. A system based on commodificationĽ which presupposes the accumulation of profitĽ is unsustainable economicallyĽ ecologicallyĽ sociallyĽ politically or morally. The fears of violent revolution are much more legitimate now than in the first half of the 20th century when Prague-born Karl Kautsky expressed his concerns regarding the instruments of violence and coercion that the politicians now have fully available. Kautsky had expected that the socialist revolution of the proletariat would have had a completely different form than the bourgeois revolutionĽ and thatĽ unlike the “philistine revolution”Ľ it could have been fought by peaceful means Ŕ economicĽ legislative and moralĽ rather than by physical forceĽ and this wherever democracy had taken root. Yet the interrelatedness between capitalism and democracyĽ used as a weighty argument in the context of the Cold War back in the 1ř70sĽ can no longer be relied upon. As reported by Robert ReichĽ former Secretary of Labour under President ClintonĽ the “democratic aspects of capitalism have declined. Corporations now have little choice but to relentlessly pursue profit. In this wayĽ the triumph of capitalism and the decline of democracy have been connected” ĚReich 200ŘĽ 50ě. Francois Furet stated thatĽ unlike the French RevolutionĽ the Russian revolution had left us empty-handedĽ without any principles or laws or institutionsĽ even without history. The October Revolution ended by liquidating all that it had created and framed by what it had sought to destroy ĚFuret 1řřřĽ VIIIĽ 2ě. Furet was obviously wrong with regard to his reference to history; it was a clash of civilizationsĽ as pointed out by J. Patočka: Lenin‟s commitment and his theory of imperialism waged Russia to turn against the domination of the West by an attempt to establish a kind of “radical Over-civilisation” ĚPatočka 1řř6Ľ 270ě. The Bolshevik faction of the Russian revolutionaries was really fundamentally different 42 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 from the Third Estate Ŕ the hegemonic leader of the French RevolutionĽ although the two revolutions were characterized by applying the principle of class dictatorship and revolutionary terror. The Russian BolsheviksĽ including LeninĽ were inspired by the Jacobean period. This is why historian Michal Reiman nicknamed the Russian Revolution “The Plebeian Revolution” ĚReiman 1řř1Ľ 277 Ŕ 27Řě. Historical legacy of the Paris Commune and of the Russian revolutions of 1ř05 and 1ř17 has remained up today: the concept of the self-governance of societyĽ a participatory democracy. Both revolutions had a common goal Ŕ the fundamental transformation of societyĽ not only in France or in RussiaĽ but worldwide. The October Revolution was carried out by the forces that in the February Revolution represented the most radical element of the plebeian campĽ which is to be understood as the impoverished and radicalized element comprised of those who experienced the most adverse social consequences of the war and the revolution. The Plebeian revolution advocated a radical break with the pastĽ which was dismantled not only in the material but also in the physical sense. The Bolsheviks were incapable of ruling; they had no education or experienceĽ they could maintain power only by military means and repressive terrorĽ which resulted in the systematic elimination of the wealthy and educated classes. For exampleĽ in 1ř20 the Soviet government put forward “propositions to reinforce the system of war communism”: in addition to electrificationĽ these propositions included militarization of the economy Ŕ labour obligation had already been introduced Ŕ as well as full suppression of the market and the abolition of money and money management. ThisĽ howeverĽ failed to materialize; the reality enforced a change in the form of Lenin‟s New Economic PolicyĽ even though Lenin himselfĽ distrusting the free marketĽ considered those measures only temporary. The elements of war communism in a modified arrangement lingered onĽ becoming a legacy of the power elites. While there were significant differences between the Stalinist period and the post-Stalinist “actually existing socialism”Ľ the principles of war communism expressed in the denial of market incentives and persistent distrust of intelligence became entrenched. The last Plebeian generation was the Brezhnev retinueĽ which vacated their positions to more cultured and more educated technocrats only through the natural dying off of the Politburo members. Industrialization in the 1ř30s and the subsequent collectivization of 43 Ladislav Hohoš agriculture initiated by Stalin were enforced by repressive terrorĽ including periodic purgesĽ which could be viewed as an instrument of “acceleration strategy”. I recall this termĽ introduced by M. Gorbachev as he assumed powerĽ to the more widely known term “perestroika”. The strategy of acceleration was abandonedĽ being absolutely unrealistic; what is moreĽ there was even no attempt at directed change through economic reforms so the economic instruments necessary for the transition from stagnation to acceleration were not created. Disproportions that developed in the former USSR in the 1ř30s have remained to this day. Despite its wealthĽ Russia represents a typical Third World country reliant on oil and gas prices in the world market. It has cutting edge weapons but is lacking material-technical base for high-end technologies. According to Arnold ToynbeeĽ in order to gain majorityĽ the creative minorities use a primitive and universal ability Ŕ mimesis: the uncreative majority passes a drill by imitating inspiring role models; in this way even commercial exploiters or political demagogues can assert themselves. The risk of disaster in using the art of mimesis lies in its mechanizationĽ which is a kind of social drillĽ a machinelike response to the external requestĽ to the demands of the leaders ĚToynbee 1ř64Ľ 315 Ŕ 31Řě. Both the concept of revolution as of a belated or possibly retarded mimesis and the concept of revolution as a manifestation of the plebeian “vox populi” confirm the relevance of Benjamin's reflection on the revolution as an “emergency brake”: it becomes the ultimate emergency measure when the opportunity to flip the switch has been wasted. Repeated disastersĽ feared by BenjaminĽ can trigger social upheavals and disrupt political stabilityĽ even call the legitimacy of governments and political elites into question. The interrelation between social and ecological disasters raises the question of anti-capitalist alternativesĽ since meaningful discussion presupposes pluralism in a theoretical plane. The end of the Cold War allows one to see the world as it isĽ without the pervasive ideological mimicry based on an artificial construct of two “camps” divided by the Iron Curtain. The current world system is so severely thrown out of balance that it is no longer sustainable. There is a global civilizational transformationĽ which isĽ like any transformationĽ largely emergent and thus with an unpredictable outcome. If we consider a transformation strategyĽ the key issue that comes into foreground is the extent of destruction that accompanies every fundamental qualitative 44 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 transformation. Our current situation shows typical symptoms of the declining ancient civilizations that perished as a result of their own successĽ which brought about the depletion of indispensable available resources. The question arises at what price the humanity will survive the current civilization‟s rupture. In terms of alternative scenariosĽ thereforeĽ the main concern is how to handle the transformation with the least barbarity. We do not know whether the new system will be better or worse than the existing one; the preservation of the current living standards in the more developed parts of the world is problematic Ěwater-food bubbleĽ climate changesĽ etc.ě The outcome will be decided through political struggleĽ more or less violent. The shift from manufacturing to financing shows that investors avoid the risks associated with the production of goodsĽ where Marx's law of falling profit rates operates in a modified formĽ and refocus on new financial productsĽ commodifying the risk. ThisĽ coupled with the introduction of new high-tech technologiesĽ leads to the loss of dominance of organized labourĽ substituted by precarious work. Since the 1ř70sĽ the U.S. has become a country of rentiersĽ losing control over their currency and economyĽ with the emergence of a global-scale patrimonial capitalism. Thomas Piketty distinguishes between two kinds of increasingly unequal society which coexist: the rentier society and the top manager society; both parts are often played by the same person. The inherited wealth grows faster than the output and the income. The concentration of wealth is now much higher in the U.S. than in EuropeĽ which is the very result of the interconnection between the rentiers and the managers. In the years aheadĽ this combination may create a new world of inequalityĽ more extreme than ever before. Patrimonial capitalismĽ not unlike that during the La Belle Époque Ě1Řř0 Ŕ 1ř14ěĽ is thriving; the crisis of 200Ř was its first but certainly not its last crisis. Piketty warns that whenever economic growth slows down and the return on the capital increasesĽ as is the case nowĽ major political upheavals follow ĚPiketty 2014Ľ 173Ľ 237ě. The new type of economic rationality is based on decommodificationĽ on the promotion of the utility value instead of exchange valueĽ on the recognition that non-market values deserve special attentionĽ particularly with regard to public or social goods. I understand the concept of decommodification in a broader senseĽ as a removal of the dominant 45 Ladislav Hohoš position of the exchange value in the world of commodities in favour of utility values. This presupposes the abolition of profit. Money will probably not disappear entirelyĽ but one can imagine introduction of measures such as a progressive global tax on capital ĚPiketty 2014Ľ 515ě or amnesty on international and consumer debt ĚGraeber 2011Ľ 3ř1 Ŕ 3ř2ě. If we manage to push through a compromise between the World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum in the form of a “global redistributive project”Ľ productive capital could once again assert itself at the expense of financial capital. Alternative to underlying compromiseĽ according to W. RobinsonĽ is the rise of global fascism ĚRobinson 2004Ľ 173ě. Such a compromise would attribute historical truth to Kautsky and his concept of “ultraimperialism”Ľ that isĽ the possibility of a pacifist cartel of the world's financial capital. In his Philosophy of HistoryĽ W. Benjamin introduced an objectification of the historical process through the inclusion of the historically aggrieved as an interaction among partners of our current experience within a moral community ĚHonneth 2013Ľ 107Ľ 110ě. The American-German historian Fritz Stern described the First World War as the first disaster of the twentieth centuryĽ the scourge that gave birth to all the other disasters such as the Russian Revolution and World War II. The manner in which the First World War was waged as the first industriallywaged war in history brought down all inhibitions; this was what subsequently allowed concentration campsĽ holocaustĽ carpet bombing and the use of the atomic bomb. What is moreĽ World War I demonstrated the failure of the elitesĽ which is looming on the horizonĽ given the current unstable situation and uncertainty regarding the rules of the world order. The crisis factorsĽ which resemble the situation from a hundred years agoĽ include the extremely deepening inequality. Christopher ClarkĽ historian of PrussiaĽ concludes: “The protagonists of 1ř14 were sleepwalkersĽ watchful but unseeingĽ haunted by dreamsĽ yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world” ĚClark 2013Ľ 562ě. FortunatelyĽ we are not consigned to historical necessity or repetition of the past; moreoverĽ I hope that even the followers of neo-Marxism no longer believe in the “iron necessity”. Similar doubts concern frequent references of political analysts to “geopolitical necessity”. These are the same petrified schemes based on the repetition of the past. F. Jullien argues that our failure to notice the effect of cumulative 46 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 changes over time is due to the grounding of Western thought in Greek philosophy of being. In contrastĽ Chinese thought provides a more flexible way of understanding the “silent transformations”: Revolutions “radicalize action and carry it to its highest intensity... silent transformations deflect step by step without warningĽ without announcement Ŕ to the point of causing everything to topple over into its opposite without anyone having noticed” ĚJullien 2011ě. Revolution forces the situation to its extreme pointĽ intending to break forcefully with the established order; it fightsĽ or rather strugglesĽ in a space of forces which have been declared and become rivals; every revolution is followed by restorations which take more or less time to arrive. The silent transformation does not use forceĽ it does not fightĽ but makes its wayĽ infiltratesĽ spreadsĽ branches out and becomes pervasive; this is also why it is silent because it does not give rise to any resistance to it. “It is these silent transformationsĽ more than the force of the rebellious MassesĽ the ultimate utopian representation of the AgentĽ which overturn and will overturn all the Ancient Regimes through progressive erosion of everything that supports themĽ in relation to which actions and revolutions are perhaps less catalyzers than simply indicators” ĚJullien 2011Ľ 65 Ŕ 6Řě. The process of globalization as an emergence of the silent transformation especially in its forced neoliberal version has not found a point of acceptance which would allow its integration into historical context. History would not be over because it had been forever pacified: terrorism is the manifestation of the negative in historyĽ which is today no longer allowed to be aimed outside because it belonged to another camp or another class as in the time of the Cold War ĚJullien 2011Ľ 66; 120ě. The future is open to several alternatives. One can imagine global governance on the basis of international lawĽ which builds on the reality of a multipolar worldĽ or an intercultural dialogue as a means of shaping a single cosmopolitan earthly “civilization” instead of a war over hegemony. The transformation of capitalism will take place one way or another; bets are being laid on the costs. The hopes are pinned on taking a moral stance: hecatombs of victims cannot be redressed by hollow gestures; empathy with them could help us in our effort to change the value priorities of the sorely-tried classes of Western civilization. 47 Ladislav Hohoš References BENJAMINĽ W. Ě1ř6Řě: Thesis on the Philosophy of History. In: BenjaminĽ W.: Illuminations. New York: Schocken Books. BENJAMINĽ W. Ě1řřřě: Iluminácie. Bratislava: Kalligram. BONDYĽ E. Ě2005ě: O globalizaci. Brno: vyd. L. Marek. BONDYĽ E. Ě2013ě: Why I Am Still a Marxist: The Question of Ontology. In: BondyĽ E.: Postpříběh, příležitostné eseje a rekapitulace. Praha: DharmaGhaia. CLARKĽ C. Ě2013ě: The Sleepwalkers. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. CLARKĽ C. Ě2014ě: Náměsičníci. Jak Evropa v roce 1914 dospěla k válce. Praha: BB/art. DINUŠĽ P. Ŕ HOHOŠĽ L. Ŕ HRUBECĽ M. a kol. Ě2014ě: Revoluce nebo transformace – Revolúcia alebo transformácia. Praha-Bratislava: VedaFilosofia. FURETĽ F. Ě1řřřě: The Passing of an Ilusion. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. FURETĽ F. Ě2000ě: Minulosť jednej ilúzie. Bratislava: Agora. GRAEBERĽ D. Ě2011ě: Debt: the first 5,000 years. BrooklynĽ New York: Melville House Publishing. GRAEBERĽ D. Ě2012ě: Dluh: prvních 5000 let. Brno: BizBooks. HONNETHĽ A. Ě2013ě: Kommunikative Erschließung der Vergangenheit. In: HonnethĽ A.: Die zerissene Welt des Sozialen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkampf Verlag. JULLIENĽ F. Ě2011ě: The Silent Transformations. London: Seagul Books. KELLERĽ J. Ě2007ě: Teorie modernizace. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství. PATOČKAĽ J. Ě1řř6ě: Péče o duši I. Praha: Oikoymenh. PIKETTYĽ T. Ě2014ě: Capital in the Twenty-First Century. CambridgeĽ Mass.: Belknap Press. REICHĽ R. Ě200Řě: Supercapitalism. Cambridge: Icon Books. REIMANĽ M. Ě1řř1ě: Ruská revoluce. Praha: Naše vojsko. ROBINSONĽ W. I. Ě2004ě: A Theory of Global Capitalism. BaltimoreĽ Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press. ROBINSONĽ W. I. Ě200řě: Teorie globálního kapitalismu. Praha: Filosofia. 4Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 ROTHKOPFĽ D. Ě200Řě: Superclass: The global power elite and the world they are making. New York: FarrarĽ Straus and Giroux. ROTHKOPFĽ D. Ě200řě: Supertřída. Jak globální mocenská elita pretváří svět. Praha: Beta Ŕ Dobrovský. SCHWEICKARTĽ D. Ě2002ě: After Capitalism. LanhamĽ Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. SCHWEICKARTĽ D. Ě2010ě: Po kapitalizme. Bratislava: vyd. Spolku slovenských spisovate ov. TOYNBEEĽ A. Ě1ř64ě: Civilization on Trial and the World and the West. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company. Doc. PhDr. Ladislav HohošĽ CSc. Department of Philosophy and of History of Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy Comenius University in Bratislava Gondova 2, P.O.BOX 32 814 99 Bratislava Slovak Republic ladislav.hohos@gmail.com 4ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 )NTERSTATE RECOGN)T)ON AND )TS GLOBAL OVERCOM)NG Marek Hrubec The article focuses on philosophy of recognition among states and on its relation to recognition on the transnational and global levels. Specifically, it analyses positive aspects and limits of a concept of interstate recognition developed by Axel Honneth within his Critical theory of recognition, and shows the process of articulation of transnational and global recognition. The first part of the article touches on the metatheoretical plane of Honneth‟s conception of moral realism, and specifies it with regard to the issue of the legitimacy of states. Then, it focuses on the fundamentals of Honneth‟s concept of recognition between states, and dwells on the necessity of recognition for each state. The second part formulates the dilemmas and limits of the concept of interstate recognition, especially in view of the globalization processes and in relation to a concept of the individual in relations of mutual recognition in a community. Then, it discusses Heins‟ and Pogge‟s problematic transposition of the patterns of social relations from the national plane to the international plane. The third part focuses on developmental tendencies of international and global recognition, and deals with an important transitory concept of extra-territorial recognition. The fourth part analyses possibilities and ambivalences of global state, following especially Alexander Wendt a William Scheuerman. In the end, it sketches possibilities of further examination of a theory of recognition at the transnational and global levels. Keywords: recognition – states – Critical theory – globalization – legitimacy “Global social and economic processes bring individuals and institutions into ongoing structural connection with one another across national jurisdictions. Adopting a conception of responsibility that recognizes this connection is an important element in developing a theory of global justice.” Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice The theme of socialĽ economicĽ political and legal aspects of an arrangement beyond boundaries of nation state has become important 51 Marek Hrubec especially in the last decades of the intensified global interactionsĽ mainly after the fall of the bipolar world. In this paperĽ I will focus on philosophy of recognition among states and on its relation to recognition on the transnational and global levels. SpecificallyĽ I will analyse positive aspects and limits of a concept of interstate recognitionĽ mainly developed by Axel Honneth within his ground-breaking Critical theory of recognitionĽ and show the process of articulation of global alternatives of this interstate concept.1 Axel Honneth articulates developmental trends that are detectable in the moral grammar of social conflicts based on struggle for recognition in the West in the timeframe of the past few centuries. The concept of the polemical relationships of mis/recognition between states is one of the specifications of this concept of social conflicts.2 Although Honneth‟s analysis of the order beyond nation-states has not been fully developed yetĽ it has opened many very relevant and provocative questions. In generalĽ it is possible to say thatĽ compared to analyses of local and national levels of recognitionĽ analyses of recognition beyond the borders of a jurisdiction of state are not yet sufficiently detailed and require other research. Analyses of the struggle for recognition among states need further conceptual distinction between the different relations crossing state borders. If we divide these topics into classic international issues and current transnational and global issuesĽ Honneth‟s analyses are based primarily on the category of international order.3 He refers to the main focus of his position as an analysis of recognition between states. We might talk of the concept of international orderĽ as he himself uses the term “international” as a synonym for “interstate”.4 One of my main sources in the writing of this paper comprised discussions at a conference held at the university PUCRS in Porto AlegreĽ which was dedicated to the Critical theory of Axel Honneth. I would like to thank especially Nythamar de OliveiraĽ Giovani Saavedra and Emil Sobottka from that university for the invitationĽ and particularly Axel Honneth for the discussions. In this paperĽ I use and develop my analyses worked out in: ĚHrubec 2011ě. 2 Particularly: ĚHonneth 2012Ľ 137 Ŕ 152ě. 3 Honneth makes a classic differentiation into individual statesĽ and examines particularly with states in the international context. He does not deal with relations between peoplesĽ as performed by RawlsĽ for example. ĚRawls 1řřřě. 4 ĚHonneth 2012ě. 1 52 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 That is not to sayĽ howeverĽ that Honneth wishes to attribute normative priority to states and the relations of recognition between themĽ and examine his position simply within the theory of national and international relations. His general social theory analyses also a surplus of normative validity which is expected to correspond to the developmental tendencies of the patterns of recognition. ThusĽ his theory should include also the trends of transnational and global development. Of courseĽ this raises considerable attention and questions among many scholars who continue to build on or develop the concept of international orderĽ or proceed beyond it to the macro-regional and global levels. HoweverĽ because Honneth has not focused on interstate relations in the explicit way in many papers so farĽ it is necessary to explore not only his texts which are dedicated directly to that theme5 but also to his specific theses in the texts which have the main subject of study different.6 I will address these issues in the following order. In the first part of my paperĽ on the metatheoretical planeĽ I will touch Honneth‟s conception of moral realismĽ and specify it with regard to the issue of the legitimacy of states. ThenĽ I will focus on the fundamentals of Honneth‟s concept of recognition between statesĽ and dwell on the necessity of recognition for each stateĽ including an issue of the relationship between the state and political and cultural recognition. In the second partĽ I will formulate the dilemmas and limits of the concept of interstate recognitionĽ especially in view of the globalization processes and in relation to a concept of the individual in relations of mutual recognition in a community. ThenĽ I will discuss Heins‟s and Pogge‟s inadequate transposition of the patterns of social relations from the national plane to the international and global plane. In the third partĽ I will focus on developmental tendencies of international and global recognitionĽ and recall a part of my own theory which is focused on an important transitory concept of extra-territorial recognition. In the fourth partĽ I will analyse possibilities and ambivalences of global stateĽ following especially Alexander Wendt a The principal analyses should focus primarily on the already mentioned text: ĚHonneth 2012ě; See also his paper on philosophical bases of the international covenantsĽ specifically on human rights: ĚHonneth 1řř7ě. In German: ĚHonneth 2000aě. 6 ĚHonneth 1řř6ě. In: German orig.: ĚHonneth 1řř2ě; ĚFraser Ŕ Honneth 2003aě. In German: ĚFraser Ŕ Honneth 2003bě; ĚHonneth 2014ě. In German orig.: ĚHonneth 2011ě. See also some analyses of Honneth‟s team in the book he edited: ĚHonneth 2002ě. 5 53 Marek Hrubec William Scheuerman. In the endĽ I will conclude by stressing the concept of extra-territorial recognitionĽ and showing possibilities of further examination of a theory of recognition at the transnational and global levels. 1. Interstate Recognition Before addressing the proper issue of recognition between statesĽ it is important to deal at least briefly with a metatheoretical concept of realismĽ and distinguish Honneth‟s concept from other onesĽ especially from Rawls‟s one which is discussed in this context as well and mentioned also by Honneth. There seems to be the certain similarity between Honneth and Rawls because the both share a kind of realismĽ although more detailed specifications show that the two concepts of realism differ. While Rawls gave up a connection of normative theoretical and empirical kinds of research and focused only on normative constructivismĽ he accedes at least formally to one version of a concept of realistic utopiaĽ whichĽ on the one handĽ transcends reality with the certain normative visionĽ andĽ on the other handĽ limits normativity by the realistic applicability of its design. ĚRawls 1řřřĽ pp. 4Ľ 5 Ŕ 6Ľ 16 Ŕ 17ě His concept is designed for “reconciliation” with the social worldĽ which for Rawls means that it is proven that there is a real possibility of the certain kind of society and politicsĽ even if it is not based on the struggles for justice in the reality but only on Rawls‟s individual vision. Although Rawls keeps to this formulation of a realistic utopiaĽ in the background of his reasoning lurks another ideaĽ whichĽ while not directly included in his definition of a realistic utopiaĽ is an integral component of his political theory. At play here is not merely a pragmatic consideration of feasibility trying to avoid more demanding requirements of the people and to establish a compromise solution in the real politics. His version of realistic utopia includes the element of civil legitimacy as well. This element is also close to Honneth‟s concept of moral realism at first sight. HoweverĽ unlike of RawlsĽ Honneth does not concentrate only on the practical application of normativity into the framework of problematic legitimacy of momentary time cut but he views it systematically within 54 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 the framework of his concept of moral realism7 which enables his theory to draw on the long-term social struggles and their normative demands for legitimacy in general. He develops not only a conception of the synchronic spheres of recognition but also and mainly a conception of the diachronicĽ historical development of patterns of recognition. From this point of viewĽ Honneth‟s concept of realism can extend beyond a description of the situation between states in the momentary time cut and target a normative articulation of long-term tendencies of struggles against misrecognition between states. As for the longer conceptual historyĽ Honneth follows Hegel in many respectsĽ8 as is well knownĽ but he takes a different path in recognition between states9 because Hegel associates recognition only with the claims of nations as yet unrecognizedĽ i.e. nations which do not yet feature as actors in international relations ĚHegel 1řř1ě. HoweverĽ Honneth is aware thatĽ while the pursuit of recognition is a common part of the vocabulary of individual governments or statesĽ consideration of this vocabulary urges a more cautious approach to the use of the concept of recognition in international relations. MoreoverĽ while purposefully rational arguments about relationships between states prevail in theoretical considerations dealing with international relationsĽ the term recognition is used in a different sense in the sphere of theory in international law than that intuitively perceived and implemented in philosophical tradition associated especially with existentialist connotations. It is important that the definition of the stateĽ in international-law discourseĽ whether theoretical or practicalĽ usually requires not only people Ěa populationěĽ territoryĽ and a government but also the ability to enter into relations with other statesĽ which implies one or the other kind of external recognition by other states.10 The struggle for recognition here goes beyond the scope of Honneth elaborates on his arguments regarding moral realism in this sub-chapterĽ for example: Critical Social Theory and Immanent Transcendence. In: ĚFraser Ŕ Honneth 2003aĽ 23Ř Ŕ 247ě. 8 ĚHonneth 2000bě. The German version: ĚHonneth 2001ě. See also ĚHonneth 2014ě. 9 ĚHonneth 2012ě; ĚHonneth 1řř7ě. 10 Cf. analysis recognizing the legitimacy that a state receives from other states on the basis of fulfilling certain criteria of justice: ĚBuchanan 1řřřě. Disputation with this approach is offeredĽ for exampleĽ by justification recognizing legitimacy from a pragmatic point of view: ĚNaticchia 1řřřě. 7 55 Marek Hrubec psychological interpretation which concentrates on the relations between human individuals or smaller groups of persons. To specify the kinds of recognition between statesĽ it is relevant to see Honneth‟s polemic with Hans Kelsen when Honneth questions his reduction of recognition to descriptive registration of the fact of the existence of one state by another state.11 Although Kelsen grasps legal recognition as a reciprocal act between two or more entitiesĽ he perceives recognition in a relatively narrow sense of cognitionĽ i.e. only as an act of a government acknowledging the existence of another state. This is not an active volitional relationship with anotherĽ but only confirmation of a fact. HoweverĽ as recognition requires a real possibility of a decision and not just a confirmation of the status quoĽ according to Kelsen this is not recognition but mere Ěone-offě cognition. While this Kelsen‟s interpretation is considered unconvincing by HonnethĽ he finds an adequate interpretation in one of Kelsen‟s distinctions Ŕ the distinction between legal and political recognition ĚKelsen 1ř41ě. While legal recognition as mere cognition is effectively no recognition for KelsenĽ he considers “political” acts of recognitionĽ through which governments positively or negatively relate to the governments and citizens of other countriesĽ to be understandable and real. He takes the term political recognition to mean roughly what Honneth calls recognition in general. More specificallyĽ political recognition can be grasped as part of Honneth‟s broader concept of recognition which includes also legal recognition.12 Although political recognition can also be viewed as specificĽ it is also a more fundamental concept than legal recognition asĽ in a more detailed interpretationĽ it becomes evident that a legal relationship to other states is not possible without constantly assuming political recognition in the sense of obtaining affirming responses to efforts at official recognition of the collective identity of the state. Individual states need not only the legitimacy of their citizensĽ but also the legitimacy of the outside world beyond their borders. States receive neither of these types of legitimacy entirely automatically and permanently. In this regardĽ statesĽ even those already recognizedĽ are struggling for their recognition ĚHonneth 2012ě; Honneth analyses particularly the text: ĚKelsen 1ř41ě. See the analyses of Honneth‟s earlier texts: ĚThompson 2006ě. Cf. with the later one: ĚHonneth 2014ě. 11 12 56 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 all of the time. This argument also applies to authoritarian states where the people have no real opportunity to participate in the running of the state. These statesĽ tooĽ if they do not wish to rely only on violence in the internal and external contextsĽ must strive for the certain legitimacy among their citizens and other countries. FurthermoreĽ given that absolute violence is both unsustainable and pragmatically inefficientĽ each state works with legitimacy to a greater or lesser extent. In this senseĽ howeverĽ it would be more accurate to speak of the recognition of the legitimacy thanĽ generallyĽ of political recognitionĽ which may include a wider range of recognition. HoweverĽ as I have noted aboveĽ states also need long-term recognitionĽ not only current legitimacy. Honneth touches yet another form of recognition sought by statesĽ such being unofficial recognition Ěas opposed to the above-mentioned more official recognitioně on both cultural and diplomatic planes. He refers to this as the symbolic space of meaning which creates the context of official political recognition. This kind of symbolic recognition is often implicit but no less significant. In factĽ it is more fundamental. It is not purely purposefully rational action aimed at the pursuit of power and certain goods but a symbolic act that contains normative requirements which are based on the specific expectations. ThereforeĽ it is impossible here to make a clean cut between strategic action and social action of a symbolic nature. This interconnection is not a haphazard and auxiliary explanation but corresponds with the above concept of interlinking the descriptive and normative aspects of recognition. This is also evident from military recognitionĽ whichĽ by contrastĽ is strongly linked with power and which may be symbolically manifested in conflict situations only by tacit recognitionĽ i.e. tolerance in the form of the absence of military intervention. ThusĽ the struggle for recognition between states may be perceived as long-term efforts aimed at respect developed from the perspective of members of the community of the state orĽ indirectlyĽ their political and cultural representatives home and abroad. According to HonnethĽ such efforts struggle for recognition of a particular group of persons whichĽ thusĽ takes on a specific bond of reciprocity both within the group and with external entities providing recognition. These relations are not unidirectional since recognition is a reciprocal relationshipĽ even if the 57 Marek Hrubec parties can assume asymmetrical positions.13 2. The Dilemmas of Transcending Interstate Recognition I will focus on dilemmas contained in Honneth‟s concept of relations between statesĽ the dilemmas that are characteristic problems of similar concepts of other authors as well. At the same timeĽ I will point out the potential which Honneth‟s theory of recognition offers for the redefinition of the concept of interstate recognition andĽ more generallyĽ international relations and global interactions. Despite the fact that Honneth has yet to develop his concept of recognition in this directionĽ he presents strong arguments underpinning such development. I will pay attention to the difference between international and cosmopolitan theoriesĽ as well as to the conservativist reasons preventing theorists of international relations from advancing from an international theory to the direction of a cosmopolitan theory. The progressivist perspective does not mean a resignation on international issues but an inclusion of international relations into the broader global context which is very important especially for the global development of the last decades. Honneth is prevented from developing a more adequate theory by the fact that he underestimates the negative impacts of economic globalization. A concept of international relations is limited here because it is not able to cross relations between states and address the important problems of global capitalism. Many authors point out the influences on national socialĽ economicĽ political and cultural phenomena in society caused by various problematic globalĽ especially economic and financialĽ interventions that can substantially and rapidly worsen nation-states circumstancesĽ such as standard of livingĽ and can significantly Honneth‟s position is illuminated by seeing the conflict between the constitutive theory of statehoodĽ which is based on the recognition of a state by other statesĽ and declaratory theory is not critical in this case because even declaratory theories eventually assume someĽ though not perhaps politicalĽ recognition by other states. This is evident in the 1ř33 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of StatesĽ where the explicit political existence of the stateĽ in one sentenceĽ is regarded as independent of recognition by other states butĽ in other sentencesĽ certain forms of recognition are assumedĽ for exampleĽ in the matter of conserving peace by “recognized pacific methods”. Cf. ĚWallace-Bruce 1řř4ě. 13 5Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 compromise national and international justice.14 As I will explainĽ a social theoryĽ which would include analyses of the developmental transition from the theory of international interactions to global interactionsĽ is more compelling than the traditional concept of international relationsĽ which underestimatesĽ or even ignoresĽ the globalization-based economic and other pressures and opposing struggles for global justice. HoweverĽ even if Honneth‟s theory shares these shortcomings with the mainstream international theoryĽ he offers a basis for overcoming them. While the mainstream theories of international justiceĽ i.e. liberal ones Ěbe they formulated by John Rawls or other theoristsěĽ suffers from deeper social philosophical deficitsĽ Honneth presents a way to transcend them by his theory of recognition. It can be illuminated by the problem of justice. The guaranteeing of justice and rightsĽ including justice within international lawĽ requires a certain political responsibility and solidarityĽ and therefore also identification with the political community. The key to identification with the community is basic good in the form of relations of mutual recognition.15 Honneth observes: “… HegelĽ in contrast to RawlsĽ does not assume that this „basic good‟ is a good in the narrow senseĽ something which ought to be divided and distributed according to a just standard; ratherĽ it seems that Hegel wants to advocate the idea that modern societies can be just only to the extent of their ability to enable all subjects to participate in this „basic good‟ equally” ĚHonneth 2000bĽ 27 Ŕ 2Řě.16 According to HonnethĽ although Rawls rightly opens an issue of the good in distributive social justiceĽ he does not understand its foundation in the basic good of relation of social recognitionĽ which is a prerequisite for any other goods and also justice in general. Honneth is right when he stresses that if individuals were more rooted in the mentioned basic goodĽ i.e. if they were involved in relationships of mutual recognition with others in the local communityĽ they could be better integrated into relations within the national community relations and could demonstrate solidarity therein. ThenĽ it is possible to addĽ they could smoothly go beyond this framework andĽ in solidarityĽ align So farĽ seeĽ for example: ĚRobinson 2004ě; ĚLinklater 2007; ĚLinklater 1řřŘě; ĚForst 2002ě; ĚDelanty 200řě; ĚFraser 2010ě. 15 ĚHonneth 2000bě. 16 See also cf. ĚHonneth 1řř6ě; ĚTaylor 1řŘ5ě; ĚTaylor 1řř5ě. 14 5ř Marek Hrubec themselves with the macro-regional or continental intercultural community on the higher level and the largest cosmopolitan community on the highest level as well. This version of cosmopolitan theory develops half-forgotten elements of Hegelian philosophy establishing universalist characteristics of community. Although Honneth builds on Hegel‟s concept of recognition and communityĽ he follows the more traditional version of his concept of international interactions and does not envisage a kind of a neo-Hegelian concept that would transcend the boundaries of international politics and analyse various transnational and global issuesĽ as some other contemporary authors do.17 ThereforeĽ the considerable potential offered by Honneth‟s general theory to a theory of global justice has not been used by him yet. The main problem I find with Honneth‟s concept is the underestimation of transnational and global interactionsĽ and consequently a certain reification of the nation state. This approach prevents him from grasping major evolutionary dynamics taking place above the plane of nation states especially during the last decadesĽ because transnationalization and globalization significantly de-statize economicĽ politicalĽ legalĽ social and other national orders. And if Honneth disregards this aspectĽ he cannot sufficiently develop his thoughts on criticism of global social pathologies and social injusticeĽ and address the position of West in the global framework of agonic intercultural relations.18 Despite these problemsĽ Honneth‟s establishment of an analysis of the order beyond the nation state in his theory of recognition provides an excellent starting pointĽ but he has not used it yet. The line of reasoning with this cosmopolitan intimation is followed by Volker HeinsĽ who recently tried to apply it to three of Honneth‟s types of The representative example of this position can be foundĽ for exampleĽ in the texts of Robert Fine: ĚFine 2003aěĽ ĚFine 2007ě; See the other examples: ĚBurns 2013ě; ĚBuchwalter 2013ě; ĚJones 1řřřě; ĚVincent 1řŘ3ě. If a cosmopolitan theory was not based in the relations of mutual recognition of persons within a communityĽ it would suffer the same problems as traditional international theories. Neohegelian defenders of cosmopolitan justice overcome the nationalistic explanatory framework of that timeĽ and articulate a cosmopolitan potential of Hegel‟s theory which is present in his critique of cosmopolitanism alienated from the communityĽ i. e. his critique of -ism in cosmopolitanism. ĚFine 2003bě. Cf. with various alternative cosmopolitan concepts in: ĚDelanty 2012ě. 18 ĚHrubec 2013ě; ĚHrubec 2010ě. See also other papers in: ĚBurns Ŕ Thompson 2013ě. 17 60 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 recognition.19 In his studyĽ he tries to extend Honneth‟s theory in the cosmopolitan way but while his main intention is goodĽ the realization is not successful. Based on Honneth‟s three-dimensional theory of recognitionĽ he inferred arguments for the transition from recognition within a national framework to cosmopolitan recognitionĽ and he incoherently draws on certain elements of international theory at the same time. It is more or less the mechanical transmission of Honneth‟s ideas from a national level to a global planeĽ regardless of the different basis of the theory and the context. Looking at Honneth‟s theoryĽ which belongs to the sphere of nation states and his analyses of international relationsĽ we can ask if there is a parallel between the kinds of recognition at national and international level. We can explore whether and how such identification beyond the nation state is possible in the unchanged form of Honneth‟s three kinds of recognition: love and friendshipĽ equal respect and rightsĽ esteem and performance. While Honneth himself does not undertake such an analysisĽ Heins attempts to do so by transposing these three differentiated spheres into international and global relations. Just as Thomas Pogge redefined John Rawls‟ A Theory of Justice by the transnational extension of the national principles of justiceĽ Heins makes a transnational extension of Honneth‟s patterns of recognition formulated in his book The Struggle for Recognition.20 As is clear from the title of Heins‟s article Ě“Realizing Honneth”ěĽ this parallel with Pogge Ě“Realizing Rawls”ě is intentional and acknowledged. HeinsĽ like PoggeĽ shares the main ideas with the author of the original theory he is developingĽ and elaborates on them in an area beyond the framework of the nation state. HoweverĽ there are serious limits to this parallel resulting from the different bases of Rawls‟s and Honneth‟s theories. Liberal theory and Critical theory haveĽ of courseĽ different starting points and bases. It can be said thatĽ although Honneth and Heins agree with Rawls and Pogge on ĚHeins 200Řaě I would like to thank Volker Heins for discussions on our international and transnational analyses of Honneth‟s theory of recognition. 20 Heins‟s intention is to “„globalize‟ Honneth in the same way as Thomas Pogge was able to globalize Rawls”. ĚHeins 200ŘaĽ 3ě; ĚPogge 1řř0ě; ĚPogge 2002ě. Cf. the investigation of Honneth‟s three spheres of recognition beyond the state with an intension global theory of justice as recognition but without a necessary global transposition of Honneth‟s spheres: ĚThompson 2013ě. 19 61 Marek Hrubec the idea of the need for distributive justiceĽ Honneth and Heinz criticize the mainstream theory of distributive justiceĽ including the Rawlsian theoryĽ for deforming the social relations among human beingsĽ which occurs as a result of ignoring the patterns of mutual recognition. HoweverĽ when it comes to issues of transnational or global justiceĽ this parallel is apt. Heins‟s efforts are aimed at the global transfer of Honneth‟s recognition patterns that would determine the moral expectations of individuals in mutual relations of loveĽ rights and esteem in a transnational environment. He does it even if he is aware that the institutional framework that would provide a backdrop for the mechanic application of Honneth‟s three principles of recognition in the international arena is very weak and specific. The kind type of recognition Ŕ in the form of love and friendship Ŕ seems to be in first sight scale-neutral in relation to the territorial extent. This is borne out by the various forms of love carried across bordersĽ whether formally unregistered long-distance relationshipsĽ marriage between partners from different countriesĽ and so on. HoweverĽ the automatic transmission of patterns of recognition from a national to an international and transnational levelĽ as proposed by HeinsĽ is not possible. For exampleĽ the child sponsorship he refers to does not fit into the category of recognition in the form of loveĽ which in Honneth‟s analyses at national level relates to intimate and emotional relationships between a small number of people. Although this kind of adoption resembles the traditional parent-child relationshipĽ it is primarily a relationship of charity or solidarity with people living in a state of insecurityĽ particularly in the developing countriesĽ and not a relationship of family love. We have to see that a child sponsorship is a borderline category relationship on the boundary of Honneth‟s first and third type of recognition. ThusĽ it requires a specific articulation which would formulate the new important transnational and global patterns of recognitionĽ and the mechanical transposition of the patterns of recognition is not possible. I would like to stress other problematic relationshipsĽ specifically transnational care practicesĽ whichĽ in the form of immigrant nannies and domestic workersĽ cause mothers from less developed countries to leave their children and seek work in richer households in developed countries. This is the transnational exploitative deformation of interpersonal relationships whichĽ in a significantĽ but 62 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 more parentally detached mannerĽ benefits only one partyĽ i.e. the employerĽ and does not constitute the development of transnational love.21 In connection with the motto “the personal is political”Ľ it could also be said that “the personal is global”Ľ but as a problem rather than part of an articulated sphere of recognition.22 These complications are also evident in other examples of Heins‟s transposition. The inclusion of these examples in Honneth‟s theoryĽ if it were theoretically possibleĽ would require substantial reformulation.23 HoweverĽ Heins does not undertake this. He also disregards the fact that other forms of recognition on the first planeĽ such as friendshipĽ are already realized at international and transnational level to some extent and are compatible with Honneth‟s theory. Friendship mayĽ but need notĽ take the form of traditional friendship based on personal contactĽ and it may also be a virtual friendship in various forms of the widespread social media.24 The second level of recognition Ŕ legal recognition Ŕ is regarded by Heins as territorially highly specific.25 While he does not consider the institutional anchoring of the first level of recognition to be problematic territoriallyĽ legal recognition is institutionally closely related to the territory of the nation stateĽ in particular because of the enforcement of individual rights by the government institutions. Although he also considers human rightsĽ he points to the possibility of their limited application due to a lack of institutional support.26 If human rights do not become part of the constitutions of nation statesĽ they must be regarded more as manifestation rights onlyĽ the strength of which lies primarily in ĚEhrenreich Ŕ Hochschild 2003ě; ĚHondagneu-Sotelo Ŕ Avila 2006ě; ĚParrenas 2001ě. ĚHochschild 2005ě. 23 Honneth‟s redefinition of his own original interpretation of recognition in the form of love in the sense of the possibility of the further normative development of this form of recognition facilitates the development of considerations in this transnational direction. See his sub-chapter The Capitalist Recognition Order and Conflicts over Distribution. In: ĚFraser Ŕ Honneth 2003aĽ 135ffě. 24 These interactions can be realized in various ambivalent formsĽ from e-mail exchanges to daily interaction in social networks such as FacebookĽ MySpaceĽ etc. 25 The more detailed elaboration of an analysis of the legal sphere of recognition is performed by Heins primarily on the examples of children‟s global rightsĽ human rights and intellectual propertyĽ but his articles also offer more general arguments about the global order: ĚHeins 200ŘaĽ 15 Ŕ 16ě; ĚHeins 200Řbě. 26 Cf. alternative point of view: ĚPogge 2002ě. 21 22 63 Marek Hrubec their political and diplomatic significance. The promotion of human rights in international relations can at least draw attention to problems and demand solutions in the spirit of the internationally accepted Declaration and the related international agreements. According to HeinsĽ delineating this sphere of influence determines the limits of human rights. The end of the Cold War and the political opportunities that this opened up led Honneth to promote the need for the moralization of world politics. He argued in favour of strengthening the importance of human rights and the possibility of the legal enforcement thereof27 which he later Ŕ in his paper on recognition between states Ŕ specifies mainly by developing arguments in favour of pre-legal presuppositions of the legal arrangement. As Honneth attaches importance to this kind of recognition on the international scaleĽ his focus on human rights issues is the relevant topic in an analysis of his theory. Heins‟s point of view is limited in that human rights are bound only to statesĽ and international institutions extending beyond states with their internationalĽ macroregional and global activities are underestimated. As I will showĽ transnational and global elements in the application of human rightsĽ especially extraterritorial recognitionĽ should be added to the overlaps in the inter-national frameworkĽ not only by macroregional and global institutionsĽ but also through nation states. In this respectĽ Heins underestimates legal recognition in international and global relations. According to HeinsĽ the third type of recognitionĽ which includes forms of esteem and solidarityĽ is deficient at international and transnational level28 becauseĽ beyond the nation stateĽ it does not have an adequate parallel; speci-ficallyĽ there are insufficiently developed global values to form a basis for this third type of recognition. The greatly unequal financial valuation of work on a transnational scale disrespects people who make a claim to the meritocratic valuation of work. There are only exceptions in particular sectorsĽ such as some servicesĽ which promote certain transnational standardsĽ but tend to in-troduce unfavourable working conditions. As a result of comparisons of work remunerationĽ in recent times there has been a greater push aimed at demanding higher wages for workersĽ at least in some sectorsĽ such as agriĚHonneth 1řř7ě. ĚHeins 200ŘaĽ 16ffě. In the area of non-governmental organizationsĽ howeverĽ he does elaborate well on his analysis: ĚHeins 200Řcě. 27 28 64 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 cultureĽ or in the struggle for gender equality. One might askĽ howeverĽ whether it would be fruitful to focus more on criticism of the current condi-tions and on an interpretation of normative transnational and global expecta-tions currently manifested and promoted in these struggles for recognition. To sum up Heins‟s mechanical transposition of patterns of recognition from a national level to international and transnational levelsĽ we can say that he regards the different levels of recognition as transposable: the first kind of recognition Ělove and friendshipě smoothlyĽ the second kind of recognition Ělegal recognitioně partiallyĽ and the third kind of recognition Ěesteemě in the uneasy way. All the three types of recognition specific for a national level in Honneth‟s theoryĽ howeverĽ according to Heins‟s opinionĽ occur to a greater or lesser extent in internationally and transnationally institutionalized patterns of recognition. 3. From International to Global: Extra-territorial Recognition Now I will move on from the problematic attempts to transcend the concept of national and international recognition to the articulation of a more appropriate approach that is able to realize this transcendence. I have thus far focused my objections to Heins‟s transposition only on particular issues within each type of recognition. HoweverĽ I think that his main problem is deeper. The fundamental problem is his ahistorical approach to the patterns of recognition. As Heins copies Pogge‟s transposition of Rawls‟s theoryĽ he also gratuitously follows his ahistorical approach to the principles of justice. While an ahistorical approach is typical for liberal theoryĽ it is entirely inadequate for Critical theoryĽ especially in Honneth‟s version. Honneth explicitly conducts a detailed analysis of both the synchronous and diachronic Ěhistoricalě dimensions of the patterns of recognition. FurthermoreĽ for himĽ the analysis of the historical aspect is not just an accessoryĽ but a highly important and fundamental part of his methodology and significant for Critical theory in general. And since Heins‟s static transmission of the patterns of recognition from the national level to the international plane does not reflect the historical developments in institutional structures of recognition at international levelĽ it is unable to provide an interpretation of the structure of patterns of recognition at 65 Marek Hrubec international and transnational levels. ThereforeĽ Heins‟s transposition is not in fact an elaboration of Honneth‟s theory of recognition but contradicts it methodologically andĽ therebyĽ also in the content in the end. Honneth is aware of the difficulties of such a transpositionĽ and does not even attempt this. ThereforeĽ whereas he considers three levels of recognition in the local and national communitiesĽ he does not accede to this on the plane of international relations because he sees there is no support for it. He knows that they are similarities between the national and international levels but there is a specific development of specific spheres of recognition beyond the boundaries of nation states. What is moreĽ in the different conditions of international relationsĽ he takes the view that it is not currently possible to rely on the necessary social institutions.29 At the international levelĽ thereforeĽ Honneth concentrates on the general recognition of states and specifically on the recognition of the personality of states. From this perspectiveĽ his analysis of recognition between states can be considered an inspiring but underdeveloped contribution to the analysis of the contemporary recognition beyond the borders of nation states. While Honneth‟s analysis offers mainly a model of three patterns of recognition in the Western contextĽ Heins attempts to transpose this modelĽ in a Western-centric wayĽ into the global arena without analysing the formation of patterns of recognition in other Ěnon-Westerně cultures and their intercultural interactions. This absence of the cross-cultural aspect is another serious deficiency in Heins‟s analysis. Despite the overall problematic approach which he prefersĽ his analysis keeps in some aspects with Honneth30 when he shows that legal recognition offers a Ěquasi-ěuniversal hope for global recognition even if he more or less reproduces Honneth‟s basic structure of legal recognition from the national level. HoweverĽ there is in fact the real international and global potential of legal recognition because the gradual establishment of the international legal structures already represents the certain good institutionalized values and structures shared by individual states and other actors. NeverthelessĽ the articulation of this form of recognition A similar argumentĽ again on a metatheoretical planeĽ is developed by Honneth in his response to Nancy Fraser‟s chapter “Concluding Conjunctural Reflections: Post-FordismĽ PostcommunismĽ and Globalization” in their joint work ĚFraser Ŕ Honneth 2003aě. 30 ĚHonneth 1řř7ě. 29 66 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 needs to be subjected to further critical analysis and the patterns of recognition beyond the borders of the nation state need to be identified more finely than Heins has done. Honneth is aware of that. In his only paper focused on the one specific kind of recognition beyond nation stateĽ he explains the importance of human rights and their legal connotations in the international context.31 Efforts to develop and reformulate Honneth‟s analyses of recognition beyond states require the mapping of the historical developmental trends which are articulated primarily through the ambivalent contemporary international legal order which is based on national legal orders. Although Honneth has yet to analyse global issues directlyĽ the focus of his writings shows that he is inclined to think that legal relations on an international levelĽ especially human rightsĽ are more developed compared to the other two spheres of recognitionĽ i.e. the sphere of personal relationships and the sphere of esteem and performance. More preciselyĽ it can mean thatĽ according to his opinionĽ the remaining two spheres are currently developed much less in international and transnational spaceĽ and thereforeĽ in terms of moral and social realismĽ they provide a weaker basis for important normative connotationsĽ even though they have already started to come more to the fore in the struggle for recognition. NeverthelessĽ the third and the second sphere of recognition are not entirely separate from one another in this context. At international levelĽ legal and cultural recognition is interdependent because legal relations are not completely separated from the cultural status of nation states. Legal relations retain certain cultural connotations of a politics of difference and characteristics of recognitionĽ which is typical for this areaĽ including the use of the term recognition in both the traditional Ěhierarchicalě and the post-traditional Ěequitableě senses. For exampleĽ recognition of the sovereign status of a new state by existing states is a legal actĽ the intercultural component of which is reflected in the acceptance of anotherĽ in the acceptance of the different entity by states from other cultural or civilizational circles. As I already mentionedĽ Honneth‟s analysis of interstate recognition may be viewed only as a partly developed contribution to the study of recognition beyond the borders of nation states. His neglect of otherĽ 31 ĚHonneth 1řř7ě. 67 Marek Hrubec specific forms of recognition on international and transnational planes is difficult to defend. The articulation of forms of recognition on new levels requires an analysis of the developmental tendencies mainly in the last decadesĽ and internationalĽ transnationalĽ and global patterns of recognition need to be identified more finely than Heins has done. I presented such a developmental approach in my analyses of socialĽ economicĽ legalĽ and cultural dimensions of recognition.32 Now I would like to remind only one of my analyses of global society and politics where I showed that the development of recognition is rooted also in social struggles for the reactualization of some aspects of the current international legal systemĽ whichĽ despite not being free of negative aspectsĽ also incorporates various progressive featuresĽ i.e. a surplus of normative validityĽ that can be developed and thus contribute to the formation of a global legal system. One of these features now gaining in importance is a key concept of extraterritorial recognitionĽ33 especially as for social and economic rights. The concept of extraterritorial recognition is able to illuminate the historical developmental dynamics of the contemporary social struggles of the exploitedĽ the marginalized and the poor in the internationalĽ transnational and global contexts. I would like to stress it as both a relevant theoretical concept and a usefulĽ even if still very marginalizedĽ term of legal international practice. There is a big difference in the definition and practical usage of extraterritorial recognition concerning social human rightsĽ on the one sideĽ and civil human rightsĽ on the other. In civil and political rightsĽ the international law states‟ obligations focus on actors living in their territory and falling under their jurisdiction. HoweverĽ for economicĽ social and cultural rightsĽ with due regard to the contemporary international lawĽ extraterritorial recognition may also be required as there is no limit on the scope of action of the law. ThereforeĽ the enforcement of social rights extends beyond the territory of a nation state in the current international law. In the Westphalian system of international relationsĽ the concept of extraterritorial recognition was used in only a small number of cases that had little effect on either the broader population or the system of international relations. HoweverĽ because economic and financial 32 33 ĚHrubec 2010ě. See specificallyĽ for example: ĚHrubec 2013ě. ĚHrubec 2013ě. 6Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 activities of capitalism are increasingly transnational and global and they bring out the serious negative consequences on the lives of peopleĽ the degree to which the recognition of various rights of individuals and groups in other states needs to be secured is highly rising. In other wordsĽ the need to recognise rights beyond national borders in the postWestphalian world of global capitalism is very intensifying. The requirement of extraterritorial recognition of various transboundary rights encapsulates efforts by critical social and political actors in practice to force states to take responsibility for their actionsĽ for the actions of their citizensĽ and especially for the activities of economic entities. The states can and should at least regulate transnational and global economic and financial actors extraterritorially by applying legal means to assert their influence on the activities of “their” transnational corporations in other states.34 A legal relationship should be in place between economic and financial actorsĽ on the one handĽ and their home statesĽ bound by the said international lawĽ on the otherĽ based on which they shoulder legal responsibility for their transnational activities. This means thatĽ as things standĽ there is room for the extraterritorial usage of international standards of social justice to be developed. This approach helps to create a global network of recognition which helps to safeguard the most important bases of social recognition on the local and national levelsĽ and to strengthen regulation on all the levels that contributes to social justiceĽ especially to extreme poverty eradication on the global level. These processes are distinguished by the promising fragments of an emerging global legal order in distributive regulationĽ namely the extraterritorial recognition of individuals and social groups in the developing countries Ěespecially the global poorě harmed by the activities of transnational and global economic and financial actors. NeverthelessĽ the analysis of current international legal structures in relation to transnational and global economic forces and financial institutions also indicates that there are limits to the legal influence that nation states can expect to wield beyond their borders. The inability of individual states to regulate the activities of their transnational corporations and wield influence in the international financial institutions in whose operations they are involved motivates misrecognized persons 34 Ibid; cf. ĚCraven 2007ě. 6ř Marek Hrubec and groups of persons to form requirements for the establishment of transnational regulatory mechanisms safeguarding social justice macroregionally and globally. The contemporary influence brandished by transnational and global economic and financial actors triggers different reactions among those who are misrecognised and unrecognisedĽ such as the everyday resistance of the exploitedĽ the marginalized and the poor and in the developing countries. In factĽ dynamics in the historical development of recognition appear to be moving in precisely this direction: from non-recognition and misrecognitionĽ that has not been eliminated nationally or internationallyĽ to transnational and global recognition on macro-regional and global scales. Of courseĽ extraterritorial recognition does not draw exhaustively on the developmental crystallisation of all forms of recognition of the legal form of recognition but it also contains various forms of social recognition. It reveals articulation of the diachronic aspect of this form of recognition on internationalĽ transnational and global planes that are more far-reaching than Honneth‟s analysis of interstate recognitionĽ which moves beyond the current international order only in the modest way. HoweverĽ at the same timeĽ unlike HeinsĽ who also seeks this more extensive articulation of recognition on an international levelĽ there is a historical dimension to the analysis of the formation of recognition. Other features of the legal sphere of recognition and selected elements of the first and third spheres of recognition would need to be formulated in this developmental wayĽ although that is a matter beyond the scope of this article. I have discussed the separate theoretical articulation of patterns of recognition internationallyĽ transnationally and globally elsewhereĽ both from the social and economic35 and intercultural36 perspectives. Here I concentrate more directly on the line of Honneth‟s arguments. I can only stress that struggles for global justice concerning the extraterritorial recognition are closely linked to some aspects of Honneth‟s concept of recognition which are present also on the global levelĽ especially those aspects which are related to the partly globalized disputes for salaries of the exploited workers and marginalized groups of people in the ĚHrubec 2013ě. Cf.Ľ for example: ĚSklair 2002ě; ĚSklair 2000ě; ĚRobinson 2004ě; ĚBeck 1řřřě; ĚWei 2010ě; ĚEl-Ojeili Ŕ Hayden 2006ě. 36 ĚHrubec 2010ě. Cf. ĚBrown 2000ě; ĚAngle 2002ě; ĚBauer Ŕ Bell 1řřřě; ĚDussel 200řě; ĚFornet-Betancourt 2004ě; ĚAl-Jabri 2011ě; ĚTehranian 2007ě; ĚWiredu 1řř6ě. 35 70 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 developing countriesĽ and social movements accompanied those dynamicsĽ including everyday struggles for survival of the global poor. It is the reason why it is necessary to get at least the basic knowledge of alternative perspectives from other macroregions of the world in order to overcome the West-centric concepts of international relations which do not include the points of view of non-Western authors. The normative concepts of just international and global interactions cannot be formulated really universally without the inclusion of them.37 4. The Perspectives of Global State Whereas Honneth works with a relatively modest surplus of normative validity which can go over the status quo of the contemporary realityĽ andĽ thusĽ reveals lesser emancipatory potential for the development of patterns of recognitionĽ my own interpretation embraces a more demanding surplus of normative validity that contains a more forceful critique of the status quo and offers the opportunity for the further development of recognition. That is why I consider important to analyse also the ambivalences of global state as the limit point of the institutional global analyses. HoweverĽ at the same timeĽ I criticize the authors who anticipate very strong development of the normative potential of recognition in the absence of a sufficiently established relationship with the reality of social criticism and the associated articulation of normative requirements because they may be faced with speculative conclusions. When considering various scenarios of global developmentĽ which have to be subsequently documented by more detailed investigationĽ we should pay attention to the analyses of global state and recognition made by Alexander Wendt.38 It is illuminating to see these analyses by the means of the texts on global reform and world government from the point One of the main problems of the majority of Western theorists of international and global justice is that they know only Western languages and ignore mostly the perspectives formulated in the SlavicĽ ChineseĽ ArabicĽ and other languages. If they exceptionally read some of non-Western theoristsĽ they read only the assimilated selection published in Western languages. 38 ĚWendt 1řřřě; ĚWendt 2003ě; cf. ĚShaw 2000ě; ĚLinklater 2010ě. 37 71 Marek Hrubec of view of progressive realism presented by William Scheuerman.39 If we are to compare Honneth and Wendt‟s theories of recognitionĽ firstĽ the concept of diachronic development needs to be specified because their reasoning on this point leads to very different outcomes. While a difference is readily noticeable between my interpretation above and Honneth‟s opinionĽ the contrast between Honneth and Wendt is even more compelling. HonnethĽ building on his arguments of moral realismĽ contends that we need to move beyond the current state of development by forming normative requirementsĽ assisted by immanent critique and subsequent quasi-transcendental steps steeping such critique in the contradictions of the societal structure. The point here is to find elements of facticity which extend beyond the status quo of the social set-up: according to HonnethĽ nationallyĽ this concerns those three patterns of recognition to which people relate in the criticism of their misrecognitionĽ whilst internationally this area is limited to recognition between states within the framework of existing interstate relationships. Unlike HonnethĽ Wendt defends the stronger historical principle of intentional teleology which delivers a faster dynamics to the developmentĽ specifically the establishment of a world state. HoweverĽ Wendt also differs from realists in the practical-political senseĽ of courseĽ who consider where we are headed in reductionist pursuit of securityĽ because he believes that the pursuit of security Ŕ whether by individuals or entire states Ŕ can be includedĽ once reformulatedĽ in the more suitable category of the struggle for recognition.40 Wendt argues thatĽ although contemporary nations in themselves may seem relatively stableĽ in a global eraĽ given their interconnectionsĽ this is not so. He thinks that the current international order of nation states is unsustainable andĽ thereforeĽ we need to consider what system can replace it. He claims that the dynamics of current and near-future developments will result in a world state: “I argue that a world of territorial states is not stable in the long run. They may be local equilibriaĽ but they inhabit a world system that is in disequilibriumĽ the resolution of which leads to a world state. The mechanism that generates this end-directedness is an interaction between „struggles for recognition‟ at the micro-level and „cultures of anarchy‟ at the macro” ĚWendt 2003Ľ 507ě. 39 40 ĚScheuerman 2011ě. ĚWendt 2003Ľ 4ř3ffĽ and esp. 507ff.ě 72 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 Like HonnethĽ Wendt views the struggle for recognition as an effort to form individual and group identitiesĽ that isĽ as an effort focused on ideasĽ but realised through material disputes. Let‟s take a look at this position more closely. FirstĽ Wendt contends that it may be enough to complete the current internationalisation of political authority and arrive at a global state by reforming the United NationsĽ the European UnionĽ the International Criminal CourtĽ the World Trade Organisation and other institutionsĽ and continue a situation where no institution has a global monopoly on the use of force. In contrastĽ in terms of a concept of the state in the form of a “peaceful federation”Ľ that situation would only constitute a transitional stageĽ because in the long run the system monopolises power at a global level.41 A fundamental argument here is that the transformation of the current form of the state into a global state will require three major changes ĚWendt 2003Ľ 505 ff.ě. FirstlyĽ the world state will require the creation of a “universal security community”. A community of this type is based on the peaceful rather than military handling of disputes. This anticipates that states will be able to abandon the idea of other countries as an existential threat. SecondlyĽ the idea of a universal security community is associated with “universal collective security”Ľ which is impossible unless members of the security community identify threats as common threats and share in the provision of security. ThirdlyĽ a world state requires a “universal supranational authority”Ľ which should be based on safeguarding a globally legitimate method of decision-making with respect to organised violence. The implementation of a universal supranational authority is contingent on states‟ relinquishment of their sovereignty in the field of violence. This three-point approach to the transformation of the current form of the state into a global state is essentially a two-point concept. The first and second pointsĽ i.e. the universal security community and universal collective securityĽ together actually form a “global common power”. The understanding of the global stateĽ as a wholeĽ on a basic security level here is derived from the definition of a state whose essential characteristics comprise Weberian and Ŕ in keeping with Honneth Ŕ Hegelian featuresĽ namely the disposition of a monopoly on the use of organised violence in 41 ĚHiggott – Brasset 2004ě; ĚHiggott – Ougaard 2002). 73 Marek Hrubec a state and equal recognition of all its members. As this does not entail a transition to an entirely new kind of organisationĽ but only to another version of the sameĽ the main emphasis should be placed on the issue of a new level of stateĽ i.e. the global characteristics of a stateĽ and on the transition from the national to the global level. If we focusĽ in this frameworkĽ on the form of the global stateĽ there is no need to consider its most advanced variants.42 RatherĽ it suffices to delineate its realistically achievable form in the near term. The global state may be decentralised and consist of individual elements comprising the transformation of the current form of the state and its international integration. The autonomy of a political community‟s national or local unitsĽ i.e. states or other entitiesĽ need not be surrendered. Autonomy may remain in place and help to shape the existence of the global community. Autonomous national politics and culture can continue to developĽ although organised violence will no longer fall under the jurisdiction of the national community. SecondlyĽ not only autonomyĽ but also the army of national communities may remain unaffectedĽ as there is no need to create a global army. The global community would engage in military interventions in the form of pre-contracted joint operations by the armed forces of individual statesĽ or by units of their armiesĽ as is the case for regional and macro-regional events today. HoweverĽ a fundamental element here would be the subordination of the individual armies to global intervention derived from the global monopoly on organised violence. This does not mean that a global governmentĽ akin to national governmentsĽ would have to exist. ThirdlyĽ a global government should not have leadership in the hands of a single personĽ in the manner of a nationnal government. The government could be made up of a collectiveĽ more comprehensive structureĽ with debate in the global public sphere. If the European Union were to actually complete the process of its integration based on legitimate and participatory politics and transpose its structure to a global planeĽ we could think of it as a world stateĽ for example. Wendt also builds on Deudney‟s argument about the movement towards a global state based on the tenet of the extent to which national security is safeguarded.43 Whereas states could previously exist over a limited territoryĽ developments in law enforcement technologies have 42 43 Cf. ĚHaigh 2003ě; ĚJones 1řřřě; ĚNielsen 1řŘ7ě. ĚDeudneym 2000ě; cf. ĚDeudney 1řř5ě. 74 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 given rise to a situation where states are no longer able to guarantee their own security. The technologies have become destructive to such a degree that individual states are no longer able to control them. Generally speakingĽ if the extent of the use of violence exceeds existing boundariesĽ thus increasing conflictual interaction between states in the long runĽ the state will have to enlarge its territorial scope by merging with or absorbing another state. At presentĽ this tenet can be instantiated by Deudney‟s concepts of a “nuclear one-worldism” or “nuclear globalism”. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have built stairways to the expansion of a state‟s territorial scope. Just asĽ in the Middle AgesĽ Western states expanded due to the invention and use of gunpowder and related technologiesĽ today the scale of current law enforcement technologies enables them to move beyond the existing territorial scope of the state.44 This theoretical interpretation makes new technologies an external condition for the possibility of ambivalent territorial integrationĽ and technological advances here play the role of a driving principle guiding the integration telos. NeverthelessĽ it remains a mere external possibilityĽ and does not explain the internal conditions of the possibility and their dynamism in the integrational evolution of society. These are added by Wendt when he considers two aspects of his teleological clarification of developments in a world state: the first is on a micro-levelĽ the second on a macro-level. HereĽ the aspect having a bottom-up effect on movement takes the form of the self-organising process of the struggle for recognitionĽ which is implemented in response to technological change. The aspect having the opposite Ŕ top-down Ŕ effect is the structural logic of disorder in an international arena.45 In connection with this argumentĽ Wendt also incorporates the security-based driving force behind developments into his theoretical explanation andĽ as suchĽ specifies the internal telos thereof. As individual territorial units are no longer able to cope with the military threat of new technologies capable of affecting larger areasĽ and to guarantee security in their territoryĽ they must redefine their borders and move beyond them towards greater integration. NaturallyĽ other issues associated with technological advances remainĽ but the basic historical force driving forward the material shaping of the 44 45 ĚDeudney 1řřřě. ĚWendt 2003Ľ 4řŘffě; cf. ĚWendt 1řřřě. 75 Marek Hrubec global state is clarified. NeverthelessĽ it must be accompanied by a specification of the identity of the new territorial entity. If a newĽ larger territorial unit Ŕ in our case the global state Ŕ is to have its own identity rather than consist solely of the separate identities of existing entitiesĽ the inhabitants or citizens of individual states must gradually become global citizensĽ cosmopolitansĽ and shape Ŕ step by step Ŕ the identity of the global state. We could ask whether Wendt‟s concept of historical development anticipates overly fast and smooth advances in tendencies geared towards the global state. While he seems to correct in his long-term normative analysis of the selected aspects of the establishment of global stateĽ his concept of the global state in relation to his interpretation of recognition should be examined in a more precise analysis of complex short-term and long-term historical trends of the development of recognition. In my concept of extraterritorial re-cognitionĽ as discussed aboveĽ I have attempted to convey such an analysis of the historical transition from an international structure to a transnational and global set-up. The more detailed treatment of these analysis and other simi-larly oriented explorations of internationalĽ transnationalĽ macroregional and global developmental trends of socialĽ politicalĽ legal and other kinds of recognition could help to identify the strengths and limits of the concept of global stateĽ and offer a more fitting comparative approach to Honneth‟s position. 5. Conclusion In summaryĽ Honneth‟s essay on a transboundary arrangement focuses on interstate recognition. Honneth‟s basis is a position on moral realismĽ andĽ drawing on his analysis of interactions between statesĽ he concludes that the legal recognition of a state requires the constant assumption of the political recognition of the collective identity of the state. The recognition of a state is based on the legitimacy of citizens within the state and the legitimacy of the representatives of other states. As this kind of recognition is not an eternal givenĽ all statesĽ including those already recognisedĽ must constantly seek it in the historical development of the struggle for recognition. 76 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 Problems associated with Honneth‟s concept of recognition mainly stem from the problem to analyse transnational and global interactions in economicsĽ politicsĽ law and other spheres. Underestimating these problematic interactions of global capitalism and related arrangement leads to partial reification of the nation stateĽ and impedes an understanding of the development of the state and both negative and positive nationalĽ transnationalĽ macroregional and global trends towards the global state and the formation of critiques of them. This deficit held Honneth back from sufficiently developing his concept of social recognition beyond the boundaries of the nation state and critically reflecting on the dominant role of the Western economyĽ politicsĽ and culture and of the Western proposals for a global arrangement. ThereforeĽ his theory of recognition remained largely unused hereĽ despite offering excellent potential for elaboration of the category of recognition in this new context. Developing Honneth‟s concept of patterns of recognition from a national plane to international and transnational levels and developing his theory in relation to the establishment of a global state requires assessment drawing on more detailed analyses than that offered by the authors mentioned in this article. The assessment should be derived from a historically-based concept of recognition taking into account the need for analysis of the transition from an international structure to a transnational and global set-upĽ as demonstrated by the important concept of the contemporary transition phenomenon of extraterritorial recognitionĽ which is able to connect social and legal justice. Behind the dynamic of extra-territorial recognitionĽ there are the social struggles of the misrecognized. It is a model concept of the contemporary analyses which correspond to the current stage of economicĽ socialĽ politicalĽ and legal historical developments of the struggles for recognition. 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Centre of Global Studies Institute of PhilosophyĽ Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Jilská 1Ľ 110 00 Prague 1 Czech Republic hrubec@ff.cuni.cz Ř2 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 ()STOR)CAL)TY OF DASE)N BY MART)N (E)DEGGER Andrea Javorská The aim of this paper is to clarify Heidegger's question of temporality and historicality of Dasein which in his conception resulted into the problem of conception of Being to be interpreted out of an authentically understood time. Heidegger understood time as the horizon of understanding Being. Time understood this way is original in a sense of its ecstatic-horizonal structure which clarifies the totality of authentic care as Being-towards-death and at the same time the most original basis of beings which is Being. Key words: Heidegger – Being – Dasein – time – temporality – historicality Martin Heidegger and his fundamental ontology shows that the question of history belongs among the most fundamental questions of human existence and is closely bound to the relationship between Being and time. This problem appears on the background of revealing dynamic structure of historicality and temporality of Dasein. Thus he opens an ontological sense of the question of time that enables him to distinguish between the “ordinary” conception of time and original temporalityĽ the sense of being which is rooted in time and which together with its modes is called a temporal interpretation. According to HeideggerĽ existence has an open characterĽ and therefore is always a part of the worldĽ i.e. it is in the world. Such openness is an ontological meaning of “there”Ľ the Dasein ĚdaĽ there Ŕ hereĽ the being-daĽ das Da-seiněĽ it is a constitutive moment of one´s own ecstatic structure. A man is the only being open to the world; he does not accept his world passivelyĽ but actively influences and changes it. Based on the opennessĽ the Dasein can keep distance from the worldĽ can come to itself and can be free in utilizing its own potential. Being an open existenceĽ the Dasein has an understanding relationship to the world and to the original openness of being Heidegger in Ř3 Andrea Javorská his later workĽ after “turnover”Ľ calls “unhideness of being”. The term “sense of being” will be replaced by the “truth of being”Ľ that will be articulated as the place for beingĽ the purpose of which is to prevent the possible confusion of the term “truth” and the traditional conception of rightness. The most original horizon revealing the meaning of Being and everything that exists and at the same time articulating the answer to the question of Being is time. The condition of a possible comprehension of time and hence being-in-timeĽ is temporality. Historicality and Understanding Heidegger articulated his approach towards Being as such already in his work Being and Time from the point of view of an authentic and non-authentic understanding of Dasein. The original structure of temporality was manifested as being the original condition of possibility of care as well as the ontological problem of Dasein´s hapenning. Hediegger reveals an ontological conception of historicality as the foundation of the structure of happeningĽ as the existential-temporal condition of its possibility. Heidegger had worked out the ontological conception of historicality to be able to reveal the structure of happening and gain access to its existential-temporal condition of its possibility. In this context he aimed to elaborate the Being of the historicalĽ historicality as the ontological structureĽ yet as nothing historicalĽ no beings to be deal with “historically”. Heidegger was trying to thematize the original time as the sense of Being and later he also stressed that the structures of understandingĽ he had analyzed in Being and TimeĽ are the structures of understanding of Being at all. Thanks to practical handling with beings we are being left to encounter beings in situation of openness. And just due to tentative practical Being-in-the-world there is also a secondary possibility Ŕ the dimension of the knowledge of “objects”. The knowledge of objects is the matter of various specialized sciencesĽ which based on various criteria had divided themselves specific beings. Their task is to recognize these beingsĽ categorize and classify them. Aristotle had already enabled and encouraged the division of all knowledge into various scientific fields but at the same time he underlined that the question of what beings are as beingsĽ the question of Being is not the matter of research of any special positive science. HiedeggerĽ often turning back to AristotleĽ indicates the question of the sense of BeingĽ Being of beingsĽ as well as the question of history and historicality itselfĽ that would not be accessible in the context of a Ř4 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 systematicĽ scientificĽ objectiveĽ ontical researchĽ but in the context of a thinker`s roleĽ who embodies a possibility to ask relevant questions concerning the ontological assumptions of a science. He tries to get this assumption from the structure of being Dasein. ”It is essential to search for the ontological possibility of the origin of science in the basic structure of Being Dasein” ĚHeidegger 1řř6Ľ 40Řě. He focuses his attention especially on uncovering the assumptions of history as the science that assumes historicality of Dasein and its rooting in temporality: “history still assumes historicality of Dasein in a totaly specific and significant way” ĚIbid.Ľ 425ě. Heidegger in fact seeks for the existential origin of history in order to be able to analyse Dasein`s historicality and its rooting in temporality. How does historiology assume historicality of Daseinť How does Heidegger s topical distinguishing of historiologyĽ history and historicality depend on the so called Being of historyť Where in fact lies the fundamental structure of historyť Historical Dasein grasps beings by existing as the Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is a specific meaningful structure which is ontologically typical for human existence. Human existenceĽ as being over-thrown into the world and being towards the deathĽ is unanimously a final existence and alsoĽ what Heidegger calls itĽ an “ecstatic temporality” as the final temporality. Precisely this final temporality constitutes an original time and it is the basis of what Heidegger called historicality of DaseinĽ “i.e. not of the factĽ that it can be the subject of a historical scienceĽ but of the factĽ that it exists in fact historicallyĽ giving oneself possibilities” ĚDastur 1řř6Ľ 2řě. In his Being and Time he was concerned with the existential analysis of historicality: “Our next target is to find the solution to the original question of Being of historyĽ that means of the existential construction of historicality. This solution is something that is historical by its original means” ĚHeidegger 1řř6Ľ 411ě. Historical knowledge isĽ according to HeideggerĽ thus possible only on the basis of historicality of Dasein. To be able to explain that history cannot be understood as a thingĽ object standing in front of usĽ he speaks about various meanings of understanding of the history. He focuses his explanation on a general distinction between something historicalĽ the past beingsĽ in a sense of no longer occurring as well as the beings that exist but no longer influence the present. FurthermoreĽ from his point of viewĽ history is normally understood either as some origin of the past corresponding with the category of evolutionĽ or as the unity of beings that changes in time. In this connection Heidegger points out the change and Ř5 Andrea Javorská human fateĽ human societies and their culturesĽ as well as the tradition which is either historically researched or is accepted by some societies as something natural while its origin remains hidden. History is conceptualized as historiology: the science about the past or a historical science. As we can seeĽ an obvious connection with temporal characteristics and almost unanimous priority of the past topicality corresponds to the outlined meanings of ordinary conception of history. What topicality of the past does Heidegger meanť How can history become a possible object of historiologyť In his interpretation Heidegger will outline the way of being of what itself is historicalĽ its historicality and its rooting in temporality. Which beings are historicalť Is it only the Dasein or are there non-human beings as wellť Do the beings have to occur first to be able to get into history later onť According to HeideggerĽ the Dasein does not become historical via joining and entering various circumstances and events. On the contraryĽ it is by events themselves the Being of the Dasein is formedĽ so only “just because Dasein is in its Being historicalĽ circumstancesĽ events and fates are ontologically possible” ĚHeidegger 1řř6Ľ 411ě. The Dasein does not have its historicality at its own disposal; we cannot decide for itĽ neither can deserve it for no matter what good reasons. The structure of Being in Heidegger‟s conception is projected in the relation of time to being. And that is why the historicality and its existential analytic have a temporal meaning. Besides DaseinĽ innerwordly beings are historical as wellĽ but secondarily. This does not mean that they would be historical only due to the historical objectification. Can they become objects of the historical research just because they are historicalť Ordinary objectsĽ such as hand tools or even antiquesĽ which belong to the pastĽ belong to it for reasons different than for not being used any longer. They still do occur at present! If we have accepted an unambiguous conception of history as something past then weĽ together with HeideggerĽ ask “in what sense are these hand tools historicalĽ though not yet being pastť” ĚIbid.ě. No matter if we do or do not use these hand toolsĽ they are obviously not what they used to be. In what context do we talk then about something pastĽ about what no longer exists? In Heidegger‟s existential analyticĽ innerwordly beings do meaningfully belong into a unit of toolsĽ into the world where Dasein concerns and uses them in some reasonable circumstances. But the world of these reasonable circumstances where we used to concern about or use that toolĽ no longer exists. In spite of that innerworldly beings can still occur. Does this mean that before Ŕ in the past Ŕ there used to be a world that no longer exists and the Ř6 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 innerwordly beings occur now in the world that existsť The worldĽ according to HeideggerĽ is not a set of single things somewhere in the spaceĽ is not a total sum of the objects known. The world belongs to the way the Dasein isĽ and it conditions its basic comprehensionĽ basic definition of Dasein as a certain way of openness. That is why the world is only “in the way of an existing DaseinĽ that ‟as being in the world‟ in fact exists” ĚIbid.Ľ 414ě. In this connection people of various periods liveĽ setting their approach to what existsĽ as well as their self-conception. Historicality of innerwordly beings that still occurs but meaningfully belongs into the pastĽ thus according to Heidegger does not depend on historical objectificationĽ but rests in a prethematic relationship of the Dasein to innerwordly beingsĽ that had belonged to the world of the “having-been” Dasein. Heidegger considers this also in his The Origin of the Work of Art and says we do not understand the specificity of some era by naming the objects which had belonged to that time. Our understanding of the world is set by clarifyingĽ revealing accessibility of beings to the Dasein. We are coming to the sphere of openness. The way we meet and understand beings depends on what kind of openness we occur in. The specific type of opennessĽ as Heidegger claimsĽ differentiates also historical worlds. The openness itself is not materialĽ touchable; it cannot be a topic of any positive science. The openness is not only the matter of the non-human beingsĽ which is encountered by human beingsĽ but also the matter of the ĚDasein sě self-conceptionĽ conception of the others as well as spiritual comprehension. The circle movement of Hiedegger s comprehension aims at openness as something unhidden in sense of alétheia. Just because the thing shows itselfĽ that its being is manifestedĽ we can articulate openness of beings in what and how it is. That means that beings become accessible in their own essentia. In this manner Heidegger talks about alétheia as to “let-beingsbecome-accessible in their essentia” ĚBiemel 1řř5Ľ 10Řě. While all the effort of Heidegger´s existential analytic aims at finding the possibilities to answer the question of sense of being as suchĽ the analysis first needs to focus on understanding of Being. Understanding being happens in the horizon of time. Heidegger interprets the understanding of being from temporalityĽ from the primordial time. Temporality ĚZeitlichkeitě has in the plan of Dasein analysis developed into the basic dimension of human being as an original condition of possibility of the care. It was explicated in relation to the authentic “potentiality-for-being-a-whole” Dasein. Since “temporality enables the unity of existenceĽ factuality and falling and originally constitutes Ř7 Andrea Javorská the unity of the structure of care” ĚHeidegger 1řř6Ľ 360ěĽ the totality of Dasein is determined by the ecstatico-horizonal structure of temporality. Temporality and Historicality Heidegger comprehended time as the horizon of understanding Being. Interpreted this wayĽ time is original in sense of its ecstatico-horizonal structure which explains the totality of authentic care as “being towards death” and at the same time also the most original and deepest basis of beings: being. Time does not characterize Dasein as temporal but Dasein is interpreted as temporal. It does not mean “existing in time” but “existing temporally” as a temporal being. Being can be distinguished through timeĽ i.e. it can be interpreted as temporal. Distinguishing the being means that it can be interpreted in its senseĽ that something like a sense enables its explanation. This temporal interpretation is possible only because Dasein understands its own being from time. The being of temporality lies in timing the unity of time ecstasiesĽ phenomena of the futureĽ “having been” and presentĽ and it enables the unity of existenceĽ factuality and falling. Specific constellation of connection between the meanings of “was”Ľ “is” and “will be” creates a specific negative bound of access to time and being. If this access is meant correctlyĽ there must be something like an open dimensionĽ an open area from which Being can be disclosed at allĽ accessible and present in and by its means also possibly understood. Understanding this specific mutual bound based on unhiddenness of being and time and self-hiddeness of the unity of “was”Ľ “is” and “will be” Ětill unhiddeness of being of beings lastsěĽ requires the investigation into the inner structure of these temporal ecstasiesĽ i.e. ecstatic temporality. This structure that articulates parting or span of Dasein in timing temporality and appears as the “sense of authentic care” ĚIbid.Ľ 35ŘěĽ refers to its original ecstatic unity of “having-been” Ědas Geweseně as over-throwness of Dasein into the worldĽ the moment Being-always-already-in; present ĚGegenwartě as being alongside this or that beings; future ĚZukunftě as self Ŕ projection of DaseinĽ being kept in opportunities of coming to itselfĽ as moment of Beingalways-ahead-of-oneself-in. The sentence from §65 of Heidegger‟s Being and Time becomes the starting point of our further analysis. Dasein can exist like an overthrownness being only because the care itself is based in “having-been” ĚIbid.ě. ŘŘ Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 Let us remind that Dasein is the being which in its being cares for the being itself. Its own being is assigned to him. It means that Dasein has opened itself into “there” Ědaě to access its own Being. “There” suggests something like an open space of some possible regionĽ stretched out area of a possible world Ŕ thus Being of that “Being here” Ědas Da-seině is from the outset a Being-in-the-world. That means Dasein is always assigned to be this “here” of its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger writes about factuality of an assigment of our own Being and calls it “over-thrownness” of being Dasein. An “over-thrownness” means that the being of Dasein Ěas Being-inthe-worldě is for it itself “always already” thrown into opennessĽ into the “there”. Because of thatĽ Dasein has “always already” found itself standing in front of its factuality of Being-in-the-worldĽ in a certain state of moodĽ “stateof-mind” ĚBefindlichkeitě. The state-of-mind is a way by which it has “always already” opened into the “there” of one s own over-thrownness of Being-inthe-world. It precedes all possible reflexion or comprehension. That is why it “always already” is concerned with one s own Being. How do these short reflections correspond with our topicť How can the above described structures of Being be possibleť In Being and Time Heidegger makes a distinction between “having-beenBeing” and “past-Being”. In the horizon of Heidegger s analysisĽ the past Ědie Vergangenheitě does not indicate something datable that was exhaustedĽ and so remains exhausted “now”Ľ something that we refer to as existing “then”. Heidegger does neither come out from the idea of time as the sequence of the pastĽ present and futureĽ nor from the idea of being associated with the present as “still being” or with future or past as “already not-being”. Such definition of time belongsĽ according to himĽ to the ordinary conception of time.1 Heidegger‟s conception of time explicated within confines of the existential analytic of the Dasein is not an objective frame of happeningĽ it does not occur somewhere “outside” or somewhere “inside”Ľ e.g. in consciousness.2 Time is not a being that appears or disappearsĽ that can be measuredĽ defined through termsĽ or something that would be everlasting. Heidegger took a critical approach towards traditional conception of time that was typical e.g. for Aristotle because it was not sufficient to articulate the relationship between Being and time. See: ĚMitterpach 2007Ľ 65 Ŕ 66ě. 2 He diverts also from Husserl‟s conception of time which is according to him not determined by the question of Being: “My question of time was determined by the question of Being. It was taking the direction which remains to Husserlʼs investigation of inner conscience of time permanently unfamiliar.” In: ĚHeidegger 1řř3cĽ 53ě. 1 Řř Andrea Javorská Heidegger writes about the past with regard to “non-human” beings that appear and take place “in time”. The way Dasein projects oneself into this Being is called existentiality. That is why DaseinĽ besides being the overthrown Being-in-the-worldĽ is also an understanding self-projection into one s own potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. This way of Dasein‟s being Heidegger calls an “over-thrown projection”. According to HeideggerĽ Dasein as existence cannot be past Ědie Vergangenheitě because it can never essentially occur. “Dasein can obviously never be as pastĽ not because it would be not disappearingĽ but because it can never occur essentially. As far as it isĽ it exists. And Dasein which no longer existsĽ is not past in ontological senseĽ but is this having-been-here.” ĚHeidegger 1řř6Ľ 414ě That is why he uses the term “having been” Ědas Geweseně as a meaningful term signifying one of the temporal constituents which cannot be analyzed as isolated or alternately opposite to other remaining constituents of the complete structure of care. Having-beenĽ Present and even Future as well are always in mutual inter-connectionĽ which creates an integrated and own phenomenonĽ the sense of Dasein. The phenomenological analysis of the appearance of a beingĽ described as arriving into presence from hiddenness and non-presenceĽ enabled to distinguish the sensual present as appearance from enpresenting in a sense of “coming out”Ľ “rising up” into unhiddenĽ or as standing up into openness. Enpresenting enables “being at” ĚconcernĽ within-the-world beingsě hand in hand with the fallenness of Dasein. Fallenness means to get lost in present. Presence does not represent a momentĽ “now” as some point in a specific temporal order. Presence as the moment “now” would be a temporal phenomenon corresponding to time in sense of within-time-ness. In time as within-time-nessĽ there always occurs something. But Dasein is not an occurant beingĽ that is why one´s own “Being-alongside” cannot be explained from the “now”. Different from beings that appear “in” the presentĽ the Dasein is ecstatic. Regarding to this ecstatic character of DaseinĽ the past does not mean “being no longer”Ľ but it means a “having-been” of Dasein itself. Neither presence means “now”Ľ but is an access to Being in its unhidenness. Present as an ecstatic modus is the one which enables “meeting with what can be” in a certain time “ready-to-hand” or “present-at-hand beings” ĚIbid.Ľ 370ě. That is why Dasein can be nearby within-the-world beings only when it is open for the possible “present enpresenting” Ěgegenwertiges Anweseně of this beingsĽ and thus even or itself. By this “Being alongside” Dasein is extracted so that it can be present ĚGegen-wartě. Present means enpresenting of beings in its unhiddenness. ř0 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 It is likewise also with the analysis of the third temporal ecstasisĽ the future. If we allowed a vulgar interpretation of timeĽ than the future would stand for the upcomnigĽ something that has not been beforeĽ i.e. is notĽ but will be Ŕ will become present. If the future was only to come then it would be able to appear as the future because it would permanently keep distant ĚDas Abwesendeě.3 To this upcoming future Hidegger assigns a non-authentic understanding of temporality. The future Ědie Zukunftě in the original horizon of time Ěin original horizonal temporalityě always already isĽ never upcomes. In Being and Time it is interpreted as self-projection of DaseinĽ as Beingahead-of-oneself. Dasein projects oneself according to its own possibilities of Being and Heidegger understands this self-projection “into” one‟s own possibilities as a temporalizing of future. Future enables to understand something like ahead-of-itself. That is why Dasein is as ahead-of-itself futurally. Futurally means Dasein's coming-towards-oneself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Ahead-of-itself points out to authentic future which enables Dasein to be the way that it cares for one´s own potentiality-forBeing. A phenomenal feature of the future is “coming-towards-oneself” Ěfrom some specific possibilityěĽ is the “Being-towards”. The future understood like thisĽ in a specific way still concerns the man. Heidegger's interpretation of original temporality keeps accenting a dynamic structure of the unit of original temporality. But since Dasein as Being-in-the-world exists in two basic modules of Being DaseinĽ and gets to one´s own potentiality-for-Being through concern with beingsĽ it cannot see that the unity of temporality does not pay attention to itĽ misses it. If Dasein is concerned “with its Being”Ľ then it also takes care of its own ecstaticness either non-authentically in a way of fallennessĽ or authentically. Temporality temporalizes either as forgettingenpresenting expectingĽ i.e. non-authentically from intra-temporal beingsĽ or as continuous renewal of the momentĽ i.e. authentically from one‟s own temporality itself. AppearentlyĽ certain moments of the structure of Being Dasein are possible only under the condition that Dasein is in its diversification always at the same time upcoming Ŕ future ĚZukunftěĽ “already” Ŕ “having-been” ĚGeweseně and enpresenting-present ĚGegenwartě. From phenomenological perspective these three temporal ecstases create a unit and that means they are temporalizing the original temporality. This unitĽ according to HeideggerĽ takes place in the world. The analysis of sensual determination of Anwesen and Abwesen we meet especially in the works after turnoverĽ e.g. Die Geschichte des Seyns, Was heisst Denken? 3 ř1 Andrea Javorská World is the space for beingsĽ which can be investigated by man just because he always already understood what Being. The world belongs to existence and indicates the way how beings can be manifested to man who lives it as a whole. In phenomenology manifestation means to be somehow here. As being present in the “place” where meeting occurs. But this “place” must be somehow understood: non-authenticallyĽ model of which is materialityĽ occurrence in present; and authenticallyĽ for which each present is accessible from futureĽ each understanding is a projection but an over thrown projectionĽ since every present is at the same time determined by past. Having understood “the-step-out” that enables the presence in specific situationĽ always steps out from somewhereĽ out of some determinationĽ dependence on what used to be. Both in authenticity and non-authenticity it appears in a relation to oneself. In first case we come to ourselvesĽ in second one we do not. But in both cases there has to be some structure that enables things become clear and accessible to us and us to ourselves. For understanding of what being Dasein isĽ Heidegger reveals a crucial modality Eigentlichkiet des Desiens we usually translate by perhaps ethically not appropriate term Ŕ Dasein's authenticity. The authenticity makes the finality of Being Dasein understandable. In this context Heidegger finds for his expression the phenomenon of Being-towards-deathĽ which becomes significant in one‟s confrontation with finality as an authentic comprehension of human Being. Temporalizing of the time which is characteristic for an authentic existence is in modus of historicality. HeideggerĽ analyzing temporal character of historical beings at all stresses the fact that we cannot come out from “Being-in-time” in a way of entity present-at-hand. Yet entity does not become “more historical by stepping back into more and more distant pastĽ so that the oldest would be historical in the most actual sense” ĚHeideggerĽ 1řř6Ľ 415ě. DaseinĽ according to HeideggerĽ is not historical because it is not here but only in temporalizing one‟s own temporality which has esctatic-horizonal structure we can talk about historicality as essential structure of Dasein. Heidegger discusses historicality as an ontological problem which he analyzes through existential analytic of Being Dasein. He points out a meaningful structure of temporalizing temporality which is represented by the historicality of Dasein. Heidegger considered existential construction of historicality; historicality in this analysis “is not only a simple ontical statement of the fact that Dasein acts in „world history‟. Historicality of Dasein is the basis for possible historical comprehension which brings along the possibility to keep history explicit as a science” ĚIbid.Ľ 364ě. Heidegger was trying to explain historicality from the point of view of temporalityĽ ř2 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 originally from authentic temporality. References BIEMELĽ W. Ě1řř5ě: Martin Heidegger. Praha: Mladá fronta. DASTURĽ F. Ě1řř6ě: Čas a druhý u Husserla a Heideggera. Praha: Filosofický ústav ČSAV. DASTURĽ F. Ě1řřřě: Heidegger and the Question of Time. Humanity BooksĽ Amherst: N. Y. FLEISCHERĽ M. Ě1řř1ě: Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers “Sein und Zeit”. Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř3ě: Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř6ě: Bytí a čas. Praha: Oikoymenh. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř3aě: Co je metafyzika?. Praha: Oikoymenh. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř3ě: Básnicky bydlí člověk. Praha: Oikoymenh. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř3cě: Konec filosofie a úkol myšlení. Praha: Oikoymenh. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1ř75ě: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenology, GA 24. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řŘ2ě: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř4ě: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). Frankfurt am Mein: Vittorio Klosterman. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1ř76ě: Zur Sache des Denkens. Tübingen: Niemeyer. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř2ě: The Concept of Time. Blackwell. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1ř57ě: Identität und Differenz. Tübingen: Niemeyer. JAVORSKÁĽ A. Ě2013ě: Dejiny a dejinnosť v diele Martina Heideggera. Bratislava: Iris. MITTERPACHĽ K. Ě2007ě: Bytie, čas, priestor v myslení Martina Heideggera. Bratislava: Iris. The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. ř3 Andrea Javorská Andrea JavorskἠPh.D. Department of Philosophy Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra Hodţova 1 ř4ř 74 Nitra Slovak Republic ajavorska@ukf.sk ř4 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 C(ANG)NG T(E CONCEPTS OF T(E DEBATE. Ž)ŽEK (ELP)NG (E)DEGGER FA)L BETTER Klement Mitterpach The paper focuses on Slavoj Žižek‟s re-appropriation of Heideggerian ontological background and analyses the position Heidegger occupies when viewed from the point of Kant-Hegel shift Žižek elevates as the central to understanding the idea of philosophy and its post-Hegelian development. The framework serves us to indicate the meaning of ontological speculation within contemporary debates challenging philosophy to deliver understanding of the ongoing debate on mainly social and political issues of the day. It shows that the idea of failure of understanding to be enacted on the ontological level – counterintuitively rendered by Žižek on the issue of the failure of the role of understanding being in Heidegger´s thinking – is seminal to understanding the expected role as well as possible performance of philosophy within contemporary debates. Keywords: Understanding – Failure – Kant-Hegel shift – Heidegger – Dialectics of Debate Heidegger did not Understand Anyone at All In a short written record of what was supposed to be a dialogue between Alain Badiou and Slavoj Ţiţek published in 2007 under the title Philosophy in the PresentĽ Slavoj Ţiţek started his speech by an overt rejection of any philosophy which would try to appear or introduce itself as a dialogue: “Philosophy is not a dialogue. Name me a single example of a successful philosophical dialogueĽ that wasn‟t a dreadful misunderstanding. This is true also of the most prominent cases: Aristotle didn´t understand Plato correctly; Hegel who might have been pleased by the fact Ŕ of course didn‟t understand Kant. And Heidegger fundamentally didn´t understand anyone at all. So no dialogue” ĚBadiou Ŕ Ţiţek 2007Ľ 50ě. The statement could be read with respect to the opportunity which ř5 Klement Mitterpach was arranged to suggest the form of a dialogue between philosophers whichĽ as both declaredĽ are “to a large extent in agreement”. ObviouslyĽ commenting upon “wrong” choice of partakers who display no dialoguepromoting discordĽ Ţiţek does not only count on a simple effect of rhetorical exaggeration and over-generalization because his rebuff of the dialogue in philosophy is followed by an even more resolute refusal Ŕ literally “fleeing from” anyone suggesting a discussion or philosophy in a dialogue. Far from simply showing disregard for the communicationoriented philosophical space todayĽ Ţiţek from the very start follows his sentence upon a dialogue running even between philosophers who would be considered essentially in need of dialogical mediation or critical articulation of their mutual discord. Ţiţek‟s brief and fierce account of the dialogue and philosophy eventually focuses on undermining almost selfevident expectations philosophers are supposed to share with those who challenge them to explain or at least to analyse the possibility of mutual understanding upon the issues of the day. What seems to be an over-stated postmodern attitude isĽ howeverĽ its contraryĽ for Ţiţek directly confirms Badiou‟s thesis that philosophy is axiomatic. ŢiţekĽ howeverĽ does not exaggerate an autonomy of philosopher´s theoretical space here but points to an implicitly shared belief in commonsensical autonomy of our everyday beliefs which nonetheless often demands a “philosophical” confirmation and for this reason counts on philosophy “providing public opinion with some orientation in problematic situation” ĚBadiou Ŕ Ţiţek 2007Ľ 51ě. The line of the “philosophical pairs” to provide for a brief examples of most flagrant intra-philosophical “misunderstandings” to be chosen purely randomlyĽ nevertheless betrays arranged positionsĽ where Heidegger s case seems to represent the apex of misunderstanding. He no longer stands out as the one who misunderstood Husserl but as someone to misunderstand “anyone at all”. The philosopher of “understanding“Ľ having rendered understanding as a fundamental phenomenal feature of DaseinĽ that meansĽ his own being and meaning of being as suchĽ howeverĽ might not appear in this position solely as the ultimate case of the desperate lack of understanding but more likely as philosophically most trenchant example of the failure “in” the philosophical comprehension of the concept of understanding as well as probably the failure “of” the concept itself in regard to the Ěcommonsensically often ironicalě idea of philosophy as its ř6 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 general provider. With respect to Ţiţek‟s claim about the even philosophically often misunderstood public role of philosophyĽ we could hardly declare misunderstanding a failure without considering the misunderstanding of failure. Even at the level of introductory apprehension to Heidegger‟s philosophical enterprise Heidegger obviously represents a philosopher who deliberately exemplifies an explicit attempt at radical displacment of the meaning of the term from its commonsensical/ontical use in order to work out what he calls “ontological” sense of understanding and make it appear in course of explication of the ontologically oriented human practice itself. One could say Heidegger is the philosopher of understanding to the extent he succeeds to displace the implicit meaning of understanding as a practice within its quotidian context by the practice which transforms its own commonsensically rendered relata and ultimately changes the horizonĽ which supports the ordinary meaning of the wordĽ as well as the practice it describes. The philosopher´s practice therefore signifies a philosophy which seems to combine inconnectible tendencies: reading other philosophers as the authentic procedure of pursuing philosophical practice itself and at the same time promoting a strictly ontological philosophical approachĽ that meansĽ practicing understanding which has no intention to emphatically adhere to any of the philosophical “positions” in author´s philosophical developmentĽ but displaying their ontological failure as the proper way of re-opening “the question of being”. Heidegger seen as an example of the most extensive misunderstanding therefore does not seem to work as the example of some profound confusionĽ but as an example of an intentional refusal to subject philosophy to an ontologically misconceived claim Ěnot rendered ontologically yetě on understanding itself. HoweverĽ we could ask: Is not Heidegger precisely a case of losing the prospect of the real problem of understanding under the flag of strictly ontologically conceived notion of understandingť We should not forget that the ambiguity of Ţiţek‟s list and Heidegger´s position is strictly intentional and congruent to Ţiţek‟s reformulating the whole issue of the “philosophy in the present”. Ţiţek‟s “we must change the concepts of the debate” ĚBadiou Ŕ Ţiţek 2007Ľ 51ě therefore represents an account directly enacted by the number of exemplary examples of philosophical topoi he provides just in order to ř7 Klement Mitterpach face the alternatives we “spontaneously” collectively share when discussing the pressing up-to-date problems as false ones. Heidegger Trauma. Demands on Philosophy or Just Philosophical Demands? Does one not expect philosophy to provide understandingť Or does one expect philosophy to appear once again as a misunderstandingĽ just to prove again that the understanding we already possess has nothing to do with philosophizing about the circumstancesĽ which despite all the attempts taken by philosophers very soon turn into the self-enclosed structuring of a purely notional philosophical practiceť Ţiţek starts with the question he from the very outset declares as “approaching the problem the usual way”Ľ that isĽ describing the situation as that of philosopher “being addressedĽ questioned and challenged to intervene into the European public sphere” ĚBadiou Ŕ Ţiţek 2007Ľ 50ě. The point is he addresses precisely this idea of “philosophy being asked to intervene”Ľ no matter whether shared by philosophers too eagerly demanding to be publicly recognized as useful and actualĽ or only the idea “inauthentically” shared by the publicĽ who fantasizes about a “subject supposed to know”. Does Ţiţek propose an arrogant division between philosophy which “heroically” faces the inevitable inauthenticity of the crowd and the public indifference which despite naively demands someone to provide answersť Ţiţek‟s pointĽ howeverĽ leads beyond the choice of authentic philosophical aims and inauthentic pragmatism of a crowdĽ and the idea of philosopher´s changing concepts of the debate pertains primarily to the false alternatives assigned to the issue of an engaged philosophyĽ that isĽ philosophy in current situation as either being engaged or none. To render it differentlyĽ it is a concern which confronts philosophers with the choice either to call for the democratic civic vigilance or to publicly confess that any other philosophical intervention into the public attitude is incongruent with the idea of publicly acceptable and practicable proposal. Ţiţek‟s well-known reaction basically changes the idea of philosophy being responsive by answering the given questions in favour of philosophy responding by positing the new questionsĽ which introduce the possibility of radical choice against the falseĽ fake possibility of alternatives usually publically řŘ Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 shared even by philosophers themselves. Ţiţek‟s answer thus turns to philosopher‟s ideas about philosophy and its public engagementĽ in order to showĽ how what philosophers themselves demonstrate as a political complement to their philosophical workĽ reveals their unconscious philosophical affinities even among those who are believed Ěand who themselves believeě to hold on totally opposite philosophical stances. The idea of the common but hidden ground is certainly not new. HoweverĽ Ţiţek basically shows that the ground itself is in fact not hiddenĽ but rather disclosedĽ revealed as philosophical precisely politically. What one does not usually expect to see politically is the very own core of the otherwise opposite philosophical enterprises. One therefore does not usually expect to see the properly philosophical via politicalĽ even though we got used to expect to see philosophical as political. Ţiţek‟s example is well-known DerridaŔHabermas debate about the future of Europe. This point leads further than we would expectĽ if we take ourselves to be experienced in cases among which Heidegger is interestingly again one of the exemplary cases of our times Ŕ if not the single example of the philosopher of philosophical autonomy exemplifying the paradoxical radically pursued authenticity of the philosophical stance which is said to convert into an ambiguously radical political engagement. Political naivety or philosophical irresponsibility of the philosopher will have to appear as false alternativesĽ if philosophers after Heidegger attempt to follow the public claims not only on philosophical responsibilityĽ but also adopt the role of compulsory criticism which attempts to follow the trace political coding in the fissure of philosophically proclaimed political neutrality of the ontological thinking. The fact isĽ they should rather follow the ontological trace in otherwise utterly politically correct thinkingĽ or spot the unexpected sameness of political ontologies of the declarations of the current challenges which attempt to identify the core critical issue of the day. The idea of the engaged philosophy is therefore from this point not a matter of occasionĽ of the turbulent times to come philosophers are waiting for to get into use again. The fact isĽ the ontological substance of their thought is sought to succumb totally to this fundamental claim of responsibility which has been confronted with the trauma of counterenlightenment thoughtĽ which gets unleashed the moment one takes the modern subjectivity into a questionĽ that meansĽ the moment one takes řř Klement Mitterpach ontological neutrality of the political into question. HoweverĽ the moment such a demand was internalized by philosophers themselvesĽ we face the fact that all the philosophizing along the lines of the public or political recognition of philosophy finally does not get enough recognitionĽ or perhapsĽ that all the demands pressing upon philosophy are a philosophical fantasy responsible philosophers have made up themselves to revive from the trauma of the Heideggerian philosophico-political Ěiněexperience. Is not Ţiţek‟s stating the fact itselfĽ the fact of philosophy being publicly addressed this wayĽ a total mis-perception of the situation philosophy finds itself inť Should we not therefore ask if the way Ţiţek starts about the situation of philosophy being asked and challenged by public demands is not also only part of his philosophical fantasyĽ fantasy about the event taking place to cover the fact there is noneť Would it not be all the more appropriate to confessĽ there is no such spontaneous necessity to address philosophersť FinallyĽ is Ţiţek not wrong about facts even though we might have found his answers “stimulating”1 when we read him contra-factuallyť HoweverĽ what if the only fact that is missed by such to-be-realist cynical stance is that the politically responsive philosophy faces the situation marked by false alternatives of pleading for recognition or directly attempting to integrate the demands into the pragmatico-political process and become a StaatsphilsophieĽ philosophy which by overtly declaring its demands actually performs the task of Ěeven criticalě legitimizing not the role of the philosophical-political thinkingĽ but the particular state apparatus instead. What if what seems to be an apparently final realist passion for the real of the situation Ŕ taking it as it is without any idealistic ballastĽ being true to rough facts Ŕ and a direct call to an active participation of the philosopher on the political agenda is itself just a reaction to the alternative of simple belief that there is finallyĽ cynicallyĽ no such demandť Is this reading of the situation not itself correlative to the reading of the politically responsible philosophy which reactively clings to politico-pragmatic process which is believed to be true to factsĽ Peter Engelmann somewhat disappointedly finishes his editor‟s preface: “Perhaps Ţiţek is right that philosophy is not a dialogue. Philosophical discussion is nevertheless always stimulatingĽ as the presentation and now this book demonstrate” ĚBadiou Ŕ Ţiţek 2007Ľ xiiě. 1 100 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 considering the realist account of the situationĽ the possibilities it offersĽ in order to escape the temptation of the irresponsible and non-responsive Ěto the realist account of the situationě philosophersĽ itself a fundamentally ontologically based claimť Ontology of the Failed Understanding Ţiţek‟s rejection of a debate should be read precisely as an answer to this suspicion about philosophy rendered as from its very essence always coming short of facts or lacking the responsibility towards any normative challenge or request.2 What might have been considered typically philosophically elusive Ěreluctance to remain at the level of the shared identification of a probleměĽ is itself the cure. A debate is therefore no longer starting by an empty gesture of invitation to an open space of communicative practice but more likely by the imposition of the failure of understanding. Ţiţek‟s answer does not only promote the idea of philosopher correcting the false illusions we share unless we do not render our situation philosophically. It rather shows that philosophy can respond only by the questions which we have not demanded. The falsity of our questions however can be articulated only on the background of the imposition of the new oneĽ the falsity of our demand to appear at the background of the question which responds to the demand we are suddenly challenged to figure out and to formulate. BasicallyĽ the question is wherefrom does a philosopher come to his proposalĽ what kind of stance we encounter when being imposed with a question we cannot simple deduce from our attitudinal backgroundĽ but from its very failureť It is the change which does not change our epistemological misconceptions or fills the lack of proper normatively based understandingĽ not even the change of the very epistemological standards In July 2013 a debate had occurred between Ţiţek and ChomskyĽ including couple of reactions which followed Ţiţek‟s comment he made on account of some of Chomsky s rather disparaging comments on ignoring empirical facts in continental philosophy and Ţiţek‟s pointing to the ideological nature of such reductive empirical strategy and its downplaying of the theoretical work indispensable of conceptualizing such ideological frameworks. See ĚChomsky 2013ě and ĚŢiţek 2013ě. 2 101 Klement Mitterpach we have already accepted although failed to follow. The conceptual intervention of the philosopher shows our knowledge to be sustained by illusions to be dissolvedĽ but shows these precisely from the standpoint which first allows us to come into grips with what we believe retrospectivelyĽ from the point that has been enacted by the conceptual intervention itself. ThereforeĽ it is not by means of direct normative imposition itselfĽ or direct argumentative correcting of the inconsistency of our conceptions that the philosopher makes us confront the truth of the situation. The change in the concepts of the debate makes us face the consistency of our knowledge based on an indispensable illusion which makes our own demand appear a part of the illusion itself. To see the situation from this point means to stumble upon the philosophical stance which gives us as a result what can be understood only as a philosophical challenge which drags us not inside but outside the situationĽ to the point which is enacted as universalĽ even without support of philosophical articulation. The conceptual shift therefore represents a shift from the epistemological framing of the problem to its ontologyĽ to ontology of understandingĽ and as such reminds us of its historical philosophical exemplification in Kant-Hegel shiftĽ which Ţiţek considers to constitute the philosophy proper. It represents a shift from knowledge of reality to the reality of our knowledge ĚKantěĽ or as would be accurately HegelianĽ knowledge in realityĽ as the part of reality and therefore its own ontological inconsistency. We thus move from epistemological inconsistency or factual inaccuracy of our beliefs to the inconsistency of the missed opportunity of the philosophical questioningĽ which not only changes the view we understand our roleĽ but also the status of understanding from epistemological to ontologicalĽ that is to an ontology of its failure. It is therefore not enough to admit the fact of the failure of “my” understandingĽ but to admit the failure of the ontological “facticity” of understandingĽ understanding failing to cope with itself as an ontological issueĽ as a part of realityĽ condition of possibility of acting Ŕ to show understanding in its productive mode. The shift from epistemology to ontology thus appears only if we assume that understanding as performative of the knowledge of reality we have. It fails precisely as this “performative” because it does not account for the ontology of the impossible it excludes as its own ontological condition of possibilityĽ fails 102 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 to recognize it as its own condition of impossibility and as such the condition of the possibility of the ontological stance properĽ which contains the exclusion of the impossible under the guise of its epistemological restriction which is said the only to be respected as properly philosophical one. From this point it seems that the authentic philosophical position restricts us to reveal the hidden presuppositions we shareĽ while the commonsensical criticism reminds us that such philosophical engagement is always already entangled into the same presuppositions and therefore cannot substantially render an explicit conceptual encounter with reality as such. HoweverĽ what such commonsensical criticism posits as normative erasure of all philosophical attemptsĽ is misrecognized by the philosophically authentic stanceĽ which is restricted to revealing the presuppositionsĽ as the step which philosophy has already enacted to accomplish the task of such restricted revelation: to reveal presuppositionsĽ one has to posit themĽ that isĽ it must not only render ontical ontologicallyĽ but assume the non-mediated onticity of the ontologically posited. The authentic thus lies in the fact that we authentically deserve philosophy to confirm the falsity as merely epistemological Ŕ we perceive it not as a confirmation of our views but as a confirmation that there is no such view as to move us into a position of ontological agents. Philosophy is in fact usually asked to engage to warning us against the changeĽ to protecting us from the change and to supporting the protection by kind of explanatory reasoned negotiationĽ through which the philosopher is obliged to legitimize his position to prolong his patronizing advisorship till one finds it no longer necessaryĽ till one gets the full satisfaction in “not having escaped the problem” precisely by entering into public debate which represents his attitudinal engagement and is believed to become a legitimization of his activist pursuance of particular normative proposals. Ţiţek´s account of the changing of the concepts of debate shows that the shift from epistemological to ontological is not just a shift of the thematic domainĽ or a shift to a more basicĽ and therefore ontological questions or the meaning itself we have been conformed to. It rather shows that the concepts being changed make us fail at the more fundamental level Ŕ faces us with our fundamentally authentic conformist position of negotiatingĽ tempting the philosopher to prove I am finally 103 Klement Mitterpach rightĽ or to level philosophy to a common view which “I have always already had anyway”. If we take notice of Ţiţek‟s examplesĽ we can see that the line does not divide the authentically philosophical from the commonsensicalĽ and thereforeĽ has no intention to prove neither philosophy an authentic reflection of the commonsensical presupposition nor have a common sense to prove the philosophical naivety residing in its proverbially philosophical inability to confront the facts. It is rather the idea of the inscription of the commonsensical into philosophical itself than the philosophical inscription into commonsensical that makes the difference in rendering the “philosophical debate” from a shifted perspective. Ţiţek‟s examples focus on the philosophers‟ thought to be identified according to beliefs the philosophers share and leave intact as precisely commonsensically shared from their own philosophical point of view and therefore nevertheless still move within confines of the alternatives they believe to be challenged to answerĽ alternatives they however share as the factual issues of the day. From his perspective they do not as much display their public responsibility and responsivenessĽ their honorable up-to-date public engagementĽ as they signify the limits of their concept of philosophyĽ of their engagement in philosophyĽ the absence of radicality of assuming their philosophical duty to enable the encounter with radical choiceĽ that isĽ choice of the failure of the debate enhanced precisely philosophically. Ontology of Historical Misunderstanding The failure of understanding as demonstrated is a core figure of even anotherĽ historically “refined” version of Ţiţek‟s account of the history of philosophy he pronounced in one of his interviews: “Philosophy is something which began with Kant and ended with Hegel Ělaughsě. BeforeĽ there were very interesting thingsĽ like PlatoĽ which announced it. AfterwardsĽ it‟s all one big misunderstanding. As a leftist I say thisĽ Marx obviously didn‟t understand Hegel and so on and so on” ĚHauser Ŕ Ţiţek 2007Ľ 2 Ŕ 3ě. For Ţiţek the shift from Kant to Hegel represents a paradigm of the philosophy properĽ that is the Hegel´s speculative appropriation of understanding as it is represented within confines of Kantian account of the finitude of subjectivity. From this point Ţiţek interprets Kant as the 104 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 philosopher of finitude finally appropriated by Heidegger‟s existential analytics of the DaseinĽ which he basically developed into a “historicized transcendentalism” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ Řř0ěĽ while Hegel simply represents the step which has been thoroughly misunderstood after in the “postmetaphysical thought”. Ţiţek therefore perceives Hegel as the “vanishing mediator” between the traditional metaphysics and the post-metaphysical thought. Hegel thus represents the philosopher who made the account of ĚKantianě understanding proper and precisely by doing this was doomed to be misunderstood after. This timeĽ Heidegger is apparently not on the list while from the new point of orderingĽ the one concerned with the positive meaning of understandingĽ the list is centered on the point of the Kant-Hegel shift Ţiţek identifies as crucial for understanding the “big misunderstanding” itself. NowĽ there is no need to account for the apex of its displacement but rather for its constitutive failure which is constitutive of the ontology conceived as understanding. We could say Heidegger stands in the list hidden in one of the following “so on-s”Ľ which meansĽ that from this point of view Heidegger‟s attempt to overcome the limitsĽ or being able to properly assume the end of metaphysic as a taskĽ is itself a heir of the unresolved ambiguity of the shift which for Ţiţek contains the philosophy itself. We might expect thenĽ that Ţiţek‟s central position of the shift offers an ontological “Auseinandersetzung” with Heidegger´s finalĽ not only ironicalĽ position of a certain climax of misunderstanding. Would it appear to reside in Heidegger´s concept of ontology which appears “final” the moment we decide to consider ontology to overlap with understandingť Ţiţek‟s positive account of understanding is the anti-thesis which creates the position wherefrom understanding itself may become accessible by releasing it from the epistemological constraint to its ontologyĽ that isĽ ontology of the failed understanding. In his Less than nothingĽ in the chapter named In Praise of Understanding he gives an account of Hegel´s praise of understanding as the “power of the Absolute” and at the same time as the exemplary theme for correcting interpretations of the step “beyond” Kant or of the step “back” to pre-Kantian metaphysicsĽ both representing the alternatives philosophy has performed after. ThereforeĽ the idea of the history of philosophy itself is articulated around the shift concerning understandingĽ that isĽ the shift we have 105 Klement Mitterpach considered as “ontological”Ľ and eventually represents a shift in understanding of the ontology itselfĽ now considered “speculative”. The interpretation of the shift therefore contains the resolution about the difference of the possible ways of attaching ontology to understanding: “There are thus two main versions of this passage: Ě1ě Kant asserts the gap of finitudeĽ transcendental schematismĽ the negative access to the Noumenal Ěvia the Sublimeě as the only one possibleĽ and so forthĽ while Hegel‟s absolute idealism closes the Kantian gap and returns to pre-critical metaphysics. Ě2ě It is Kant who goes only half-way in his destruction of metaphysicsĽ still maintaining the reference to the Thing-in-itself as an external inaccessible entityĽ and Hegel is merely a radicalized KantĽ who moves from our negative access to the Absolute to the Absolute itself as negativity” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 266 Ŕ 267ě. Simply putĽ the first alternative is the one of Hegel misunderstanding Kant while the other Hegel understanding Kant better then Kant himself. Ţiţek clearly opts for the second possibility although he mentions both interpretations in order to comment on their confusion when being translated into the terms of epistemological Ŕ ontological shift: “OrĽ to put it in terms of the Hegelian shift from epistemological obstacle to positive ontological condition Ěour incomplete knowledge of the thing becomes a positive feature of the thing which is in itself incompleteĽ inconsistentě: it is not that Hegel „ontologizes‟ Kant; on the contraryĽ it is Kant whoĽ insofar as he conceives the gap as merely epistemologicalĽ continues to presuppose a fully constituted noumenal realm existing out thereĽ and it is Hegel who „deontologizes‟ KantĽ introducing a gap into the very texture of reality” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 267ě. Ţiţek basically saysĽ that if we understand ontology the way the positive pre-critical metaphysic doesĽ as a thorough account of the ordered whole of the existent beingsĽ we will not understand what it means to turn “an epistemological obstacle to positive ontological condition”. What he calls an “epistemological obstacle” is here precisely an obstacle to build ontology in the classical vein and epistemologically restricting the access to noumenal realm. The problem is that the classical ontology is restricted 106 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 precisely Ěonlyě epistemologicallyĽ which is why Kant still even though epistemologically negatively clings to idea of the fully-constituted although inaccessible reality. It followsĽ that Hegel s ontological shiftĽ shift to ontology of understanding proceeds precisely by “deontologization”Ľ which meansĽ by releasing even the negative Ěnegatively accessibleě presence of the noumenal Ěconditioned epistemologicallyě and taking a completely different stance of affirmation of the Kantian division itself to become the focus of our view. What does this “de-ontologization” meanť What “de-ontologized” ontology we come toĽ if we follow Ţiţek s figure of “introducing a gap” into the realityĽ of introducing reality itself as inconsistent due to this gapť Perhaps it becomes more obvious due to its re-connection to the concept of understanding again. ApparentlyĽ ontology to be de-ontologized is the classical ontology Ěas well as the ontology of understanding of Kantian critical philosophyĽ ontology pertaining to understanding as merely an epistemological issueěĽ which meansĽ the ontology that provides understanding the unity and structure of the world in its principles. The critical stance represented by Kant in fact keeps to this in a negative mode Ŕ there is the fullyconstituted world but we only understand that the idea of the full constitution is antinomical unless we are no table to decide even the difference between this being a presupposition posited by the shortcircuited reason and the fact of things existing out there although inaccessible to reasonĽ always accompanying our synthetic activity of reason. So the confusion of the phenomenal and noumenal manifests itself as antinomicalĽ and antinomies are basically the form of appearance of inability to make an account of the unsurpassableĽ incommensurable division of the objects of understanding and Things-in-themselves. It is nevertheless the theme of understandingĽ the problem of its statusĽ which shows that Kant s ontology is still classical although his concept of understanding does not provide access to the ontology but nevertheless sustains it in its simple negative refusalĽ in making it numb. “This is the feature that Kant shares with pre-critical metaphysics: both positions remain in the domain of Understanding and its fixed determinationsĽ and Kant s critique of metaphysics spells out the final result of metaphysics: as long as we move in the domain of UnderstandingĽ Things-in-themselves are out of reachĽ our knowledge 107 Klement Mitterpach is ultimately in vain” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 26Řě. The domain of Understanding is what pre-critical and critical ontology share. It seems however that it was Hegel‟s task to infer conclusions of the critical-ontology in regard of Understanding itself. Therefore Ţiţek keeps to idea that Hegel simply gave understanding its proper place within the critical stance and did not attempt to go “beyond”Ľ which also means he had not relied himself on any even more fundamental level which could be called ontological in the pre-critical manner. His move is precisely that of not missingĽ not mis-understanding what has been gained by KantĽ or his mis-understanding of the Kant´s move beyond the restriction he himself imposed on understanding proper. The move beyond Hegel‟s “deontologization” would therefore pertain to the pre-critical sense of ontologyĽ which in Kant is discovered to fail to cover the domain of understanding proper and is thus reserved for the noumenal realm as the negative notion of all that is inaccesible to understanding. For HegelĽ to gain access to the understanding itselfĽ he has to “deontologize” itĽ to understand it positively as far as it has become obvious that Kant‟s “positive” thematic approach to understanding itself has character of the critiqueĽ that meansĽ it delineates what pertains to understanding from the point of its impossibility. The noumenalĽ the realm of ontologically positiveĽ must therefore be identified not only as the unknown but ontologically as principally unknowable. ThereforeĽ we could infer that the role the noumenal methodologically plays in Kant‟s critique is no way just a residual thing we do not knowĽ but is identified by Kant himself as the thing-in-itselfĽ nevertheless only to be treated as merely a residue of understanding Ěthe noumenon characterized by Kant as a negative notioně. The problem isĽ how to treat understanding from the point of the ontology of the Thing-in-itselfĽ howeverĽ ontology no longer sustained by understanding which treats ontology only residually as the remainder that causes troubles to insufficiently critical reason and as a rule results in the misapplication of the categories of understandingť The idea of limiting the phenomenalĽ of understanding having nothing to do with things-in-themselves but their appearanceĽ simply proposes the noumenal as the limitation of the phenomenal. The point isĽ understanding as the criterion sustains what it considers a neccessary illusion of the old ontology ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 27ř Ŕ 2Ř1ěĽ although it has imposed the idea of 10Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 proper self-restriction on itself. ThereforeĽ to understand noumena we have to think about the presupposition of the phenomenal which is constitutive of our idea of the noumenalĽ the reality in itself: “In other wordsĽ we should never forget that what we know Ěas phenomenaě is not separated from things-in-themselves by a dividing lineĽ but is constitutive of them: phenomena do not form a special ontological domainĽ they are simply part of reality” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 2Ř3ě. The idea of “inserting a gap” in reality itself therefore depends on “deontologizing” the role of understanding in order to introduce understanding as an ontological constituent of the reality itself. HoweverĽ it is constitutive of the real precisely as the gap within realityĽ a gap which in its thorough negativity eventually represents the “wholeness” itself. There is no gap between two ontological domainsĽ the so called things-inthemselves are only a constitutive illusion of the phenomenal as mere appearances. Problem is that neither are appearances mere appearances nor noumena ontologically independent self-sufficient things. Therefore the idea of fully ontological but nevertheless unknown still deserves to be reminded that the fully constituted is constituted by this unknown as an inevitable part to complete as well as irrefutably keep its “fullness” openĽ never to fully overlap with itself. The idea of the fully constituted although “unknowable” rests on the presupposition of the division which inserts understanding into reality but precisely as the part which divides what it pertains to as much as itself from its own divisive pertainment to reality. It is this division from the division between understanding and reality that is at play anytime we attempt to follow the fundamental divisions at all. Therefore reality itself does not only arise due to the action of divisive understandingĽ but as a resultĽ it appears as that which to be conceived as reality must contain the dividing forceĽ which is what we call understandingĽ rather than understanding conceived as a capture of the primordialĽ pre-reflective unity “out there”. Understanding therefore appears as de-ontologizedĽ because it is free from the role of thatĽ which fails to grasp the real. At the same timeĽ this freeing itself “ontologizes” understanding as the gap itselfĽ which precisely can never Ěontologicallyě stand on its ownĽ but gains its ontological reality in being the negative rupture itself as always already contained within somethingĽ which can 10ř Klement Mitterpach present itself ontologically positive only due to its containment of this irreplaceable negativity. SoĽ to have realityĽ we have it as incompleteĽ precisely because the incompleteness itself is its part. To de-ontologize Kant‟s ontology nevertheless does not mean to return to any epistemologically independent stance properĽ but it means inserting the gap into reality which meansĽ asserting the ontology of the incompleteness itself. It follows that understanding as a part of things-in-themselves is precisely not viewed from the neutral standpoint outside of both Ěsubject and realityěĽ but as being a part of realityĽ the part which containing the necessary illusion at the same time enacts a gap towards the reality itself as well as to its illusionĽ and therefore can and must in fact deal with these differences whenever it reflects on itself. From this point of self-reflecting negativity it can “understand”Ľ therefore: speculatively render reality as incomplete and its own understanding as the gap. It means rendering the negative positively as subject and the reality as incomplete due to its own presence thereĽ being itself the gap and constitutively Ěproductivelyě inscribing the gap into what it thematically confronts with. Ţiţek sees this as Hegelian step of dialectical appropriation of the problem of understanding and at the same time as Hegel´s answer to the idea of Understanding as the Absolute force which like Spirit itself has the power to “tear things apart”. The Absolute Power of Understanding Ţiţek referring to Hegel‟s Foreword to Phenomenology of Spirit refers to Hegel s rendition of the concept of understanding which always already is an analysisĽ the act of separating elements which no longer keep the form of the idea to be “understood”. SoĽ it means understanding the concreteĽ the “concrete itself”Ľ which can be said to divide itselfĽ to “move by itself”. The philosophical does not in fact lie in a special level of “philosophical analysis” but rather at the level of focusing on understanding itselfĽ which no longer acts from the point outside realityĽ but in fact works as the power of negativityĽ by separation letting the elements gain their own reality. Therefore with concern for what has been remarked about Ţiţek‟s treatment of the debate challenging philosophyĽ we could quote at full what from the point of the focus of this text seems 110 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 to be the apex of the useful necessary minimum: “Understanding is not too abstract or violentĽ it isĽ on the contraryĽ as Hegel remarked of KantĽ too soft towards thingsĽ too afraid to locate its violent movement of tearing things apart in the things themselves. In a wayĽ it is epistemology versus ontology: the illusion of Understanding is that its own analytical powerĽ the power to make „an accident as such ... obtain an existence all its ownĽ gain freedom and independence on its own account‟ Ŕ is only an „abstraction‟: something external to „true reality‟ which persists out there intact in its inaccessible wholeness. In other wordsĽ it is the standard critical view of Understanding and its power of abstraction Ěthat it is just an impotent intellectual exercise which misses the wealth of realityě which contains the core illusion of Understanding. To put it in yet another wayĽ the mistake of Understanding is to perceive its own negative activity Ěof separatingĽ tearing things apartě only in its negative aspectĽ ignoring its „positive‟ Ěproductiveě aspect Ŕ Reason is Understanding itself in its productive aspect!” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 277ě This minimal analytical potency of understanding indicates reason why it not always already conforms to the ontological background of the historicallyĽ commonsensically shared constellationĽ disclosure of being ĚHeideggerěĽ but also a feature of already cutting out which rendered positively is to be conceived as “productive”. Ţiţek chooses the word to denote what Hegel directly states even more surprisingly: „Aber ein wesentliches Moment ist dies GeschiedeneĽ Unwirkliche selbst; denn nur darumĽ daß das Konkrete sich scheidet und zum Unwirklichen machtĽ ist es das sich Bewegende” ĚHegel 1ř70Ľ 35 Ŕ 36ě. Not only is understanding a performance of the “tearing things apart” but the “essential” seems to be the “separated itself”Ľ which stands as unreal and precisely as unreal it becomes self-moving by the very act of separation of the concrete. Thanks to itsĽ “illegitimate” separation performed by understanding the accidental becomes “separated” and therefore can appear and be captured at its own beingĽ which appears as no longer mediated by understanding from the outsideĽ but it itself is the mediationĽ the subject ĚHegel 1ř70Ľ 36ě. To discover understanding in itselfĽ one stumbles upon features which are no longer correlative to the Kantian transcendental scheme. Understanding 111 Klement Mitterpach proper must be torn out of the automatic immediacy in order to perceive this immediacy as a productĽ that isĽ it perceives itself on its own as subject substantiallyĽ as the mediationĽ the negativity itself. The understand understanding means to discover it as mediation by separation which no longer pertains to the mediating self-transparency of reality which would be automatically expected to provide us with the knowable part of reality. Understanding is therefore “inserted” into reality not only as its merely subjective mediation but also as the mediating principle which makes it moveĽ a principle of its life. Understanding could be therefore understood as an “unhistorical spontaneous ideology of everyday life” which Ţiţek ascribes to Frederick Jameson s interpretations: “Jameson seems to imply that there are two modes of ideologyĽ a historical one Ěforms linked to specific historical conditions which disappear when these conditions are abolishedĽ like traditional patriarchyě and an a priori transcendental one Ěa kind of spontaneous tendency to identitarian thinkingĽ to reificationĽ etc.Ľ which is co-substantial with language as suchĽ and whichĽ for this reasonĽ can be assimilated to the illusion of the big Other as the „subject supposed to know‟ě” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 26ř Ŕ 270ě. Jameson‟s line of division therefore follows historical/unhistorical division which makes understanding spontaneously identitarian and show reason as the historical correction making these identities fluid and “apt” to historical correction. Ţiţek however demonstrates that Jameson loses the line with Hegelian procedure. The problem is that understanding is never simply automatically unhistorical and identitarianĽ it only can be rendered this wayĽ unless we do not recognize that the everyday automatic naive ontology we automatically shareĽ itself changes. There are different commonsensical backgrounds and at the same time the historical reason posits not only new presuppositions of the new worldĽ but also its own version of the oldĽ which does not overlap with any eternal backgroundĽ which would resist the historical impositions of the new ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 272 Ŕ 273ě. 112 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 Heidegger Again. Where does He Stand Now? What is the difference between the positions assigned to Heidegger in Ţiţek‟s brief accounts of philosophical historicityť Once viewed from the point of universalized inter-philosophical misunderstandingĽ Heidegger represents its most prominent case. In case of history of philosophy rendered with respect to the occurrence of the philosophical event proper Ěphilosophy from Kant to HegelěĽ Heidegger plays an anonymous role of one of the post-philosophical misunderstandings inscribed into every philosophy which comes after Hegel and does not decide to repeat him. It is notable that Heidegger‟s position becomes conspicuous once we adopt the view concerning the role of mis-/understanding in the philosophy while it disappears when we confront Ţiţek s idea of philosophy proper. Although this time representing just one of the misconceptions of Hegelian legacyĽ Heidegger‟s account of the key issue of the KantHegelian shift is an outstanding one. Without pursuing Heidegger s interpretations of Hegel we should notice that Ţiţek does not drive as much at the extensity of Heidegger‟s misunderstanding other philosophers as on its intensity. Heidegger seems to exemplify a standard misunderstanding of Hegel butĽ neverthelessĽ misunderstanding which deliberately attempted to misunderstand any of the philosophers he appealed to within the frame of Heidegger s reference to an “ontological” understandingĽ that isĽ to the point of philosophers having missed the question of being itself. The criterion comes to the fore once the philosophy qua metaphysics is finally said to end Ěgather in its enděĽ which although historically spotted as the question to be confronted by philosophy must respond to the fact of understanding having always seemed to be succumbed to the “ontological”. So is Heidegger not just another version of Jameson s misconception of the Hegelian concept of understandingť Hegel for Heidegger was the last of GreeksĽ Heidegger seen by Ţiţek from the point of Hegel rather the one who radicalized transcendental subjectivist finitude of Kant into what Ţiţek calls “historicized transcendentalism”. Once we adopt and focus on this Heidegger exampleĽ we can notice that one of his positions cannot be simply read as the opposition of the a-historical to historical ĚJamesoně. They rather rely on different concepts of historicity Ŕ one on event which is central to 113 Klement Mitterpach distinguishing “before” and “after”Ľ the anticipating and miscomprehending views of philosophy. The other culminates in Heidegger s principally posited misunderstanding. They propose different connection of the historical and un-historical Ŕ one placing precisely the philosophical as an example of an event that can be only repeated by actualizing the potentiality which has not been realizedĽ opening the past of what Ţiţek calls “lost causes”. The otherĽ howeverĽ is itself rather HeideggerianĽ outlining the history of philosophy along the lines of having always already misunderstood the fundamental question of philosophyĽ which is nothing but the positive expression of repeating the misunderstanding itselfĽ the failure in its final “gathering” which Heidegger declares to mark our presence. It seems that Ţiţek‟s objection toward Jameson‟s idea of the historical vs. eternally commonsensical being cannot be applied to Heidegger. Heidegger‟s account of historicity is one of the themes Ţiţek dedicates one of his last chapters of his Less than Nothing in order to show that Heidegger‟s late thinking represents the very idea of historicizing what Heidegger analytically called “everyday understanding”. Ţiţek therefore refers to such historization as to a deadlock which appears once we try to “go beyond” metaphysical thinkingĽ although we are definitely committed to it: the unresolved deadlock of the dwelling in the end of metaphysics without a chance of confronting the failure of the desire to overcome metaphysicsĽ “to endorse the containment itself”. Ţiţek considers Heidegger‟s Gelassenheit is only a half-way position which fails to enact the failure of the concept of a technologically ruled world. Gelassenheit therefore appears as a gesture which results from the unresolved “immanent failure or inconsistency” of Heidegger‟s thought ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ ŘŘ2ě. The unresolved deadlock resorts in the problem Heidegger occupied himself in thirtiesĽ the problem of will and non-willing. Ţiţek shows that precisely at this pointĽ the problem of will displays its double positioningĽ as the individual-historical existential willing to be deconstructed to confront oneself with the withdrawal of being in Ereignis. HoweverĽ such radically historicized non-willing always already stumbles upon the persistence of “Ur-willing”Ľ kind of “stuckness”Ľ which “derails the natural flow” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ ŘŘ4ě. Gelassenheit therefore appears as a way to avoid this presuppositionĽ to cover it and to arrange oneself at “safe distance” towards what there is. Ţiţek therefore repeats his well-known 114 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 figure of “inserting a gap” not between Heidegger himself and his thoughtĽ but inside this thought itself “to demonstrate how the space for the Nazi engagement was opened up by an immanent failure or inconsistence of his thought” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ ŘŘ2ěĽ that his Nazi commitment was the question “of an inherent theoretical deadlock Ěwhich in itself has nothing to do with NazisměĽ and the violent passage as the only way of escaping it” ĚŢiţek 200ŘĽ 153ě. Alain Badiou says Heidegger has become a common sense and it seems he has become a philosophical “must do” Ŕ what escapes us is that Heidegger does not promote ethical ideas purely because believes they are precisely ontological ones Ŕ not that they should be derived from the ontology itself. So his grip of the ethical ĚPlato‟s agathon interpreted ontologicallyě is showing that ethical is basically a certain type of reduction of ontological rather than its extension. HeideggerĽ howeverĽ can serve even as a subtle background for more or less variable philosophical “interests”Ľ a position which in a liberal way points to particular problems of the present day in order to promote certain message whichĽ howeverĽ relies on “kind of Heideggerian”Ľ even though rather non-politicalĽ ontology in the background. HoweverĽ the problem is that Heidegger is not treated the way he treated his “philosophers worthy of reading” or rather worthy of “repeating”. In his In Defence of Lost Causes Ţiţek points out that to repeat Heidegger means something else than to subject his though to “immanent criticism”Ľ which in Heidegger‟s case would be not be enough. Even avowed Heideggerians or orthodox interpreters do not meet the idea of repeating HeideggerĽ not primarily because of the lack of accepting any “external” position to be derived or proven right from the point of their reading Heidegger or because not willing to succumb to the idea of searching for inconsistencies in his thoughtĽ but mainly because they rely too much on the persistence Ěif not merely a resistanceě of the thoughtĽ that isĽ on the ontological relevanceĽ which is generally accepted as Heideggerian instruction for preserving the idea of differenceĽ the space of soliciting the philosophical meaning per se. HoweverĽ the persistence of the ontological itself is simply indifferent to the fact that it repeats the commonsensical everyday immersion into the indifference towards the ontologicalĽ which itself relies on the background of the discourse about meaningĽ no matter whether of a religiousĽ spiritualistĽ naturalistĽ scientific kind. Doing this it sustains the everyday 115 Klement Mitterpach practice of lives which indeed must have their share of “philosophical” attitudes as well as commonsensical cynicism which proves their everyday practice even ironically as “philosophically” self-sufficient. What both lack is the total derailment of the reliance on the ontological as the agencyĽ which in a way persists to rely on the presence of meaningĽ which does not have to be revealed to be sharedĽ no matter whether as a claim or a fact. The ontological is thus shared inauthentically as the proper background on condition that it remains concealed the way it is and due to that preserves its “redeeming” status ĚHeidegger‟s proverbial quote from Hölderlin: “Wo aber das Gefahr istĽ wächst das Rettende aus.”ě. There lies the Badiouan thesis that the commonsensical today is Heideggerian ĚBadiou 1řřřĽ 47ěĽ irrespective of any of Heidegger‟s claimsĽ last but not least of a Gelassenheit having turned into a “fact”Ľ precisely when it has been ignored as an ontological claim. ThereforeĽ the claim towards ontologyĽ the ontological analytic that is expected to perform the shift in the position we share beyond the decision about the difference between facts and claims. In this respect the dubitation about Ţiţek‟s misperception of the facts ĚIs philosophy really called to the debate or notťě is a false one as much as would be the appeal to trueĽ authentic philosophy against the inauthentic one. Philosophy is really called to debateĽ howeverĽ it is called as something which can eventually appear itself in its difference to what it can contrive to becomeĽ despite and in contrast with the standards at first unacknowledged by the audience. It is generally expected as the background philosophical discourseĽ is supposed to publicly prove that our background beliefs are just realist enough to go as far as ontology itselfĽ that isĽ sufficiently realistic to cover the ontology by the realistic commonsense. The fact isĽ the public claim is put on philosophyĽ in order just to confirm there still is the claim to be put and to be reassuringly repeated. Ţiţek therefore repeats Heidegger without himself being a HeideggerianĽ although he is not Heideggerian precisely in a nonHeideggerian mannerĽ whichĽ in factĽ is the one that happened to change the concepts moving in between the authentic Heideggerian and the inauthenticĽ identified as also Heideggerian. Heidegger can be repeated precisely due to separating the Heideggrianism itself as the authentic mode of the inauthentic ontology. It does not mean to separate the inauthentic in order to preserve the original purity of Heidegger‟s 116 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 intentionsĽ or the unrecognized reserves of his textsĽ but to see it precisely not in culturalĽ scientificĽ poetic or epistemological butĽ againĽ and paradoxically the hardest to meetĽ ontological measures.3 These were the measures Heidegger attempted to meet and promoted to be met by anyone having understood the idea of philosophy. HoweverĽ the matter with understanding philosophy is not ontological when being left on its ownĽ preserving the ground open exclusively to philosophical insightsĽ but when performing the cut into the ontological to make it reappear as the case of a failed understanding. Only the failed understanding can no longer be attached to the ontological form which cannot be understoodĽ but performed. Ţiţek‟s performance therefore enacts the imposition of the standardĽ not of truth or realityĽ but standard of ontologyĽ which to appear as a standard in a non-Heideggerian way must exemplify one exemplary failure of not committing to the separation of being and understandingĽ which canĽ howeverĽ be doneĽ once the Parmenidean idea has been brought to its own meaning by Heideggerian repetition of the beginning of philosophy. Ţiţek is not Heideggerian in a non-Heideggerian wayĽ as far asĽ despite Heidegger‟s political caseĽ it is precisely Heidegger‟s ontology which he turns to become “the case”. HoweverĽ he is not prone to avoid the political butĽ on the contrary initiates the stanceĽ which allows identifying the meaning of Heidegger‟s politics from the failure of his ontologyĽ that isĽ the failure of the claim to ontology. Heidegger for this reasonĽ that isĽ for the sake of ontology itselfĽ appears as the prominent case Ŕas the exemplary failureĽ because it is the ontological failure of the present day. In this manner Heidegger is made to enact the failure of the disapproving reactions as well as indifferent ones his thought itselfĽ as the sole example of their ontological indifference. Heidegger made himself the example of the deadlock of the understanding In his posthumously published work E. Bondy has made a remark about Heidegger‟s Dasein and the Fourfold as conceptions to be considered within Bondy s transhumanist discourse as ontological articulations of once perhaps “the future ones” to transcend the “all too human” by technological advancement. InterestinglyĽ Bondy unlike most of Heidegger interpretersĽ does not automatically delve into a purely “poetic” reading of the late Heidegger s FourfoldĽ which perhaps makes him an example of rare understanding which prevents Heidegger s articulation from its perhaps all too early ontological marginalization into “poetic” thinking in its contemporaly reception ĚBondy 2013Ľ 53 Ŕ 54ě. 3 117 Klement Mitterpach that was revealed as pertaining to beingĽ which although it has been articulated along the lines of disclosure and hiddennessĽ could not figure out the divisionĽ the separation or gap which occurs when understanding seems to be always already opened as the milieu to be discovered by overcoming false Ěsubjective-objectiveě gaps. Such ontological role of understanding however cannot fully accomplish the ontological meaning of the indifference towards understanding itselfĽ as far as it precisely can never ontologically render that which gets separated by its indifference towards something it has not the slightest idea aboutĽ or even no reason to figure it out. This happens mainly in cases we stubbornly refuse to confront the indifference when accepting itĽ and accept it when confronting it. Dialectics of the Debate? Ţiţek identifying Heidegger as the most pertinent philosopher of understandingĽ reveals Heidegger‟s reliance on Kantian solutionĽ and his ordinary misconception of the Hegelian one as. Without risking violent or too eccentric transpositionsĽ we could say that the Kant-Hegel shift serves as a model of the philosophical intervention into a debate to interrupt the expectation of understanding ourselves about matters of a common interest or emergency ĚHeidegger‟s reading of Aristotelian phronesisě an unable to allow the performative identification of not only the coreĽ but also the transformativeĽ shifting issueĽ which never appears as epistemologicalĽ but points to the ontologically excluded. It meansĽ that it is not the issue itselfĽ but the very standards of the ontological which are at stake. “In case of Understanding and ReasonĽ the whole problem has been exemplified in terms that might serve us quite well: Everything turns on how we are to understand this identity-and-difference between Understanding and Reason: it is not that Reason adds something to the separating power of UnderstandingĽ reestablishing Ěat some „higher level‟ě the organic unity of what Understanding has sunderedĽ supplementing analysis with synthesis; Reason isĽ in a wayĽ not more but less than UnderstandingĽ it is Ŕ to put it in the well-known terms of 11Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 Hegel‟s opposition between what one wants to say and what one actually says Ŕ what UnderstandingĽ in its activityĽ really doesĽ in contrast to what it wants or means to do” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 276ě. To enact this “less” does not mean to fulfil our intentionsĽ or any other way of life to be negotiatedĽ „reasoned” by philosopherĽ as we could expect according to the rather usual use of the word. Ţiţek has shown that understanding can be seen precisely as the activityĽ in its performativity as reasonĽ which meansĽ that it can be affirmed precisely as the separatingĽ disjunctive force. The separation itself is not only a simple negationĽ while being activeĽ it never covers with the act itself. Hegelian proverbial: “Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen” ĚHegel 1ř70Ľ 24ě separates the “development”Ľ which is to be seen precisely on its own as the whole of the development and the development itself as nothing but the ontological standard of the wholeness. In factĽ it means not only the failure of the idea of the ontology of the whole separated from its developmentĽ but the failure of the idea of “the whole” developmentĽ which now consists of the repetition of its failure to spontaneously accomplish itself as the wholeĽ and contains this impossibility as its partĽ as the transformative issue to be encountered no other way than ontologically. With respect to the debateĽ a repetition of the failure of the debate itself has to be enacted by the active understandingĽ conceived now as “reason”. This precisely is not the model of passing to another positionĽ of adapting to one´s opinion. On a different place Ţiţek againĽ in order to exemplify the idea of self-relating negationĽ negation of the negationĽ the process of reason itselfĽ quite colloquially reminds us: “There is always the opportunity that the flow of the debate will get stuckedĽ not even due to lack of understandingĽ but precisely due to ones sticking to one´s position” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 2ř4ě. The standard criticism of the philosophical debate imagined as a pure diffusive flow moving away all determinations or the stubborn persistence on one´s own. Neither is the rule to prove an inconsistency of such position: “ OKĽ I am inconsistent with myself; but so whatť I prefer to stay where I am ... The mistake of this criticism is that it misses the point: far from being a threatening abnormalityĽ an exception to the „normal‟ 11ř Klement Mitterpach dialectical movementĽ this Ŕ the refusal of a moment to become caught in a movementĽ its sticking to its particular identity-is precisely what happens as a rule. A moment turns into its opposite precisely by way of sticking to what it isĽ by refusing to recognize its truth in its opposite” ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 2ř4ě. The change of the concepts thus confronts us with our “stuckness”Ľ which is not to be “derailed”Ľ but supported in order to enact the loss itselfĽ that isĽ not only the loss of one s positionĽ but the loss of the relevance of the opposition for that what has been excluded. The identification of the excludedĽ howeverĽ does not happen due to expert knowledge of inaccessible or expert factsĽ but by separating the enunciated from the enunciationĽ which meansĽ that philosophy has become the refusal to recognize its truth in the opposite and therefore to separate it from what it really does. The failure of understanding is thus precisely an indispensable condition of making an account of and getting rid of the idea of exchange of attitudesĽ opinionsĽ even of expecting minimum of the basic orientation in the problem. More than thatĽ philosophy plays the role of dropping the illusion by means of conceptual change which delivers my concept of understandingĽ my attitude to its demand and my reliance on its legitimacy as illegitimate. The legitimacy of the philosopher to intervene is not the one of the all-informedĽ factually saturated approach coloured by a proverbial spec of wisdom and detachment from socio-political reality. In factĽ the intervention itself shows that it has been us who meet the description of what we expected to be precisely philosophical attitude. The picture we had about our non-philosophical real problems and even about our modest asking philosophers for the advisory attunement to our opinionsĽ or critical examinations of our viewsĽ is shattered the moment we discover that the idea of realistic moderate people willing to be rational are facing precisely themselves as the only proper exemplifications of those “wisely” detached philosophers. The point is a Ěmisperception ofě failure of our previous identificationĽ as far as it was philosopher´s task to make it fail in a new division. This then would change the idea of understanding itselfĽ now being confronted with the radical choice between the sustained belief in the role of moderately negotiating understanding or the imposing a concrete negativity. This is 120 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 supposed to break the form of our attitudinal acceptation of the mediative function of understanding and face understanding in its realĽ illegitimateĽ imposition of the power of the negative Ěreasoningě. A simple change of the concepts makes us unwillingly participate at the edge of our beliefs and no longer discuss the legitimacy of a certain particular understanding. HoweverĽ such “unrealistic” position of the philosopher has always already been precisely the condition of the failure-engaged individual who embodies universal in making the particular effectively fail. In this senseĽ philosophy should be there to make the philosophy failĽ to get loose of the philosophyĽ when it is demanded. Not by finding rational reasonĽ but by the desire for the loss of particular identity as well as enacting the loss of this loss itself ĚŢiţek 2012Ľ 4ř7ěĽ which would be felt as an absence to produce the desire for reconstitution of some particular identity. It leaves one to a particular understanding for the thing to be cut off from the task it displayedĽ task of sustaining the order even in cases it is asked to deliver a fundamental criticism. This also includes the failure of the communicative function of philosophyĽ which withdraws once we are subject to philosophical choice. The failure of its communicative function does not prove philosophy a monologic esoteric wisdom. It rather makes understanding to be free for the difference between particular and its lossĽ enacted by the demand for philosophy itself. To identify the topic in order to let the debate fail effectivelyĽ the choice of the failure itselfĽ is to be provided precisely philosophicallyĽ not simply by declaring itĽ but by identifying the shared understanding of the task even between philosophically different standpointsĽ alternatives. This cannot be done simply reflectively. It can be done by positing the questionĽ conceptĽ whichĽ driven to repeat the act of failure of understandingĽ is to become the leading force of ontological affirmation of the excluded. References BADIOUĽ A. Ŕ ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě2005ě: Philosophy in the Present. Cambridge: Polity Press. 121 Klement Mitterpach BADIOUĽ A. Ě1řřřě: Manifesto for Philosophy: followed by two essays: “The (re)turn of philosophy itself” and “Definition of philosophy”. New York: SUNY. BONDYĽ E. Ě2013ě: Postpříběh, příležitostné eseje a rekapitulace. Praha: DharmaGaia. CHOMSKYĽ N. Ě2013ě: Fantasies. In: Chomsky. Info. The Noam Chomsky Website. Web. 15. Nov 2014. http://chomsky.info/articles/20130721.htm HAUSERĽ M. Ŕ ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě200řě: Humanism is not Enough. Interview with Slavoj Ţiţek. In: International Journal of Žižek Studies. Vol. 3Ľ No. 3Ľ 200ř. Web. 15. Nov 2014. http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/211/310 HEGELĽ J. W. F. Ě1ř70ě: Werke 3. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ě1řř7ě: Sein und Zeit. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě2012ě: Less Than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London: Verso. ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě200Řě: In Defence of Lost Causes. New York: Verso. ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě2013ě: Some Bewildered Clarifications: A Response to Noam Chomsky by Slavoj Ţiţek. In: Verso. Web. 15. Nov 2014. http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1365-some-bewildered-clarifications-aresponse-to-noam-chomsky-by-slavoj-zizek The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. Klement MitterpachĽ Ph.D. Department of Philosophy Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra Hodţova 1 ř4ř 74 Nitra Slovak Republic kmitterpach2@ukf.sk 122 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 T(E C)T)ZEN BY (USSERL AND T(E POSTMODERN C)T)ZENS()P Jozef Sivák There is the political problem in Husserl and his successors that the phenomenologists committed the second generation (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others) should remember. This problem occurs in the last period of Husserl's philosophy in the context of its historical considerations resulting in a cultural phenomenology. But political philosophers like Hobbes, Schopenhauer and others are present and already discussed in his lectures on ethics. Husserl's notion of politics is based on his conception of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the state is of the order of facticity, that is, a person in the sense of an association (contract) with the individual person is the member functioning as a citizen. The author tries to finally answer the question of what the world cultural man should live by while taking into account the current crisis of citizenship which hides behind the expression “postmodern citizenship” Keywords: Political Philosophy – German Phenomenology – Intersubjectivity – Citizenship – Postmodernity – E. Husserl 1. Introduction There are political problems by Husserl and his successorsĽ problems that committed phenomenologists of the second generation as SartreĽ MerleauPonty and more recently J. Patočka should not have not left forgotten. In effectĽ already in the 20sĽ in proportion to the progress of crisis in GermanyĽ Husserl had started to look more and more into the history and politics. In the 30sĽ his interest was manifested by a tour of conferences across EuropeĽ beginning in Vienna1 and followed by Prague. Even in his He will speak on the theme “Philosophy and the crisis of European humanity.” The conference will be published under the title “The crisis of European humanity and 1 123 Jozef Sivák lectures on ethics he starts to discuss political philosophers like HobbesĽ Schopenhauer and others. Husserl was blamed for his europocentrism and his ignorance of globalization in the 20th century. It should be noted that his view of Europe is spiritualĽ transcendental; he himself spoke about the “spirit of Europe”Ľ which is not limited to geographical Europe but it goes beyond the Atlantic ĚUSAĽ Canadaě and the Pacific ĚAustralia and New Zealandě by the way of the then colonized Africa. It moves this way in a phenomenological vein: all objects although incorporated into reality also have a transcendental “meaning”. Political and social considerations of this “spirit” will also lead to a cultural phenomenologyĽ the last stage of Husserl s philosophical itinerary. 2. The intersubjective and the constitution of the pure political Talking about politics and policyĽ we are in phenomenological terminologyĽ in the intersubjective. Husserl s notion of politics is based on his conception of intersubjectivity. Although the transition from subjectivity to others requiresĽ according to HusserlĽ a method known as the intersubjective reductionĽ the founder of phenomenology understood that subjectivity is already intersubjectivityĽ thanks to its Ěreflexiveě capacity to refer to itself. But an intersubjective community is something else: it is unified by intersubjectivity in the sense of spiritual unity comprising all the subjectsĽ a “subjective universe” including the surrounding world and finally being of the world. This community is open indefinitely and its social form is an “open indeterminate multiplicity”. Even if we talk about the phenomenology of intersubjectivityĽ in the strict senseĽ it is a part of the phenomenology of sociality. The fact remainsĽ howeverĽ that the phenomenology of society as a social philosophy” in the “Krisis” and is considered as the “manifesto” of Husserl. He established there a link between the crises of a society plunged into irrationalismĽ absurdity and that of sciences which although successful in the mastery of natureĽ fell into positivism in its extreme form what´s known as scientism. The scientism transforms man into a positivist man for whom a fact is a fetish asking about the origin of this fact. It is in the endless task of reason and the unifying sense of history that Husserl sees the outcome of this situation. 124 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 philosophy is possible thanks to the intersubjectivity based on “organic corporeality” ĚLeiblichkeitě. Because of bodiesĽ such expressions of the spiritĽ are porters of meaningĽ which makes the social life as life of a community possible. The intentionalityĽ the fundamental trait of subjectivityĽ is also transmitted to the community and is realized in the socialities in varying degrees. Not every community relationship is socialĽ e.g.Ľ in “symbiotic communities” Ěparent-childĽ familyěĽ the social acts are absent. The constitution of sociality is based on the being of the personĽ who supposes personal acts such willingĽ evaluatingĽ etc..Ľ which are addressed to other man. Only when they receive the form of a communication one can speak about sociality. At the same timeĽ it is a formed “communicative community” ĚMitteilungsgemeinchaftě based on spoken genres ĚquestionanswerĽ addressĽ etc…ě. The intersubjectivity thus exceeds into a social bondĽ the basic form of which is being one-with-the-other ĚMiteinanderěĽ in a wordĽ being together. The manifestation of the individual will must vent into a common willĽ the will of the community. The will as vital interest of the individual is accomplished in a community. Any community or union has its historical characterĽ its traditionality and its culture which objectifies in its performances. Another social phenomenon: the usual customsĽ standards of conduct. The performers of these manners are the people. What constitutes as the unity of a people or a nation is an awareness of belonging to this nation. But the opportunity to say “we” is not enough to constitute sustainable units. Only units composed of communitarian persons can make an object of scienceĽ of knowledge of the community on itself. CorrelativelyĽ a sustainable and specific unit is formed around a common goal. Community persons or socialities are divided into socialities of coordination and those of subordination. The first is based on cooperation and partnershipĽ such as commercial companiesĽ companies of constructionĽ economic companies Ěartisans and its customersěĽ associationsĽ etc. One is a communitarian person on the basis of a community memoryĽ namely a historical tradition. Time is the form of the genesis of a communityĽ more precisely “the immanent intersubjective time of coexistence according to subjective temporal modes and thenĽ according to the time intervals and identifiable temporal places” ĚHusserl 125 Jozef Sivák 1ř73bĽ 360ě. These temporal relations rest in foundation of a “spiritual causality” between monads at all levels Ě“I-Thou”Ľ “we”ě. In this intersubjective exchangeĽ thoughts are not in conflictĽ unlike goalsĽ the achievement of which is related to a project. On the other handĽ there is an internationality as something that is not yet specifically a state.2 By contrastĽ in societies of subordinationĽ it is an order which reigns the order of organization of power.3 In this way it can be administered a villageĽ a religious communityĽ a city Ě-stateě. The state is on the side of such companies.4 HoweverĽ the state is independent of determined persons. It has its own personality and at the same timeĽ it is an open society. If Husserl's philosophy of the state is less elaborate5 than his social philosophyĽ the phenomenology of intersubjectivityĽ together with the “intentional sociology” provides concepts and problems which are common in the political philosophy: the socio-political problems of “leadership”Ľ those relations between the condition of “master and servant”. The intersubjectivity resulting in objectivity enables a communitarian constitution of an objective world. The first stage of this objective world representsĽ according to HusserlĽ “the world of the fatherland”. Other degrees are superposed on itĽ depending on temporality or on historicityĽ and on the other hand the area or terrestrability. These views can be further developed depending on the periodicity or significant events Ědeath of a relativeĽ warsĽ etc.ěĽ on oppositions Ěnear Ŕ distantĽ land Ŕ heavenĽ etc.ě6 The state is therefore rooted in the social. In this senseĽ its origin is “natural”Ľ it comes from a “natural tribal community” and it began as a We know that since the time of Husserl the role of international organizations and even supranational ones acting as subjects of international law has increased considerablyĽ to the extent of competing and even surpassing states. TodayĽ the expression “international community wants this or that” is used to justify various interventions on international level. 3 The inequality of subjects can exist even within a familyĽ e.g.Ľ in the relationship “adultchild” where the child enters as “pre-personality” only. 4 The analogue of the stateĽ for HusserlĽ was the society or union ĚVereině. 5 Although Husserl deplored the absence of a “political phenomenology”Ľ he nonetheless left enough outlines for that matter for K. Schuhmann to pull a political philosophy out of it ĚSchuhmann 1řŘŘě. 6 These oppositionsĽ including that of the country and abroadĽ are insurmountable while allowing orientation. 2 126 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 “community of people”.7 As the state is an intersubjective phenomenon of facticity8 and as such it is part of social ontology. In its essence as the pure politicalĽ it is part of the inexact morphological essencesĽ and as such accessible to a phenomenological description. The phenomenologist is only concerned with politics and the state indirectly.9 That meansĽ he uses the concept of a self-exceeding monadĽ whose temporal form of Ěnaturalizedě consciousness changes into historicity and from the ontical point of view is recognized as the man. The state is evenĽ according to HusserlĽ a “hard reality”. It deals with destiny and with historical necessity. Its structure is also historical. The state would not be necessary if an ethical and authentic humanity was present. The state isĽ howeverĽ necessary to prevent the destruction of the teleological movementĽ e.g. during terrestrial and cosmic catastrophes. The constitution of the state is not a case of spontaneous activity of individuals or groupsĽ but rather it is the state which makes possible these activities. An autonomous monadic body is its substrate. The state is neither an end in itselfĽ nor is it an absoluteĽ even though its role rests in denying: to preventĽ to avoid. HusserlĽ concerning the instruments which the state may have to perform this taskĽ is conservative. What matters to HusserlĽ by contrastĽ is the law as an essential attribute of the stateĽ which can exist in its proper condition only in case it is not an organization of robbers of great style. In additionĽ Husserl submits the state and the right to a higher ideal of the intermonadic telos of the developed rationality. The denying role of the state is also transmitted to the right as of a prohibited sphere. The legal rules are binding ĚZwangsregelě and the penalty is part of the unity of the state. The total disappearance of the state is possibleĽ but it could only be done by means of the stateĽ state that no longer uses force but MoreoverĽ Husserl identifies the people with the “people of state” ĚStaatsvolkě as a person of a higher degreeĽ of a “community of life of generations” ĚLebensgemeinschaftě. NeverthelessĽ the relation between the state and the people is that of indifference. It follows a separation of ethics and politics. It is often confirmed even by a rare successful reconciliation of man of reflection with the man of action occurring in the same individual. 8 This facticity is distinct from the empirical as the contrary of the Ěeideticě essentialĽ because it is the basis for the rational. 9 This can be explained by the fact that Husserl considered his work apolitical; not that he wanted to avoid politicsĽ but he wanted to avoid misunderstandings due to politicking. 7 127 Jozef Sivák phenomenological means of reason. The phenomenology isĽ in factĽ called to change the world because it is able to change the bare facts in eternal essences. Husserl was aware of the power of ideas and it is appropriate to speak of a sovereignty of thoughtĽ sovereignty that he believed to be embodied in the German nation ĚSivák 2005ě. In this senseĽ we understand its delimitation with respect to the “raison d être” of the state: “The transcendental philosophyĽ a very useless art that does not help to the masters and rulers of this worldĽ to politiciansĽ engineers and to industrists” ĚHusserl 1ř56Ľ 2Ř3ě. Husserl does not stop at the dimension of a nation. The world of our lifeĽ which the constitution would lead toĽ may have a national or supranational dimension.10 It is a paradox that the development of sciences in the interwar years was contemporary to European crisis and even to a global crisis Husserl interpreted as a crisis of sense. The truth is that these sciences elaborated no scientific “medicine” for nations and national communities. The “supranationality” ĚÜbernationalitätě is not only the highest level of the community but it also has some essential “style” principle to be applied to the sick Europe.11 With the ideal of “federalism”Ľ European nations could correspond with new relations inside the community of philosophers and researchers. Philosophizing finally means co-philosophizing. Husserl´s views of coexistence and cooperation among nationsĽ scientistsĽ artistsĽ philosophersĽ may seem too optimistic or utopian without losing their actuality. For a committed philosopher that Husserl finally becameĽ it was worthy to be opposed to fate and pessimismĽ to the Realpolitik of his time. The constitution itself as a donation of sense to the world isĽ howeverĽ a “political” act in the Platonic sense. But Husserl does not merely repeat the tradition. His notion of reason does not represent something completeĽ a pure thought nor a techniqueĽ but a “constant movement of self-clarification” passing from one HusserlĽ unlike KantĽ prefers speaking about links between nations than between statesĽ so he sets limits to cosmopolitanism. We must reach the global community through communication. 11 Husserl could not predict the fate of this notion in the current European integration where it is still not admitted because it evokes a limited sovereignty and we prefer the notion of subsidiarity. HoweverĽ it comes back with the actual European crisis that some think would be solved by closer integration or federalization. 10 12Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 generation to another. The reign of reason is not a pre-programmed “ideocracy”Ľ but a teleology that transverses all being; its action thus leads individuals as the whole of humanity to a consciousness of itselfĽ to selfresponsibility and ultimately to autonomy. It is the coming of “archontic” role of phenomenology and of phenomenologists as “public servants of humanity” starting with “archontic” individual monads to the “phenomenological community” ĚHusserl 1ř76Ľ 15; Husserl 1ř73cĽ 66řě. This community would still be above the community of love representing a Ěnon-violentě synthesis of community and state. The result of it would be the “universal humanity” or the “world state”Ľ though not in sense of a superstate but that of unified and self-organized subjectivity. The supranational community of philosophers has already been called to act in an educative manner and mutually in the direction of a nonphilosophical community where philosophyĽ or other knowledgeĽ will not be foreign to anyone Ŕ in accord with the intersubjective experience of the other who is not radically different from me but looks like me. In the reform advocated by HusserlĽ the largest role should rest with rationalism enabling the elucidation of the concept of societyĽ concept distorted by a violent ideology. Such rationalism should be based on a “feasible method”. ThenĽ we are connected to the idea of reasonĽ that the ethical personality must assume acting in a surrounding world. As the acting contains evaluation and logical actsĽ it is the ethical component which should prevail in a philosopher. “The philosopher is an ethical personality or anything”Ľ wrote Husserl to Ingarden. The ethical lifeĽ which makes life reasonable for all peopleĽ is “social-ethical life” to the highest degree possible. 3. The private man and the citizen To define state by the law is not enough. Its effectiveness and its implementation presuppose an original power. In this senseĽ state is an organized power and this power is rational on the one hand and adequate to its purpose on the other. SoĽ the organic nature of power presupposes an incessant activity which organizes and maintains it. This activity is politics. By this the state gives to individuals the meansĽ particularly those of acting and of decidingĽ because laws without sanction remain a dead 12ř Jozef Sivák letter. Husserl and Rousseau would agree upon this. Yet the individual person escapes the state. It has concern for this relation only insofar as it performs a function. The state being in the order of facticity is itself a person in the sense of a Ěcontractualě association of which the individual person is a memberĽ functioning therefore as a citizen. In other wordsĽ the person becomes a citizen as a member of a state in order to operate in a political community of law. In this senseĽ it is the person who calls the state into question and not the opposite. The state and the citizen are correlative notions. The function occurs in a person and the stateĽ in its turnĽ is embodied in the individuals who represent it. In thatĽ Husserl seems to profess classical doctrine: the state does not act; only individuals act. HoweverĽ the state as a willĽ more concretelyĽ as “sustainable social direction of the will” is distinguished from the individual will of the citizen12 ĚHusserl 1ř73bĽ 405 Ŕ 406ě. NeverthelessĽ citizensĽ together with civil servantsĽ are two fundamental pillars of the stateĽ unequal pillarsĽ second depending upon the first. ThusĽ the civil servant actualizes the citizenĽ who feeds him through taxes. In this senseĽ the state consists of the activity of citizensĽ ranging from a simple citizen to a servant of the state ĚHusserl 1ř73aĽ 110ě. We can think here of P. Ricoeur: according to him “the citizen is a sovereign in miniature” ĚRicoeur 1řř0Ľ 54ě. HusserlĽ in the footsteps of HegelĽ still makes the distinction between the individual and the function and by thatĽ between the private man and the citizen. The private man does not escape the jurisdiction of the stateĽ e. g. as an elector or tax payerĽ but he is a citizen only as the member of the state community only ĚHusserl 1ř73cĽ 40ř sqě. NormallyĽ the social life of a community state or of a national community proceeds in accordance with the habits and customs of everyday life. And the private is what is left to the individual´s freedomĽ which does not mean that the private man would be powerless: he has his rights and therefore a power too.13 This difference between the citizen and the private man is overcome at the level of the personality of the state. Husserl will even sayĽ by analogy to one s selfĽ that “the state is somehow me of state ” ĚStaats-IchěĽ but he would not say in the style of Louis XIVĽ that “the state Ŕ that is me”. 13 But he does not share a common right as a trader: buying entails no legal thoughtĽ unlike the selling. The private man opposes even more to the statesmanĽ the military and to the civil servant. 12 130 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 The citizen conditions changesĽ howeverĽ depending on the degree of the development of the state. In a developed state the “state order” is no longer limited to transparent and known customsĽ rights and politeness when we add a conflict of interests between his state and some otherĽ conflict which even may acquire a form of peaceful coexistence or hostility. A citizen is supposed to be interested not only in the history of his countryĽ but also in foreign countriesĽ as well as the history of the “community of states”.14 The horizon of the stateĽ which temporal mode is that of a presenceĽ is for “everyone”Ľ howeverĽ it remains unknown or mysterious. It is a task for professionals to educateĽ to manageĽ to make politicsĽ in a wordĽ specialists who can quickly become bureaucrats.15 In the same senseĽ it is preventing a reduction of the state and the right to a rigid doctrineĽ that isĽ we repeat their historic character. The fact remains that concerning history as a science which is aiming at the generalĽ it is the political which comes first in the order of this generality. Another topic to appear within the storyĽ in this senseĽ is the new universality that represents the cultural ĚHusserl 1ř73cĽ 411ě. 4. The man and his cultural world Culture is also one of the stages of the constitution of the being-for-us or the life-worldĽ thanks to its historical and cultural16 dimension. Culture and historyĽ although broadly synonymousĽ do not overlap in the strict sense. The history concerns the “bringing into community” or “communification” ĚVergemeinschaftungě of humanity. CultureĽ it is the Husserl lists the disciplines of a “universal knowledge” that is provided to “everyone” and in particular to a citizen: historyĽ including the science of state and lawĽ namely the political science as it looks todayĽ geography or geopoliticsĽ history of law and “political” history. The state isĽ moreoverĽ according to HusserlĽ “the first theme of universal historiography”. 15 According to HusserlĽ the philosophy eitherĽ as it has become an academic specialtyĽ did not escape the danger of specialization that he wanted to avoid in his way of philosophizing. 16 By culture Husserl seems to understand what others would call “civilization” ĚHusserl 1ř73bĽ 206ě. 14 131 Jozef Sivák matter of the creative life of humanity and it objectivizes itself in doingĽ in the performances of communities ĚHusserl 1ř73bĽ 207ě. History is also the history of the culture to the extent that it is culture which makes humanity a concrete being. This “enculturation”17Ľ as we would say todayĽ of the life-world is possible in principle with the case of a “world of a pre-given experience”Ľ a world of a pre-predicative experience. This world of experience is already impregnated with logical activityĽ tradition and education. Even pre-scientific myths are included. The life wouldĽ howeverĽ be unable to create spiritual formations without a concourse of thought and even without a symbiosis with thought. The culture has a gradation beginning with the fatherlandĽ of which reference was already madeĽ and should be identified more closely. Every man hasĽ firstĽ his homeĽ his familyĽ his birthplace and then his village or town. With these everyday “internal environments” they oppose the “outer worlds” devoid of everyday nature: the external life-worldĽ the horizon of most external and the farthest world ĚSivákĽ ibid.ě.18 The people composing the communities have their vital interests which they perform in practical life. As well as the stateĽ the culture is an intersubjective phenomenonĽ of intersubjective provenance.19 The culture blends with the historic character of the communityĽ namely its tradition For more detailsĽ cf. our work ĚSivák 1řřŘě. Husserl still carries a double distinction: homeland Ŕ abroad. FirstĽ man lives in a community of pre-given origin whose “foreign” environment is no less human. Where we actĽ we exchange and we suffer in a horizon more or less known and having the form of being-together. ThusĽ the distinction between these “fatherlands” and state domain that unifies and dominates them through a “government”. These distinctions are for HusserlĽ if we need reminding, insurmountable. 19 In factĽ Husserl combines the notions of culture and of civilization. Let us judge: “Unter Kultur verstehen wir ja nichts anderes als den Inbegriff der LeistungenĽ die in den Menschen fortlaufenden Tätigkeiten vergemeinschafteter zustande kommen und die in der Einheit des Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein und seine vorerhaltenden Tradition haben ihr bleibendes geistiges Dasein. Aufgrund ihrer physischen VerleiblichungĽ ihres sie dem ursprünglichen Schöpfer entäußernden Ausdrucks sind sie in ihrem Sinn für jeden geistigen zum Nachverstehen Befähigten erfahrbar. Können Sie in der immer wieder zu Folgezeit Ausstrahlungspunkten geistiger Wirkungen werden auf neue immer im Rahmen Generationen historischer Kontinuität. Und eben darin hat allesĽ was Titel der Kultur befasstĽ seine weseneigentümliche Art objektiver Existenz und fungiert andererseits als eine beständige Quelle der Vergemeinschaftung” ĚHusserl 1řŘŘĽ 21 Ŕ 22ě. 17 18 132 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 unified through community souvenir. Culture and history are inseparable.20 At the lowest of this sociality Ěculturalě level is a culture associated with the standards of behavior that are still prejuridical. The culture is also a “self-cultivation” ĚSelbstkulturě. The “being of self” is standard and ideal at the same time; being and duty here are inseparable. The authentic life is an autonomous life. This “self” does not relate to the individual only because this “self-formation to authenticity” should be accomplished according to the “Idea of a philosophical culture”.21 The same applies to self-responsibility which is not limited to the “responsibility for” Ěsomethingě but responsibility to others while being aware that others may be responsible for me.22 Not all cultures are equal. There is number of different culturesĽ but the idea of philosophy lives in European humanity as an absolute idea without a link with any anthropological typeĽ for example China or India. Phenomenology also refers to the whole of subjectivity and not to a contingent existence or an empirical person. It contains the to-be-realized telos of all cultural creation. MoreoverĽ the phenomenological education should be part of the cultureĽ including political education. This is the finality of knowledgeĽ as well as of the domination of men and humanity: to educate the man so that he could determine for himself on grounds of reason. What still belongs to the culture Ěscientific and phenomenologicalě is its purpose of “self-deployment” of subjectivity and of the world included in it. This passage to the phenomenology of culture is linked with the series of articles written for the Japanese magazine Kaizo, another demonstration of Husserl´s commitmentĽ titled “On the renewal of man and culture”. By This historical dimension consists of the fact that the development of the culture is historical and after that it is transmitted from one generation to another. 21 The passage from me to self proceeds within another identityĽ one that answers the question “Who am Iť” It is the identity of the person as uniqueĽ different from othersĽ dynamic and even historical identity. 22 “SelbstverantwortungĽ Sein Leben aus Selbstverantwortung in einem LebenĽ das von Selbstverantwortung durchsetzt ist in der Einheit einer Habitualität universaler Selbstverantwortung. Aber Selbstverantwortung ist für den MenschenĽ der Mensch ist im gemeinschaftlichen Sein und vergemeinschafteten LebenĽ eins mit der Verantwortung vor Anderen und mit dem Verantwortlichmachen der Anderen” ĚHusserl 1ř73cĽ 422ě. 20 133 Jozef Sivák the revival he meant an “ethical conversion” and “formation of a universal ethical culture of humanity” ĚHusserl 1řŘŘĽ XI.ě. Husserl saw the cause of the misery after the Great War in impotence and inauthenticity of ideas valid so far. This renewal should ensure a strong literary organization supported by the highest ethical ideals in order to teach and educate the humanity. As a member of the life of communityĽ everyone should be concerned. The main question of the articles addressed to JapaneseĽ who felt the same need to think about themselves and on their post-war years23Ľ was: how to rationalize the spiritualť The rationalization would make “eidetic science of reasonable humanity” possibleĽ i.e. an ethics of rationality. This revival will not only happen on a rational but also on a volitional level.24 Husserl finds a lacunal imbalance in the development of scienceĽ concretelyĽ the absence of a science of manĽ science which would introduce the rational on the social and political levelsĽ where the idea of man would be parallel to the idea of nature that stands in focus of the pure mathematics of nature. More concretelyĽ it should be opposed to the “universitas” of natural sciencesĽ the “universitas” of all the sciencesĽ the social sciences of the mind in particular. Human sciences are no less empiricalĽ but they lack a link in form of a principled rationalityĽ or the “mathesis of spirit and of humanity” that would thematize the “a priori” of truthĽ rooted in man as “logos of the method”. In this senseĽ while the mathematics of nature “explains” the empirical natural scienceĽ the science of the spirit is not sufficiently explanatory. The normative judgment must be associated to it according to the “general standards” that characterize the “reasonable” humanity and should help this humanity on a practical level. The reality of nature differs essentially from that of the mind. The analysis of the phenomenon of renewal must avoid naturalistic prejudices. While the naturalistic reasoning leads to a rationality of externalityĽ that is ordered causallyĽ the forms and essential determinations of the spiritual are differentĽ where even the spatiotemporal form receives a different meaning. The essential difference lies in the fact that each spiritual reality MoreoverĽ the magazine seems to have been founded precisely for this purpose; the title means exactly “renewal”. 24 Husserl diagnosed his time using these words: infamyĽ skeptical pessimismĽ political sophistry. 23 134 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 contains the “inner”; its “enclosed” conscious life is related to an “I”Ľ the central hub of actsĽ linked not causally but motivationally ĚHusserl 1řŘŘĽ Řě. Husserl can be blamed for addressing Japanese without having knowledge of their ĚEastě way of philosophizing. But he believed in the universality of Greek philosophyĽ thanks to the autonomy and independence of mindĽ which could not let the Japanese and other Orientals indifferent. The philosophy in this senseĽ is a “protophenomenon”Ľ thus it is not focused exclusively on Europe and its culture. For Husserl distinguishes between “empirical Europe”25 and Europe in the “spiritual sense”Ľ he is convinced that his philosophical-anthropological attitude is valid for everyoneĽ without favoring any particular cultureĽ with regard to a framework common to various cultures. Husserlian theme of the renewal represents an ethical-cultural problem and at the same time it is a principle. In this senseĽ it means two things: it is a reaction to a crisis on one hand and an ongoing requirement directed toward the future on the other.26 This revival had been radicalized by Husserl under the headwords like reviewĽ change or revision.27 Although Husserl admits that there are many culturesĽ he does not deal with interculturalismĽ but moves within a single culture onlyĽ the European one. E. W. Orth proposes another terminology that he deems it most appropriate to cultural phenomena: the inter-intentionality.28 It means that in the world of culture various intentionalitiesĽ implicit as explicitĽ are intertwined. ThusĽ culture is no less accessible to intentional According to the commentary of articles for the review KaizoĽ one no longer has the feeling Europe would enjoy such a privilege today; strictly speaking one could rather speak about a “heritage” ĚOrth 1řř3Ľ 334ě. HoweverĽ are Europeans themselves familiar with that legacyť 26 The articles for Kaizo announce the issue of the Crisis. 27 According to the commentatorĽ the interpretation of Husserl is placed between two synonyms for the word “kaizo”: “kuakoushin” changeĽ revision and “saishin”Ľ survey. 28 This inter-intentionality proposed to enrich the meaning of the “internationality” means that every man and every community are configurations of intentionalities. More specificallyĽ it concerns the Ěintentionalě relations of a subject-subject type on the one hand and those of a subject-thing type on the other. This internationality is not imposed by force but is instituted in the spirit of autonomy. HoweverĽ it would be unrealistic to seek to completely eliminate the force at the international level. 25 135 Jozef Sivák analysis.29 A critique of culture as before that of reason presupposes the freedom which is also inherent in the culture. And the capacityĽ the power to criticize is essential to man. The culture allowsĽ howeverĽ criticismĽ a shading of the truth geared to the membership in a cultural circle. The cultureĽ area of freedomĽ also offers the matter of freedom as a field of application to the phenomenological reduction.30 The cultureĽ a complex phenomenonĽ admits and even requires several pathways.31 FinallyĽ the expressions with reflexive pronouns as “self” or “auto” indicate the presence of another method or rather techniqueĽ that of the imaginary variationĽ basis of ideation or eidetic intuition.32 They relate ultimately to all cultureĽ forming the “technique of self-realization of humanity” ĚHusserl 1řŘŘĽ 56ě. The relations at the level of inter-internationality and within the whole of phenomenology of the cultureĽ by which Husserlian noematics culminatesĽ are realĽ their holders are practical men: “... we cannot drop man as concrete man of a culture” ĚOrth 1řř3Ľ 351ě. If in framework of a Accordingly Orth proposed the concrete material relations would represent the hyletic componentĽ the mutual spiritual understanding would correspond to the noetic direction and the active participation in common goods and values would correspond to the noematic direction. 30 Is it a coincidence that the first two volumes of the First Philosophy ĚHusserl 1ř56 and Husserl 1ř5řěĽ one subtitled “A critical history of ideas” and the otherĽ titled “The theory of the phenomenological reduction”Ľ combine to show a close connection between the historical-cultural reality and the epistemological problem of knowledge. 31 E. W. Roth distinguishes three approaches to culture in Husserl: 1. by the intentionalityĽ culture as the set of concrete intentional sequences; 2. by the problem of historicity where the history of philosophy is replaced by a "poem of the history of philosophy"Ľ and to be composed by independent thinkers although in conjunction with the philosophies of the past; 3. approach which passes through the idea of humanity and its ethosĽ two inseparable components of Husserl´s ideal of rigorous scienceĽ that recalls the “epistemology” of M. Foucault. According to the foregoingĽ we could add to these approaches the knowledge of literatureĽ of political history and of geography from the local to the global level. 32 The list of these expressions which become phenomenological terms does not appear to be complete: Selbstwertung, self-evaluationĽ SelbstgestaltungĽ self-formationĽ SebstbetrachtungĽ consideration of selfĽ SelbststudiumĽ self-learningĽ Selbstregulierung, self-regulationĽ etc. These are also the cultural phenomena that at the individual level more precisely represent the essential forms of “self-renewal” ĚSelbsterneurungěĽ forms of becoming. 29 136 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 constitutive or pure phenomenology Husserl could not avoid talking about Ěpossibleě essencesĽ in this last stage of the route he could not avoid talking about the effective and practical reality. “In respect of I and of the worldĽ the reality ĚWirklichkeitě precedes any possibility!”33 But the last word of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity would not be that of the state but that of the phenomenology gifted by its own teleology and striving to become the hidden desire of all philosophy. The evolutionary teleology of the monadic universe is moving towards the practical idea of “true humanity” and of “ethical” ideas belonging thereto. It should be added that it is as new way of “communification” and a new form of durable maintainable community whose spiritual life rests within a horizon of infinite futureĽ the horizon of infinite generations renovating themselves the spirit of ideas. The sequence of generations motivated accordingly exemplifies the reflection of an infinite chain of philosophical and scientific idealities. The same goes for any culture pointing to a “true” cultureĽ “full of value” and so far as the culture is the product of the cultural life of humanity it converges to phenomenology. In this senseĽ phenomenology is in an antagonistic relationship to the state which does not relate to humanity as a whole but to the plurality of interests on an internal as well as on an external level in defending the interests of a given political community against other states. Every state has its governmentĽ it is unified by the power and it remains in constant disputation with other nations. The supranational law which rests on various international treatiesĽ treaties of peaceĽ of tradeĽ etc.Ľ can provide only a relative peace. As an ethical instance based on ideal standardsĽ the phenomenology isĽ howeverĽ above the state. On the other sideĽ the state compared to the phenomenologyĽ has the advantage of preexistence of a factual fieldĽ and in this senseĽ since its birth phenomenology has been “... The knowledge of the 'possible' must precede that of the actual Ěder Wirklichkeiteně ...” ĚHusserl 1ř50Ľ 20řě. “Hinsichtlich meiner und der Welt geht die jeder Wirklichkeit Möglichkeit vorher” ĚHusserl 1ř73cĽ 51řě. The title of the supplement ĚXXXIIIěĽ the quotation is taken fromĽ announces it expressly: “Zur Umfingierung des Ich und der Welt: das Primat der Wirklichkeit gegenüber der Möglichkeit. Das Ich in der Selbstgemeinschaftung und Selbsterhaltung.” This formulation does not contradict Husserl´s theory of knowledge; it does not entail a revision thereofĽ as Orth wroteĽ but we must realize that the two seemingly contradictory formulations proceed from different registers. 33 137 Jozef Sivák subjected to the state although always in relation of an ever increasing competition. But the final victory is reserved for phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. Husserl believes that the ethical development will result in the dismantling of the state organization of power. Provided that this process is not limited in time and that we will strive unceasingly to raise the political culture. The “overshoot” of the state by phenomenology does notĽ howeverĽ mean a complete disappearance of the stateĽ but it can happen again only through the stateĽ which will not use repressive meansĽ but the phenomenological means of reason. 5. In conclusion: towards a citizenship without borders? HusserlĽ starting from a critique of modern reasonĽ comes to results quite opposed to the current postmodernismĽ which believes to inaugurate a new eraĽ a new period in the history of philosophy. With his rehabilitation of reason and cultureĽ he has been subjected to the postmodern critique. This critiqueĽ reversing the relationship between philosophy and science in favor of the latterĽ hardly accepts the results of the enculturation of the life-world: homo theoreticus and homo culturalis. HusserlĽ in his turnĽ would not have accepted the concepts of “radical pluralism” and “pure difference”Ľ which he would consider to be “monsters” deficient in unity and preventing unification. The postmodernist critics´ denouncing the so-called “tyranny of reason” and the “temple of reason”Ľ which pertain to a strong and domineering subjectĽ fall into the illusion of a defeat of reason instead of translating the current cultural malaiseĽ including the philosophical cultureĽ into terms of ethics and thought.34 On the other handĽ the postmodern ideology seems easily to put up with the thesis of globalism and the process of a globalization proceeding before our eyesĽ a process In this senseĽ the diagnosis of the actual situation that the abbot E. Barbotin had given me one dayĽ still seems to be accurate and valid: “the flat ideas and weak wills”. Before himĽ J. Patočka denounced the existence of ideologies and of violence which prevent us from “living in the Idea”Ľ and the radicalism of some thinkers disintegrating great patterns and spiritual initiatives of the past. 34 13Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 considered as irreversible and imposing itself with the force of law.35 The concept of citizenship is no lessĽ if not moreĽ concerned with such a process. What is citizenship in a world without borders and shoresť The citizenshipĽ having been defined only recently and understood accordingly by Husserl himself Ŕ would it become obsolete todayť36 And taking into consideration the current crisis of citizenshipĽ would a global “citizenship” be the remedy for this crisisť Burying Ŕ perhaps too soon Ŕ the classical notion of citizenshipĽ there have been proposals to different ways of pulling it out from the state or national frameworkĽ to different notions of citizenship corresponding to these ways: “nomadic” or “shared” citizenship ĚEtienne Balibarě ĚTassin Ŕ Karul 2011Ľ 31ě the “cosmopolitan” citizenship of migrants ĚEtienne Tassině37 ĚTassin Ŕ Karul 2011Ľ řěĽ citizenship of the cultural man or the question in what world should such a man live ĚFrançoise Bonardelě ĚTassin Ŕ Karul 2011Ľ 63ě. IronicallyĽ all these authors come from a country that considers itself a “fatherland” of all men. HusserlĽ as we have seenĽ had not remained trapped within confines of a state or a communityĽ but he aimed at the whole humanity sub specie aeternitatisĽ while considering the difference “home Ŕ abroad” as insurmountable and renewable in another part of the world.38 He admitted 35 Nearly the same used to be said about the former Ěsocialistě internationalism which was neither eternal nor legal. SimilarlyĽ it is often forgotten today that particular interests lurk behind globalism too. 36 E. TassinĽ for exampleĽ believes itĽ when he speaks about a form of “traditionalĽ conventional and sterile” citizenship which should be uplifted to a new dimensionĽ global dimension ĚTassin Ŕ Karul 2011Ľ 10ě. 37 According to this authorĽ “deterritorialization” causing “disidentification” can be transformed to a new form and more active way of political subjectivation only by “a stranger”. Only those who dare to break the links with their nearly related ones as also with their ancestorsĽ will try the vagabondageĽ will face all kinds of danger and of sufferingĽ those would become the true “subjects” of the modern cosmopolitan society ĚTassin Ŕ Karul 2011Ľ 61ě. Is such a “citizenship”Ľ howeverĽ worth the effortĽ not to mention the fact that we presume that the uprooting might result in alienation or a personality changeť E.g.Ľ a forced exile may be accompanied by an adaptation syndrome which can last for years. This is also the case of unstable societiesĽ unstable politicallyĽ sociallyĽ legallyĽ where instability can become the source of other psychical disordersĽ suicides. 38 Even if the individual or a population is of an adventurous nature Ŕ man is also a world animal Ŕ he is able to relocate and create a new appurtenance to a middleĽ his new family 13ř Jozef Sivák that overcoming the state and the consideration of the transition to the supranational are necessaryĽ providing that this passage is not accompanied by violenceĽ something we cannot say about the current globalization. He preferred non-violent enculturation to violent acculturation.39 The “no-frontierism” is not without negative consequencesĽ considered in terms of mental and physical health of men.40 In additionĽ there is an imbalance between the two identities in questionĽ imbalance in favor of the one that emphasizes the peculiarityĽ originality. The life of a society then moves between two extremes: a Ěmassiveě excessive adaptation on one side and an excessive maladjustmentĽ an uprooting on the other side.41 In the first caseĽ one is open to otherness while the other prevents us from “living together”. Such a man lives only for himself in a war with the others. What is even worseĽ this happens in ignorance towards the first identity andĽ as a resultĽ specific dissimilarities dominate the collective similaritiesĽ making the access to othersĽ to the fellowĽ difficult or impossible. Putting ourselves in place of the otherĽ we worldĽ but not a new fatherland as the Chinese proverb says: “On the road to exile you will clothe good mandarin dressesĽ but you will not find another fatherland”. 39 While the enculturation represents adaptation to the culture one is born intoĽ the acculturation is an adaptation to another culture. Entire so-called “primitive” populations became victims of an acculturation as a violent change of cultureĽ which has gradually lost its vital energy and finally succumbs to a desire of death in its own right. 40 Current statistics show a rapid growth of disorders and mental illnesses throughout Europe and whose origin is perhaps not without relation to the current state of societies. A Slovak doctor psychiatrist P. Černák, recently interviewed, did not mince matters: “For a long time now, a generation of children has grown up before our eyes, generation so disharmonious and bearing signs of narcissism and a border personality disorder. It has been two decades, some explain, during which both democracy and the notion of democracy have been Ŕ maybe intentionally Ŕharmed. As if there were only rights and freedoms and no discipline and responsibility. The parents and even schools do not set clear boundaries to children. Society offers anything except visions which would have a spiritual value and would give people a sense and a direction to their lives. It is not only the fetishization of the matter. It has been offered (alas!) a distorted moral instead: the greatest evils remain unpunished, the lie is taken for truth, selfishness wins over tolerance and altruism. ... One of the key moments in psychotherapy is the definition of boundaries to patients or to clients. Entire society, especially those who form it, are in need of such boundaries. No doubt, the non-frontierism is slowly killing us” ĚUličianska 2012ě. 41 An excessive maladjustment leads to an excessive homogeneity, to the dependence due to which the man becomes the toy of the social strengths or of his own inclinations. 140 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 are striving to understandĽ is the only possibility of breaking this vicious circle. References HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř50ě: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ĚHusserliana IIIě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř77ě: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. 1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage- Nachdruck. Ed. K. Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ĚHusserliana III-1ě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř50ě: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. 2. Halbband: Ergänzende TexteĽ Ě1ř12-1ř2řě. Ed. K. Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff ĚHusserliana III-2ě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1řŘ2ě: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. Transl. Fred Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř62ě: Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenshaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. The Hague: Nijhoff ĚHusserliana VIě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř70ě: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Transl. D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř56ě: Erste Philosophie Ě1ř23/4ě. Erste Teil: Kritische Ideengeshichte. The Hague: Nijhoff ĚHusserliana VIIě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř5řě: Erste Philosophie Ě1ř23/4ě. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. The Hague: Nijhoff ĚHusserliana VIIIě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř73ě: Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1ř05-1ř20. The Hague: Nijhoff ĚHusserliana XIIIě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř73ě: Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1ř21-1ř2Ř. The Hague: Nijhoff ĚHusserliana XIVě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1ř73ě: Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1ř2ř-1ř35. The Hague: Nijhoff ĚHusserliana XVě. HUSSERLĽ E. Ě1řŘŘě: Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1ř22-1ř37. The Hague: Kluwer ĚHusserliana XXVIIě. ORTHĽ E.W. Ě1řř3ě: Interkulturalität und Inter-Intentionlität. Husserls Ethos Zu der seinen japanischen Erneurung in Kaizo-Artikeln. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 47/3. 141 Jozef Sivák RICOEURĽ P. Ě1řř0ě: Ethique et Politique. In: Ethics and Politics. Art against Totality. Bratislava: The Castle of Bratislava. SCHUHMANNĽ K. Ě1řŘŘ.ě: Husserls Staatsphilosophie. Freiburg / München: K. Alber. SIVÁKĽ J. Ě1řřŘě: Enculturation of Life-world. In: Analecta HusserlianaĽ vol. LVIIĽ pp. Ř5 Ŕ 105. SIVÁKĽ J. Ě2005ě: Husserl‟s Mission of Sovereignty of Thought: in the Light of his Briefwechsel . In: Analecta HusserlianaĽ vol. LXXXIV: Phenomenology of life: Meeting the Challenges of the Present Ŕ Day WorldĽ pp. 45 Ŕ 67. TASSINĽ E. Ŕ KARULĽ R. ĚEd.ě Ě2011ě: Občianstvo bez hraníc? ĚThe Citizenship Without Bordersťě Bratislava: Filozofický ústav SAV Ěin Slovakě. ULIČIANSKAĽ Z. Ě2012ě: Bezhraničnos nás zabije. Rozhovor s P. ČernákomĽ riad. Psychiatrickej nemocnice v Pezinku. In: SMEĽ 14.7.2012 Ěprimar.sme.sk/c/6456Ř26/bezhranicnost-nas-zabije.htmlě The contribution is a partial presentation of the outcomes of the research project VEGA No. 2/0175/12 From Phenomenology to Metaphysics and to Reflection of the Contemporary Crisis of Society and Art which has been pursued at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. Mgr. Jozef SivákĽ CSc. Institute of Philosophy Slovak Academy of Sciences Klemensova 1ř Ř11 0ř Bratislava Slovak Republic filosiva@savba.sk 142 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 ENV)RONMENTAL CR)SES TENDENC)ES OF GLOBAL )NDUSTR)AL C)V)L)ZAT)ON Richard Sťahel This paper analyzes the current crisis of the global industrial civilization as a coincidence of external and internal reasons, mainly as a coincidence of economic and environmental crises tendencies. The analysis is based on Habermas´ distinction between four types of social formation, and according to their internal organizational principles and an extent of their social and system integration, also types of crises that can occur in the given type of the social formation. The paper shows that the common reason of economic and environmental crises which are a part of system crisis of industrial civilization is an imperative of growth. This imperative, as Habermas points out, is the immanent principle of institutions and systems of capitalism. Economic and demographic growth of industrial civilization based on capitalism principles has reached its limits. However, all types of social formation, institutions and civilizations are also determined by the imperative of sustainability. The current crisis is then characterized as a display of antagonism between the imperative of growth and imperative of sustainability. This antagonism creates a new category of transformation for sustainable societies or revolution conflicts in states that break environmental and economic limits of growth. These conflicts result from food and water shortages and could bring a growing instability into the world or lead into the collapse of the industrial civilization. Keywords: globalization – industrial civilization – economic crisis tendencies – environmental crisis tendencies – imperative of growth – imperative of sustainability A crisis could be defined as a situation in which it has become clear that the existing ways of addressing problems and institutions have failed. It is also a situation requiring prompt decisions1. Identifying the crisis tendencies enables transformation of the society and its institutions; without transformation the 1 See ĚS ahel 2005aě and also ĚS ahel 200ŘěĽ ĚS ahel 2010cě. 143 Richard Sťahel development can lead to a revolution which will interrupt the continuity of the development or will threaten the identity of the political-economic system. It could leads also to the collapse of civilization as well. The economic crisis of 2007 Ŕ 200Ř is the fourth big crisis in the last two centuries2. HoweverĽ it is apparent that it is not only an economic crisis orĽ regarding the following social and political crisesĽ only a crisis of capitalism. At the same timeĽ facing deepening environmental crisisĽ we have to think about crisis of the industrial civilization3. Industrial civilization is the first truly global civilizationĽ firstlyĽ for a global application of the same theoretical and technological principles into all areas of life and reproduction of the society andĽ secondlyĽ for the consequences of applying these principles Ŕ positive or negative. Legitimacy of the term „industrial civilization“ results from the fact that it was industrial technology and organization which for the first time in human history allowed more than half of the human population of the world to live in cities at the end of the 20th century. Life in citiesĽ industrial production and distribution of products and services in such an extent creates unprecedented economicĽ socialĽ political and environmental problemsĽ which are very similarĽ if not identicalĽ in all parts of the world. The current crisis is thus unparalleled not only in its global extent but also in deepening the materialĽ food and environmental crises which threaten not only the identity but also the existence of the current global political-economic system. When reflecting on the causes and possible consequences of the crisis of the global industrial civilization we must take all these aspects into consideration and pay attention to their reciprocal conditionality and synergy4. HoweverĽ more attention is paid to the reflection of economicĽ social and political aspects of the crisis of the global industrial civilization than to the reflection of its materialĽ food and environmental aspects. The reason is that economicĽ social and political aspects of the crisis seem more acute and their theoretical reflection has a longer tradition than reflection of materialĽ food and environmental aspects of the crisis. These have been systematically reflected only in the last fifty years5. Despite the extent and argumentation See ĚHauser 2012ě. See ĚS ahel 2005bě. 4 See ĚS ahel 2005bě. 5 And this despite the factĽ that the problem was addressed by T. R. Malthus in his famous essay. See ĚMalthus1řřŘě. One of the possible explanations points to a different time frame of economicĽ social and political crises on one hand and the environmental crisis on the otherĽ what significantly influences the ability to critically reflect on these phenomena. 2 3 144 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 accuracy of results of the scientific research on the causes and possible solution of the environmental crisisĽ no changes that would at least reduce the exploitation and devastation of the environment took place within the global or domestic economicĽ social or political systems. On the contraryĽ the population of the planet has almost doubled and the consumer expectations have increased. ThereforeĽ the number of cattle or fishĽ the amount of fresh water for agricultural and industrial production as well as for human consumption including production of all kinds of products has far exceeded even the rise of human population. In regard to growing population the total consumption of the productsĽ services and energy has been increasing despite the rise of effectiveness and implementation of more environmentally considerate technologiesĽ moreoverĽ despite the decrease of economic activities induced by the economic crisis. The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere6 and chemism of the oceans7Ľ the speed of extinction of animal species and plantsĽ deforestationĽ reduction of arable land and the decrease of fresh water supplies should be added to the list of consequences. The growth of production and consumption as well as the growth of population are always related to the increased exploitation of natural resources and pollution8. The imperative of growth as the immanent part of the majority of systems and institutions of the industrial civilization can be considered the common denominator of these crisis phenomena. The globalization process9 allowed for the application of the imperative of growth in the areas and sectors that thirty or forty years ago were arranged on the basis of different imperatives while the process even eliminated or at least weakened the influence of the traditional cultural and political tools which used to regulate the growth itself as well as its side effects. The extent and the potential of economicĽ ecologicalĽ socialĽ political and cultural consequences of the environmental aspect of the global crisis make it Another one rests in a persisting faith in the technological progress which should sooner or later bring solution to all crisis phenomena. 6 Despite the Kyoto ProtocolĽ the goal of which was to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 5% regarding the level in 1řř0Ľ their concentration in the atmosphere has since the year 2000 increased by 20%. 7 Emission of greenhouse gases increased acidity of the oceans in last two centuries by 25%. In consequenceĽ it could start mass extinction of the sea animals. See also ĚLovelock 2012Ľ 174ě. 8 See ĚNaess 1řř6Ľ 301ě. 9 See ĚS ahel 2013aě. 145 Richard Sťahel then historically and by extent such a unique phenomenon that it „is not possible to formulate traditional philosophical questions without regard to the fact of the current ecological crisis anymore” ĚKolá ský 2011Ľ 30ě. We can only agree with R. Kolá ský‟s statement that the task of the current philosophy is to rethink the philosophical concepts of the past and the present ĚKolá ský 2011Ľ 130ě from the aspect of the environmental global crisis. When reflecting economicĽ social and political crises we have to take the phenomenon of the environmental crisis into account and study their interaction. This attitude enables one to think of the current crisis as the system crisis of the industrial civilization and economicĽ socialĽ politicalĽ demographicĽ food and environmental crises to understand them as individual manifestations or aspects of this system crisis10. 1. Habermas’s Crisis Theory All these phenomena could be interpreted by a coherent crisis theory which was formulated by J. Habermas in the early 1ř70s in his Legitimation Crisis11. This theoryĽ connected with some kind of philosophy of historyĽ has also offered the basis for reflection on the current crisis. HoweverĽ as R. Plant remindsĽ the “Legitimation Crisis is a research programmeĽ not a final report” ĚPlant 1řŘ2Ľ 346ě. But this fact enables the application of the Habermas‟ approach to the reflection of the current civilization crisis. According to HabermasĽ “only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of crises” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 3ě. He based this on the assertion that also “social systems have identities and can lose them” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 3ě. It is an open question thenĽ if the global industrial civilization can be perceived as an analogical social system. Since the scientific and publicistic discourses work with the term “civilization crisis” even in case of the current global crisisĽ and many economicĽ demographic and environmental phenomena are reflected on in global connectionsĽ the answer is tentatively positive. In generalĽ according to HabermasĽ “crisis occurrences owe their See also ĚS ahel 2013bě. ĚHabermas 2005ě. Legimation Crisis was first published as Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus in 1ř73 ĚFrankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlagě and in English translation in 1ř76. 10 11 146 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 objectivity to the fact that they issue from unresolved steering problems” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 4ě. HoweverĽ Habermas “distinguishes four social formations: primitive [vorhochkulturelle]Ľ traditionalĽ capitalistĽ postcapitalist” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 17ě.12 Each of them faces different problems of governance and the failure to manage them or to solve them can lead to a crisis. According to the inner organizational principle and the extent of the social and system integration13 of these types of the social formationĽ Habermas distinguishes types of crises that can occur. Primitive Social Formations are organized on the basis of the age and gender principles which are institutionalized in a kinship system. Usual source of social crises are contradictory imperatives of socio-economical systemĽ but “no contradictory imperatives follow from this principle of organization” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 1Řě. Therefore such societiesĽ states HabermasĽ are largely affected by external identity crises where “the usual source of change is demographic growth in connection with ecological factors” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 1Řě. According to Habermas only primitive or archaic social formations can face an external cased crisesĽ all others faces mainly internal cased crises. Traditional Social Formations are created on the civilizational level of development. Their basic “principle of organization is class domination in political form” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 1Řě. These are socially and by class divided societies which need to pay attention to justifying and legitimizing this division because they bring internal contradictions. Traditional societies are then threatened by internal identity crises as Habermas states: “In traditional societies the type of the crisis that arises proceeds from internal contradictions” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 20ě. Relations of production are then at the same time political relationsĽ owners of means of productionĽ primarily of the landĽ are owners of the political power; in other wordsĽ the political and economic powers are the same. According to Habermas “in traditional societiesĽ crises appear whenĽ and only whenĽ steering problems cannot be resolved within the possibility space circumscribed by the principle of organization and therefore produce dangers to system integration that threaten By the term post-capitalist social formation Habermas „designates state-socialist societies“ ĚHabermas 1řŘ0Ľ 17ěĽ which are in his view also class societiesĽ the difference is that production means are handled by political elites. 13 In other text coming from the first half of 1ř70s Habermas differentiates societies according to the level of social integration. He differentiates Neolithic societiesĽ Archaic civilizations and Developed premodern civilizations ĚHabermas 1ř75Ľ 2ř5ě. 12 147 Richard Sťahel the identity of the society” ĚHabermas 1řŘ0Ľ 25ě. Liberal-capitalist societies are organized around the relations of capital and wage labour. Relations of production are differentiated from the political relationsĽ from which also the “civil society” is differentiated. Economic system is thus free from limitations of the socially integrative subsystems. It enables the state to intensify the dynamics of growth and with it also crises that are manifested mainly as economic crises. HoweverĽ these crises finally affect the whole social system. Liberal capitalism is thus affected by system crises. Habermas can therefore emphasize that “in liberal-capitalist societies ... crises become endemic because temporarily unresolved steering problemsĽ which the process of economic growth produces at more or less regular intervalsĽ as such endanger social integration” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 25ě. A crisis is then a recurrent phenomenonĽ a cyclic phenomenon and in its occurrence specific general signs can be identified. It is then not an accidentalĽ one-time occurrenceĽ but it is connected with its growthĽ it is its accompaniment and one of its unwanted consequences. “No previous social formation lived so much in fear and expectation of sudden system changeĽ even though the idea of a temporally condensed transformation Ŕ that isĽ of a revolutionary leap Ŕ is oddly in contrast to the form of motion of system crisis as a permanent crisis” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 25ě. At least the threat of the return of the crisis has become a permanent part of the social systemĽ together with revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements and their conflicts. “Economic growth takes place through periodically recurring crises because the class structureĽ transplanted into the economic steering systemĽ has transformed the contradiction of class interests into a contradiction of system imperatives” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 26ě. We can therefore talk about a crisis cycle or cyclic crises which affect not only the economic subsystem of the society. MoreoverĽ according to HabermasĽ the economic crisis in liberal-capitalist systems is specific and historically unique in that that it is a consequence of contradictions of system imperatives which cannot be structurally solved because its source is the structure of the society organized on the basis of certain rationality. Systems crises then “have the appearance of natural catastrophes that break forth from the center of a system of purposive rational action” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 30ě. In other wordsĽ a crisis arises because the society and its subjects perform strictly “rationally”Ľ i.e. under the system imperatives and these imperatives are contradictory. FinallyĽ Habermas asksĽ if in the organized capitalism the so outlined logic of the crisis has preserved or changedĽ i.e. if capitalism has “been fully transformed into a post-capitalist social formation that has overcome the crisis-ridden form of an economic 14Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 growthť” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 31ě The development of Ěat leastě the last decade has answered this question Ŕ the economic growth has been constantly interrupted by acute crisesĽ appearing because economic subjects are trying to achieve the highest-possible economic growth in accordance with the basic system imperative. Organized or advanced capitalist social formation Ěstate-regulated capitalismě appears after World War II as a reaction to the fail of the liberal capitalism in the crisis of 1ř30s which led to a world conflict. According to Habermas “the state intervenes in the market as functional gaps developed” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 33ěĽ so as to at least reduce the conflict potential of system imperative intensified by acute crises. The economic and social politics of the Western European countries in the first three decades after World War II can be regarded as a reaction to the phenomenon of the economic crisis. “The structures of advanced capitalism can be understood as reaction formations to endemic crisis. To ward off system crisisĽ advanced capitalist societies focus all forces of social integration at the point of structurally most probable conflict Ŕ in order all the more effectively to keep it latent” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 37 Ŕ 3Řě. Habermas at the same time points out that state intervention to the economic sphereĽ which in liberal capitalism is differentiated from the politicsĽ brings new types of problems in the organized capitalism. “Recoupling the economic system to the political Ŕ which in a way repoliticizes the relations of production Ŕ creates an increased need for legitimation” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 36ě. An effort of the political sphere to ease the conflict potential of cyclic crises arising as a consequence of the unregulated economic growth leads not only to an increase of the influence of the political system on the economic oneĽ but also to a transfer of steering problems from the economic to the political sphere. “In decades since World War II the most advanced capitalist countries have succeeded Ěthe May 1ř6Ř events in Paris notwithstandingě in keeping class conflict latent in its decisive areas; in extending the business cycle and transforming periodic phases of capital devaluation into a permanent inflationary crisis with milder business fluctuations” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 3Řě. A state has taken a role of a partaker and a regulator of the market and simultaneously a compensator of its negative socialĽ cultural and later also ecologic consequences so as to prevent a breakout of acute crises. The price we pay is a systematic overload of public budgets in the form of long-term deficits. MoreoverĽ in 1ř70s the western countries were hit by some acute crises 14ř Richard Sťahel caused by the stop in an oil supply. These could be called externally produced crises. The Western European countries thus faced other type of crisisĽ different to what their institutions were prepared for. HoweverĽ Habermas points out thatĽ “If governmental crisis management failsĽ it lags behind programmatic demands that it has placed on itself. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of legitimation. ThusĽ the scope for action contracts precisely at those moments in which it needs to drastically expand” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 6řě. At the same timeĽ it seems there is no difference if it concerns crises caused primarily externally or internally. Trustworthiness of the state as an institution in the role of a protector against crises as well as the legitimacy of the political elites has considerably suffered. As J. Habermas statesĽ one of the features and conditions of the postwar class compromise was “civic privatism Ŕ that isĽ political abstinence combined with an orientation to careerĽ leisureĽ and consumption”Ľ which “promotes the expectation of suitable rewards within the system ĚmoneyĽ leisure timeĽ and securityě” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 37ě. By the end of the 1ř70s it became clear that the stateĽ as in the pre-war periodĽ is again not able to give the chance for career and employment to all and is certainly not able to provide a steady growth in consumption. All this happens despite the steady increase of the tax burden and despite the broadening of the areas over which the state is trying to gain bureaucratic or legislative control. As R. Plant reminds usĽ “capitalism has built up expectations about consumptionĽ and these have increased pressures on governments to steer the economy to produce more goods. The non-provision of goods to meet expectations becomes a dysfunctional feature of market which it has become a task of government to correct” ĚPlant 1řŘ2Ľ 343ě. HoweverĽ the development over the last decade has clearly shown that governments must also intervene when production is growing faster than possibilities of consumption of what has been produced. The support of consumerismĽ regardless of its socialĽ cultural and environmental consequencesĽ is a problem of producers as well as governments. 2. The return of the acute crisis phenomenon The process of economic globalization can be understood as the result of an effort to support further growth of production and consumption which was limited by resources and capacities of national markets. The result of globalization of the preceding three decades has been expressed in the industrially developed countries in the form of liberalization and privatization 150 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 not only of productive capacities but also of infrastructure and public servicesĽ including health and welfare systemĽ educationĽ science and cultureĽ so we can talk about the dismantlingĽ twilight or progressive reduction of a social state.14 A considerable part of regulation mechanismsĽ which were meant to prevent a formation of acute crises or to reduce their possible consequencesĽ was eliminated. To describe the social formation of the current industrial civilization it is better to take Habermas‟ characteristics of the classic liberal capitalism than to adopt the characteristics of a so-called late or regulated capitalism of 1ř70s. With liberalizationĽ deregulation Ědesocializationě15 of the economic-political system in 1řř0s the acute economic crises returnedĽ which corresponds with Habermas‟ characteristics of a crisis that affects the liberal capitalism: “The economic crisis results from contradictory system imperatives and threatens social integration. It isĽ at the same timeĽ a social crisisĽ in which the interests of groups collide and place in question the social integration of the society” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 2ř Ŕ 30ě. These words also characterize the crisis of 200Ř. In the euphoria of 1řŘř Habermas warned in his essay Die Nachholende Revolution16 that the fall of the Berlin Wall did not solve any of the system problems which have specifically arisen. Habermas states: “The indifference of a market economy to its external costsĽ which it off-loads on to the social and natural environmentĽ is sowing the path of a crisis-prone economic growth with the familiar disparities and marginalizations on the inside; with economic backwardnessĽ if not regressionĽ and consequently with barbaric living conditionsĽ cultural expropriation and catastrophic famines in the Third World; not to mention the worldwide risk caused by disrupting the balance of nature” ĚHabermas 1řř0Ľ 17ě. All these problems are still unsolved and even more complex in today‟s global civilization. Two decades laterĽ reflecting the 200Ř crisis Habermas points out its historical uniqueness when he writes: “In autumn 200ŘĽ for the first time in the history of capitalismĽ the backbone of the financial market-driven global economic system could be rescued from the brink of collapse only by the guarantees of the taxpayers” ĚHabermas 2012Ľ 125ě. Contradiction of system imperatives didn‟t disappear but they have become even deeper. According to Habermas it became obvious that “capitalism is no longer able to reproduce itself under its own steam” See ĚKeller 2005ě. Term used by P. RicœurĽ see in ĚRicœur 1řř2ě. 16 In English published under title What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left ĚHabermas 1řř0ě. 14 15 151 Richard Sťahel ĚHabermas 2012Ľ 125ěĽ so we can talk not only about “system crisis” but also about “system failure”. We can even suggest that the current managing structures cannot handle the consequent problems of the growth identified in 1ř70s by Habermas as the crisis tendencies of the late-capitalist systemĽ although they make every effort and use all means. The lack of resources of growth became evident before 200Ř. As P. Stan k statesĽ growth of productionĽ consumption and profit was to a great extent possible only by growth of indebtedness of individualsĽ businesses and countries. This indebtedness is one of the main reasons of the current economic crisis ĚStan k 2012Ľ 36ě. Indebtedness as one of the by-products of the process of polarization of income has been accelerating since 1ř70s. While the income of most of the population stagnates or even decreasesĽ income of the most rich multiplies. This has ledĽ aside from the growth of the social tensionĽ to a global decrease of consumption which could be saturated for a short period of time only by credit expansion ĚStan k 2012Ľ 61 Ŕ 62ě. Despite this factĽ many attempts to overcome the current crisis focus on stimulation of consumption. The attempts of governments to save the financial system and support consumption have only led to steep growth of national debts. One of the main system conflicts has been accentuated Ŕ on one handĽ the governments try to persuade their citizens that they need to economizeĽ which legitimizes the elimination of the social state institutes17Ľ on the other hand they encourage the citizens not to limit their consumption and keep buying all sorts of products and services. It means that the system faces also the crisis of rationalityĽ as Habermas had anticipated. 3. The Environmental Aspect of Crisis HoweverĽ artificially stimulated consumption also means acceleration of exploiting natural resources and pollution of environment which intensifies the environmental aspect of the crisis. In 1řř0s this connection was pointed out by L. Hohoš when he observed that “ecologic and economic systems are closely connected and therefore we are confronted with different aspects of one and the same crisis; after allĽ the degradation of the environment directly endangers economic systems” ĚHohoš 1řř3Ľ 120ě. Today even economists admit that the economic damages caused by climate changes and extreme weather along with expenses necessitated by the need to adapt the 17 See ĚS ahel 2010aě. 152 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 infrastructure to the climate changes will intensify the economicĽ social and political aspects of the crisis ĚStan k 2012Ľ 64 Ŕ 65ě. As Habermas states the crisis threatens the identity of a social formation. The failure to control crisis can then lead to a transformational or revolutionary change of the political-economic system.18 This conclusion can be accepted provided that reflection will focus mainly on economicĽ social and political aspects of the current crisisĽ i.e. on those aspects causes of which are considered internal. In words of I. Dubnička: “History has often confirmed that revolutions and destabilization of an established system happen in the moment when the extent of unequally redistributed property Ěaccumulated overproductioně becomes unacceptable by the majority of the society” ĚDubnička 2007Ľ 41Řě. The political-economic system can collapse in a dramatic form of revolutionĽ an international or even global conflict or internal conflict; howeverĽ the form and extent of the current threats shows that reflection on the crisis of the global industrial civilization which focuses only on the economicĽ socialĽ and political level is insufficient. It does not consider the existential threat for the civilization as a whole. This threat will become apparent in its full extent when reflection on the global industrial civilization covers materialĽ food and environmental aspectsĽ i.e. aspects the causes of which can be called mainly external. Habermas regards these as relevant mainly for archaic societiesĽ but at the same time he identifies them as possible consequent problems of the growth ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 41 Ŕ 43ě.19 Environmental and demographic threats produce those types of crises whichĽ Habermas saysĽ were faced mainly by archaic or traditional social formationsĽ meaning agrarian or rural societies. Capitalist societies are industrial and urban. In the preceding century the environmental problems were marginalized or partly resolved by technological development or by exporting environmentally demanding productions and waste to distant areas. The resulting demographic and social problems were solved by mass displacementĽ lack of soil and food by territorialĽ mainly colonial expansion20 The change can have a character of a revolutionĽ transformation or a collapse of a political-economic system. 19 But also French revolution in 17Řř could be interpreted as at least co-caused by external causesĽ mainly environmental. See ĚGore 2000Ľ 57 Ŕ 5Řě. It means that this kind of threats Ěclimate fluctuationě could destabilize not only archaic social formationsĽ as Habermas claims. 20 Following up T. R. Malthus J. S. Mill in his Principles of Political EconomyĽ first published in 1Ř4ŘĽ where he statesĽ that due to the growing population and a need to feed itĽ Great Britain “no longer depends on the fertility of her own soil ... but on the soil of the 18 153 Richard Sťahel and also by businessĽ which owing to development of transportation and storage technologies allowed import of food and other resources from the other side of the world21. HoweverĽ this process has only put off Ŕ in time and space Ŕ the recognition that environmental and demographic crisis tendencies threaten also societies of the industrial civilization and that they have the same conflict potential as other types of threats22. whole world” ĚMill 1řř4Ľ 114ě. That is why: “This limited source of supplyĽ unless great improvements take place in agricultureĽ cannot be expected to keep pace with the growing demand of so rapidly increasing a population as that of Great Britain; and if our population and capital continue to increase with their present rapidityĽ the only mode in which food can continue to be supplied cheaply to the oneĽ is by sending the other abroad to produce it” ĚMill 1řř4Ľ 115ě. Not every European country could solve these problems by the „export of the poor” to their coloniesĽ by the import of food and other resources from them. In this connection we need to point out that the fascist movements in Italy and Germany began to have the support of the masses shortly after the USA in the early 1ř20s limited immigration and these and other countries couldn´t reduce their social tension by emigration. 21 Trade accelerates processes of the division of labour and deepening of the social differencesĽ but it also enables man as a biological species to circumvent limits resulting from the climate conditions and material resources of specific areas. Men could then populate and live in areas that have not offered a possibility to produce sufficient renewable and unrenewable sources necessary for the life of human communities. Since the prehistoric times the trade has helped to at least reduce immediate determination of specific natural conditions. 22 At least in some regions of the world these threats have specific consequences. One of the main causes of series of revolutions and conflicts in the countries of North Africa and Middle East is the depletion of raw materials and exceeding environmental limits of population growth and its consumption and subsequent long-term inability of these countries to supply the population with food and drinking water from their own reserves. This was most vividly expressed in the key country of the region Ŕ EgyptĽ the world´s top wheat importer. “The Egyptian authorities have been wary of touching food subsidies since rioting swept Egyptian cities in 1ř77 after government decided to raise the prices of staples. The authorities were forced to rescind their decision to restore order. During the food crisis of 2007-0ŘĽ which pushed the cost of wheat to an all-time highĽ many families became reliant on subsidised breadĽ with long queues in front of bakeries and frequent scuffles breaking out. Army bakeries were drafted in to augment the supply” ĚTerazono Ŕ Saleh 2013Ľ 2ě. The situation worsened when Russia in 2010 due to the drought and extensive fires banned export of wheat and its prices increased to such an amount that due to the increase in basic food prices riots broke out not only in Egypt but also in other North African countries reliant on its import. These riots destabilized the whole region and in many areas grew into a real war of all against all. The subsequent regime change in Egypt has not improved the situation because the oil production and its saleĽ which has been the source of foreign exchange used for purchase of wheatĽ are decreasing and therefore the 154 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 All the aspects of the current crisis ĚeconomicĽ socialĽ politicalĽ materialĽ foodĽ demographic and environmentalě have a conflict potential that was manifested many times in the past. Due to growth of the population we can assert that their conflict potential has also grown. As one recent study shows: “If future populations respond similarly to past populationsĽ then anthropogenic climate change has the potential to substantially increase conflicts around the worldĽ relative to a world without climate change” ĚHsiang 2013ě. This study summarizes results of many previous researches and has pointed out causal connections between the climate variability and human conflicts in the past.23 The climate changes caused by the industrial civilization will very probably be faster and more extensive than those in the past. The environmental crisis caused by climate variations or by other causes will be expressed primarily as a food or humanitarian crisis24 which can quite rapidly turn into a social or political crisis. The analysis of the past crisesĽ but especially of this current oneĽ will have to cover the climate and environmental aspects more extensively. It is becoming more and more evident that the collapse of the social system can result not only from internal conflicts or conflicts of the system imperatives but also from external crises or their combinationĽ which can happen also in complex societies. HoweverĽ the question remainsĽ if overpopulation or climate changes can be regarded as external or internal causes of the crisis phenomena.25 Potential solutions of the global economic crisis must have a character of riots continue. Since 2010 Egypt has spent most of its foreign reserves on wheat import which it is not able to grow for its population because of the lack of suitable farmland and water for irrigation. See also ĚCílek 2012ě. 23 As an example we can take the consequences of the typhoon Haiyan from November 2013. Only in Philippines thousands of people died. The consequent lack of drinking waterĽ food and medicines led to looting and attacks on convoys with humanitarian help. 24 The first consequence of floodsĽ earthquakes or tornados are many people being hurt or losing their homes. Devastated sources of drinking waterĽ food reserves or a loss of harvest will come later. If the administration of the affected country is not able to deal with the humanitarian crisis in timeĽ the consequences will probably influence also the stability of the social and political system. Crisis management in Pakistan after the floods in 2010 was not managed well and it deepened the political crisis in the country. The response of Barack Obama Administration to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 influenced many voters in the US presidential elections. 25 The need of philosophical reflection on economicĽ social and political consequences of climate changes would be topical even if there was no anthropogenic reason. From this point of viewĽ the discussion about its originsĽ be they anthropic or cosmicĽ i.e. from the viewpoint of civilizationĽ be they internal or external causesĽ is irrelevant. 155 Richard Sťahel internal system changesĽ e.g. in a form suggested by J. LovelockĽ who states: “Maybe we will have to accept certain limitsĽ ration system26 and compulsory military service like in periods of war and moreoverĽ give up our freedom for a certain time” ĚLovelock 200ŘĽ 17řě. These changes could have a character of Hobbes's limit of freedom in the name of security or survival. If these were not only short-term limitsĽ it would be such a significant change of politicalĽ economic and legal subsystems that we could talk about threating the identity of the social formation. A. Palazzo states that the “climate change is a further amplification of the coming Revolution of Limits” ĚPalazzo 2014ě by which the period of growth ends. The signs of “the age of resource limits” have already become apparent and they will bring not only new types of conflicts for the reducing resources but also another Military Revolution. Today‟s military and civil infrastructure and technologies are based mainly on finite resources. Pressure of populations‟ growth and in the same time growth of consumption expectations27 will tone up existing contradictions and conflicts within and between societies. “Preparing for a most hostile world in which war is more common is also a necessity” ĚPalazzo 2014ě. According to Palazzo the question is not if the coming Revolution of Limits and climate change will influence economic-political systems but how will these systems be able to deal with them on the theoretical and practical level.28 Environmental crisis can be regarded then as a consequence of conflicting system imperatives threating the system integration. The interests of acting groups collide alike as by social crisis ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 2ř Ŕ 30ě and this can result not only in disintegration of the society it but can also endanger its potential to reproduce. MoreoverĽ this does not entail only the reproduction of an economic-political and cultural system but also the biological reproduction of a societyĽ as far as the environmental crisis threatens also the ecosystem When at the end of October 2012 the storm Sandy hit the U.S. East and CanadaĽ it killed several dozens of peopleĽ caused flooding over wide areas and other damages exceeding 50 billion US dollars. As a result a supply system of wide areas collapsedĽ so for example rationing of fuel and several other commodities was introduced in New York temporarily and some rights and freedoms were restricted. It is clear that Lovelock´s vision is more real than it would seem several years ago. 27 “The supply of all resources is finite. YetĽ the expectation of governmentsĽ and their citizens, is that growth is required and desirable. Growth is the norm” ĚPallazo 2014ě. 28 Also Pallazo used the example of Egypt “there is some suggestion that rising food prices are a factor of growing instability in Egypt” ĚPallazo 2014ě. Rising food prices as a consequence of climate fluctuation, which lead to decrease in food production, were some of the reasons of French royal regime collapse at the end of 18th century, as far as the response of political elites to this situation was inadequate. 26 156 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 conditions of the civilization existence. The revolution of limits and climate change require in extent quite revolutionary transformation of basic imperatives of the economic-political system. Habermas‟ concept of crisis can thus be applied also to the environmental crisis as a display of antagonism between imperatives of growth and sustainability. 4. The imperative of growth vs. the limits of growth In connection with the imperative of growth in capitalist social formations Habermas in 1ř70s stated that: “Ecological balance designates an absolute limit to growth” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 41ě. Many things suggest that one of the causes of the current crisis is that growth of populationĽ production and productivity Ŕ hits this absolute limit line. As Habermas points outĽ “with capital accumulationĽ economic growth is institutionalized in an unplannedĽ nature like wayĽ so that no option for self-conscious control of this process exists. Growth imperatives originally followed by capitalism have meanwhile achieved global validity through system competition and worldwide diffusion... The established mechanisms of growth are forcing an increase in both population and production on worldwide scale.” ĚHabermas 1řŘ0Ľ 41ě These established mechanisms of growth are so characteristic of the capitalist social formationĽ that: “Capitalist societies cannot follow imperatives of growth limitation without abandoning their principle of organization” ĚHabermas 1řŘ0Ľ 42ě. HoweverĽ if they do not limit themĽ not only their identity but also forms of social integration or forms of organized mass loyalty but also their basic external requirements of the system reproduction and maybe even life in any human society or the reproduction of human species itself will be threatened. This is the key contradiction and the main reason of current civilization crisis. Habermas suggests the basic system imperative of capitalism which should differentiate this social formation from traditional and especially archaic societies as systemsĽ in which “no systematic motive for producing more goods then are necessary to satisfy basic needsĽ even though the state of the productive forces may permit a surplus” ĚHabermas 2005Ľ 1Řě. We can object that the cause of not producing an overproduction is more due to low productivity of work or available technologies and limited possibilities of storage and conserving the overproduction. I. Dubnička‟s hypothesis brings convincing arguments: the production of overproduction is the primary 157 Richard Sťahel evolution strategy of homo sapiens and “does not depend on time and space on the level of cultural development nor on its consumption” ĚDubnička 200řĽ Ř6ěĽ which is documented by different forms of destruction of possessionĽ i.e. overproduction in the cultures of the Native Americans. At the same timeĽ according to I. DubničkaĽ “the production of overproductionĽ its accumulation and its consumptionĽ are the main causal phenomena of the global environmental crisis” ĚDubnička 2007Ľ 20ě. The global environmental crisis is then a consequence of this human strategyĽ application of which at present hits the limits of natural resources and the ability of nature to absorb pollution created by production and consumption of overproduction. This would support the thesis that environmental crises threaten all kinds of social formationsĽ primarily as a result of the population growthĽ which in itself leads to a necessity of production growth and by this to exploitation of natural resources as well as pollution of the environment. The growth of human population is a key factor which every type of social formation needs to deal with. Apart from severalĽ short and rare periods in historyĽ Malthus‟s perception holds true Ŕpopulation grows more quickly than its ability to secure enough food.29 For thousands of yearsĽ territorial expansionĽ i.e. colonizing the uninhabited areas used to be the human solution to population excess pressure. Populating of the worldĽ except for the remote islandsĽ was completed in prehistoric times and due to the population growth it was a necessity. In most of the newly populated areas people were able to produce more food than necessary for the basic reproduction of the human population or other commodities that could be exchanged for food. This helped them survive in times of poor harvest but in a good year it led to the growth of the population. This led to populating of the new areas. In the antiquityĽ the territorial expansion was possible only at the expense of other human communitiesĽ so the indigenous people were driven out or eliminated by more successful societies. D. Šmihula points out that for most of the history the ability to keep high reproduction potential was the key ability for the survival of the society. Societies that were not successful almost always became extinctĽ because they were not able to protect themselves ĚŠmihula 2010Ľ 42ě. The population growth then had proved to be existential. On the other handĽ the growth itself caused a necessity for territorial expansion as a way of gaining the space needed for life and production of food for the growing population. In modern times the population growth intensified and the period after the 29 See ĚMalthus 1řřŘě. 15Ř Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 Napoleonic Wars is commonly referred to as the population explosion. Its results were reduced by mass emigrationĽ often even forced one Ěat the expense of indigenous inhabitants in AmericaĽ Africa and Australia and New Zeelandě and by fertilizing till then untouched biotopes as well as more intensive exploitation of all kinds of renewable and unrenewable resources. More colonies were built because the overpopulated European countries needed food and territory to which they could relocate at least a part of their own population. Despite the factĽ many conflicts came up due to these resources aloneĽ including the two world wars. In the second half of the 20th century the environmental consequences of continuous population growth and intensified exploitation of this planet had become evident and for neither side of the so-called Iron Curtain it was possible to ignore or trivialize them anymore. As P. Jemelka statesĽ “the truly essential problems are universal Ěto a certain extent independent from a specific social-economic formationě” ĚJemelka 200řĽ 345ě. This also means that the growth of productionĽ productivity and population is not only a basic system imperative of capitalism but eventually of all social formations. In capitalismĽ it is only more intensive. The imperative of population growth is then eventually a prerequisite of reproduction Ěin competition with other societies Ŕ clanĽ tribesěĽ a prerequisite of social sustainabilityĽ a system imperative in archaic and traditional societies. ThereforeĽ already in preindustrial societies the growth of productionĽ especially of the agricultural production realized by territorial expansionĽ becomes an imperativeĽ too. The territorial expansion was in the long run possible only with relatively low world population. By the end of the 1řth century territorial expansion was no longer a legitimate tool of dealing with the population growth and the related growth of resource needs. The efforts to hold on to it led to local30 and global conflicts. Another possibility are innovations of agrotechnologies ĚcreativityĽ 30 Processes of enclosure and expropriation and social conflicts caused by them were many times described and analyzed in the past. See famous chapter 27 in the first volume of Capital (Marx 1999, 366 Ŕ 371). These processes continue till today in many ways not only in the Third World countries (Latin America, Africa) but also in countries of former Eastern Bloc, e.g. a condemnation of small owners due to foreign investor or to mining corporation. It pointed to the soil, surface of Earth as such, as a space for living, as the most basic source, furthermore as the source finite or nonrenewable, because in overpopulated world it could be obtained only at the expense of other peoples´ (communities) or animals. 15ř Richard Sťahel development of production forces or an ability to learn31ěĽ which in the 20th century led to intensification and industrialization of the agricultural productionĽ which is at present the only possibility of increasing the food production since there are no unused arable landsĽ pasturesĽ or fisheries anymore ĚCílek 2012Ľ 7Ř3ě. On the contraryĽ because of the expansion of the transportĽ residentialĽ and energy infrastructure as well as the consequences of erosionĽ desert expansion and rise in the level of oceans the arable land is diminishing. Its expansion by deforestation disrupts the water circulation in the global ecosystem and its ability to keep the planet‟s climate. As V. Cílek reminds usĽ “the moment when we lose the land and waterĽ no creativity will help” ĚCílek 2012Ľ 772ě. At present the “agriculture uses 70 Ŕ 75 % of the available fresh water” ĚBajer 2011Ľ 2Ř3ě. MoreoverĽ “present-day agriculture uses up ten times more energy than it produces in the form of food” ĚCílek 2012Ľ 776ě and at the same time it is an important source of greenhouse gassesĽ so that: “OverallĽ the impact of agriculture on the climate is comparable to the burning of fossil fuels” ĚLovelock 2012Ľ 116ě. Intensification and industrialization of the agricultural production has such devastating impact on the environmentĽ that the ability of the civilization to produce food could later become considerably limited or even impossible due to climate changes and the change in the chemism of the atmosphere and oceans. It is still possible to increase the global food productionĽ but only at the expense of biodiversity and quality of the environment which enables this productionĽ and thus at the expense of the possibility to produce food in the future. BesidesĽ the growth of the population and productionĽ the basic imperative of each social formation is to secure its own reproduction Ŕ biological and cultural Ŕ including the reproduction of economic-political system. All living thingsĽ living not only in biological but also in culturalĽ political and social meaningĽ strive to sustain or at least to survive. For many kinds of subjects and institutions it isĽ at the very leastĽ a means to preserve existing conditions of life. The tendency to struggle for survival can be identified in all kinds of social formations and on all levels or stages of development. ActuallyĽ the origin of institutions like clansĽ tribes or states could be interpreted as a direct consequence of this tendency and as the main reason for legitimizing its further existence. I meanĽ this phenomenon could be described as an 31 ĚHabermas 1ř75Ľ 2ř7ě. 160 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 imperative of sustainability32. Even the growth itself could be perceived as a strategy to fulfill this basic imperative. Surviving in biological and also in cultural and socio-political33 meaning is the consequence of self-preservative instinct but also the basic condition of all reproduction and growth. Long term sustainability is based on early identification of the real threat. If the growth itself Ěof populationĽ productionĽ consumptionĽ pollutionĽ etc.ě appears to be the threatĽ its limitation could be a reasonable response. The limitation of population or consumption growth in favor of sustainability could therefore serve as an example. In the history of ancient worldĽ many cultures learned the connection between possibility of food production and stability and sustainability of society and its political organization. As a consequenceĽ often very severe institutes were developed for limitation of the population growth and they were consistently enforced. These kinds of rules and institutions are known also in preliterate tribes which live in limited areas Ěe.g. isles or infertile territoriesě. By contrastĽ traditional and capitalist social formations used to prefer the imperative of growth and territorial and market expansion. Even market subjects themselvesĽ mainly companies and corporations that are fully determined by growth imperative often collapse because they are forced to grow at any price. Imperative of sustainability can be easily identified on the stages of clanĽ tribe and also nation or state organization levels but in the global account it is still merely theoretically conceived. HoweverĽ in generalĽ one can say the imperative of sustainability is the first and immanent imperative which is incorporated in all social and cultural institutions. This imperative is in conflict with the imperative of growth because of the limited resources34 as well as the limited ability of the environment to absorb I prefer to use the term imperative of sustainability before the Jonas´ famous imperative of responsibility: “act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with permanency of an authentically human life on Earth” ĚJonas 1řř7Ľ 35ěĽ because the real aim is sustainability of conditions for life of mankind and civilization as well, and responsibility is only a tool how achieve it. 33 Take for instance the survival of society and its social and political organization or its political and cultural identity in the war. In the name of sustainability societies often agree with a sacrifice of many of its members and also in the extreme situations individuals sacrifice themselves on behalf of survival of community or society. In the same time in the name of collective egoism they do not hesitate to oppress and exploit or even eliminate other communities. 34 Sources are “basic materialĽ energy and process conditions of life that are irretrievable” ĚCílek 2012Ľ 76řě. The sources include drinking waterĽ unpolluted or at least breathable airĽ living spaceĽ working spaceĽ space for production of at least basic food and stable climate 32 161 Richard Sťahel the side effects of reproduction of numerousĽ more complex and more energy demanding social formations. The contradiction of the imperative of growth and imperative of sustainability can be found in all social formations; on the level of the civilization development the contradiction of system imperatives intensifies. It is fully manifested in the global society35 because none of the previous ways of overcoming it Ŕ territorial expansionĽ mass emigrationĽ global trade Ŕ has everĽ not at least temporarilyĽ solved or reduced this contradictionĽ but on the contrary Ŕ they have only deepened it. 5. Conclusion The industrial civilization faces threats that have a character of internally and externally induced crises and in connection with the current situation of the global parallel environmental and economic crisis we can also speak about a system crisis which threatens the very identity of the industrial civilization. The source of internally induced crises resides in the system of production and redistributionĽ the source of externally induced crisis rests in the finality of resources as a condition of all the production. The solution to economic and social crises introduced in the form of a production growth only deepens the environmental crisis. Growth of the global population only leads to a growth of food production but this production significantly contributes to the deepening of the environmental crisis; its consequences mainly in the form of climate changes threaten the sustainability of the global food production on the current level. These contradictions are insoluble within the existing socialĽ economic and political possibilities of the industrial civilization. Two system imperatives collide Ŕ growth and sustainability of the possibility of reproduction. At the same timeĽ this contradiction deepens the conflict potential of the past crisis tendencies present in different social formations. The basic source of conflicts rests in an unequal distribution of limited resources. The effort to solve these conflicts by production growthĽ that would conditions. The lack of these sources cannot be retrieved even by use of potential technologies that would allow us to mine minerals from the interplanetary space and transport them to Earth. 35 Accordingly it is needed to emphasize the need of spread the global education in order to present knowledge about the issue of global market and global economy in the context of sustainability of. One of the main goals of this new approach in the education is to lead young people to a sense of global responsibility in global society. See ĚSvitačova Ŕ Mravcová 2014Ľ 43 Ŕ 61). 162 Philosophica 4 – Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Nitra 4 allow even the most poor to have enough for dignified lifeĽ which would not be reduced to everyday fight for basic survivalĽ collides with the lack of resources. 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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. WENDTĽ A. Ě2003ě: Why a World State is Inevitable. In: European Journal of International RelationsĽ řĽ 2003Ľ 4Ľ pp. 4ř1 Ŕ 542. WIREDUĽ K. Ě1řř6ě: Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě200Řě: In Defence of Lost Causes. New York: Verso. ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě2012ě: Less Than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London: Verso. ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ě2013ě: Some Bewildered Clarifications: A Response to Noam Chomsky by Slavoj Ţiţek. In: Verso. Web. 15. Nov 2014. http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1365-some-bewilderedclarifications-a-response-to-noam-chomsky-by-slavoj-zizek 1Ř2 Index A ARISTOTLE Ŕ Ř2Ľ ř3 AL-JABRIĽ M. A. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 75 ANGLEĽ S. C. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 75 AVILAĽ E. Ŕ 60Ľ 77 B BADIOUĽ A. Ŕ ř3-řŘĽ 112Ľ 113Ľ 11Ř BAIĽ T. Ŕ 13Ľ 1Ř BAJERĽ I. Ŕ 15řĽ 162 BALIBARĽ E. - 137 BAUERĽ J. R. Ŕ 1ŘĽ 6ŘĽ 75 BAZINĽ A. Ŕ 21Ľ 23Ľ 24Ľ 25Ľ 32 BECKĽ U. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 75 BELLĽ D. A. Ŕ 13Ľ 1ŘĽ 6Ř BENJAMINĽ W. Ŕ 21Ľ 35Ľ 40Ľ 444Ř BERLINĽ I. Ŕ ř BIEMELĽ W. Ŕ Ř5Ľ ř1 BONARDELĽ F. Ŕ 137 BONDYĽ E. Ŕ 37Ľ 3ŘĽ 41Ľ 47Ľ 113Ľ 114Ľ 11Ř BRASSEETĽ J. Ŕ 70Ľ 77 BROWNĽ C. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 75 BUCHANANĽ A. Ŕ 53Ľ 75 BUCHWALTERĽ A. Ŕ 5ŘĽ 75 BURNSĽ T. Ŕ 5ŘĽ 75 C CHANĽ J. Ŕ 12Ľ 1Ř CHOMSKYĽ N. Ŕ řřĽ 11Ř CÍLEKĽ V. Ŕ 153Ľ 15Ř-162 CLARKĽ C. Ŕ 46-4Ř CRAVENĽ M. Ŕ 66Ľ 75 D DASTURĽ F. Ŕ Ř3Ľ ř1 DELANTYĽ G. Ŕ 56Ľ 5ŘĽ 75 DELAROCHE´SĽ P. Ŕ 22 DERANTYĽ J.-P. Ŕ 11Ľ 1ř DERRIDAĽ J. Ŕ ř7 DEUDNEYĽ D. Ŕ 72Ľ 75Ľ 76 DINUŠĽ P. Ŕ 41Ľ 47 DUBNIČKAĽ I. Ŕ 151Ľ 156Ľ 162 DUSSELĽ E. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 76 E EHRENREICHĽ B. Ŕ 60Ľ 76 EL-OJEILIĽ C. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 76 F FINEĽ R. Ŕ 5ŘĽ 76 FLEISCHERĽ M. Ŕ ř1 FLUSSERĽ V. Ŕ 21Ľ 25-33 FORNET-BETANCOURTĽ R. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 76 FORSTĽ R. Ŕ 76 FOUCAULTĽ M. Ŕ 134 FRASERĽ N. Ŕ 11Ľ 12Ľ 1řĽ 51Ľ 53Ľ 56Ľ 61Ľ 63Ľ 76 FURETĽ F. Ŕ 42Ľ 47Ľ 4Ř 1Ř3 Index G GOREĽ A. Ŕ 152Ľ 162 GRAEBERĽ D. Ŕ 45Ľ 47Ľ 4Ř H HABERMASĽ J. Ŕ 11Ľ 1řĽ ř7Ľ 141Ľ 144-14řĽ 152Ľ 155Ľ 156Ľ 15ŘĽ 162 HAIGHĽ S. Ŕ 71Ľ 76 HAUSERĽ M. Ŕ 11ŘĽ 142 HAYDENĽ P. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 76 HEGELĽ J. W. F. Ŕ 53Ľ 57Ľ 76Ľ 100Ľ 102-110Ľ 115Ľ 116Ľ 11Ř HEIDEGGERĽ M. Ŕ Ř1-ř1Ľ ř3Ľ ř5-ř7Ľ 102Ľ 103Ľ 10ŘĽ 110-115Ľ 11Ř HEINSĽ V. Ŕ 4řĽ 51Ľ 5Ř-67Ľ 76Ľ 77 HIGGOTTĽ R. Ŕ 70Ľ 77 HOBBESĽ T. Ŕ 121Ľ 122Ľ 154 HOCHSCHILDĽ A. R. Ŕ 60Ľ 77 HOHOŠĽ L. Ŕ 41Ľ 151Ľ 163 HONDAGNEU-SOTELOĽ P. Ŕ 60Ľ 77 HONNETHĽ A. Ŕ Ř-14Ľ 1řĽ 45Ľ 47Ľ 4ř-70Ľ 73Ľ 74Ľ 77Ľ 7Ř HRUBECĽ M. Ŕ 41Ľ 47Ľ 50Ľ 5ŘĽ 65Ľ 6ŘĽ 7Ř HSIANGĽ S. M. Ŕ 153Ľ 162 HUSSERLĽ E. Ŕ ŘŘĽ ř4Ľ 121-136Ľ 13ŘĽ 13ř J JAEGGIĽ R. Ŕ 16Ľ 1ř JAVORSKÁĽ A. - ř1 1Ř4 JEMELKAĽ P. Ŕ 15ŘĽ 163 JONASĽ H. Ŕ 160Ľ 163 JONESĽ C. Ŕ 5ŘĽ 71Ľ 7Ř JULLIENĽ F. Ŕ 1ŘĽ 1řĽ 46Ľ 47 K KANTĽ I. Ŕ ř3Ľ 100Ľ 102-106Ľ 110Ľ 115Ľ 116 KARULĽ R. Ŕ 136Ľ 137Ľ 140 KELLERĽ J. Ŕ 3ŘĽ 47Ľ 14řĽ 163 KELSENĽ H. Ŕ 53Ľ 54Ľ 7Ř KOLÁ SKÝĽ R. Ŕ 144Ľ 163 KÖCHERĽ A. - 17 KUNDERAĽ M. Ŕ 12Ľ 1ř L LINKLATERĽ A. Ŕ 56Ľ 6řĽ 7Ř LOVELOCKĽ J. Ŕ 154Ľ 15řĽ 163 M MALTHUSĽ T. R. Ŕ 142Ľ 152Ľ 157Ľ 163 MARXĽ K. Ŕ 12Ľ 3ŘĽ 102Ľ 15ŘĽ 163 MERLEAU-PONTYĽ M. Ŕ 121 MILLĽ J. S. Ŕ 152Ľ 163 MITTERPACHĽ K. Ŕ Ř7Ľ ř1 MRAVCOVÁĽ A. Ŕ 161Ľ 164 N NAESSĽ A. Ŕ 143Ľ 163 NATICCHIAĽ C. Ŕ 53Ľ 7Ř NIELSENĽ K. Ŕ 71Ľ 7Ř Index O OUGAARDĽ M. Ŕ 70 ORTHĽ E.W. Ŕ 133Ľ 134Ľ 13ř P PALAZZOĽ A. Ŕ 154Ľ 155Ľ 163 PARRENASĽ R. S. Ŕ 60Ľ 7Ř PATOČKAĽ J. Ŕ 42Ľ 47Ľ 121Ľ 136 PIKETTYĽ T. Ŕ 45Ľ 4Ř PIŠ ÁNEKĽ P. Ŕ 15Ľ 1ř PLANTĽ R. Ŕ 144Ľ 14ŘĽ 163 PLATO Ŕ ř3Ľ 102 POGGEĽ T. Ŕ 4řĽ 51Ľ 5řĽ 61Ľ 63Ľ 7Ř R RAWLSĽ J. Ŕ 50Ľ 52Ľ 57Ľ 5řĽ 63Ľ 7Ř REICHĽ R. Ŕ 37Ľ 42Ľ 4Ř REIMANĽ M. Ŕ 42Ľ 4Ř RICOEURĽ P. Ŕ 12ŘĽ 13řĽ 14řĽ 163 ROBINSONĽ W. I. Ŕ 45Ľ 4ŘĽ 56Ľ 6ŘĽ 7Ř ROTHĽ E. W. Ŕ 134 ROTHKOPFĽ D. Ŕ 37Ľ 3ŘĽ 4Ř S SALEHĽ H. Ŕ 153Ľ 164 SARTREĽ J.P. Ŕ 121 SHAWĽ M. Ŕ 6řĽ 7ř SCHEUERMANĽ W. Ŕ 4řĽ 52Ľ 6řĽ 7ř SCHOPENHAUERĽ A. Ŕ 121Ľ 122 SCHUHMANNĽ K. Ŕ 124Ľ 13ř SCHWEICKARTĽ D. Ŕ 40Ľ 4Ř SIVÁKĽ J. Ŕ 126Ľ 12řĽ 130Ľ 140 SKLAIRĽ L. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 7ř STAN KĽ P. Ŕ 150Ľ 151Ľ 163 S AHELĽ R. Ŕ 141-143Ľ 150Ľ 163Ľ 164 SVITAČOVÁĽ E. Ŕ 161Ľ 164 Š ŠMIHULAĽ D. Ŕ 157Ľ 164 T TASSINĽ E. Ŕ 136Ľ 137Ľ 140 TAYLORĽ C. Ŕ 13Ľ 1řĽ 57Ľ 7ř TEHRANIANĽ M. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 7ř TERAZONOĽ E. Ŕ 153Ľ 164 THOMPSONĽ S. Ŕ 54Ľ 5ŘĽ 5řĽ 75Ľ 7ř TOYNBEEĽ A. Ŕ 43Ľ 4Ř U ULIČIANSKAĽ Z. Ŕ 13ŘĽ 140 V VINCENTĽ A. Ŕ 5ŘĽ 7ř W WALLACE-BRUCEĽ N. L. Ŕ 56Ľ 7ř WEIĽ X. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 7ř WENDTĽ A. Ŕ 4řĽ 52Ľ 6řĽ 70Ľ 72Ľ 73Ľ 7ř WIREDUĽ K. Ŕ 6ŘĽ 7ř 1Ř5 Index Ţ ŢIŢEKĽ S. Ŕ ř3-řřĽ 101-11Ř 1Ř6 About authors Ľubomír Dunaj, Ph.D. Studied History and Civics at the University of Prešov ĚM.A.ě and Social and Political Philosophy at the Comenius University in Bratislava ĚPh.Dě and pursued research fellowships on Institute of Philosophy at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main in the summer semester 2011 and the academic year 2013-2014 under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Axel Honneth. Among his publications is the paper The Reflections on Justice under the Conditions of Globalisation published in Human Affairs 02/2010. Tomáš Hauer, doc., Ph.D. The Czech postmodern philosopherĽ who teaches at the Technical University of OstravaĽ author of a number of books and studies on postmodern philosophyĽ contemporary philosophy and philosophy of technology. To main results of his work belong four titles: Přirozený svět a postmodernizmus, nebo-li, Toulání není bloumání ĚNatural World and Postmodernism or Wandering is not Beating ArounděĽ published in Ostrava: AriesĽ in 1řř5Ľ Skrze postmoderní teorie ĚThrough Postmodern Theory) in Prague: Karolinum in 2002Ľ Napište si svoji knihovnu ĚWrite Your Own Bookcase or Language Vagabonds and Postmodern Public AreaěĽ in Prague: ISVĽ 2002 and together with Jaromír Feber and Jelena PetrucijovἠZtraceni v terrapolis. Antropologie – Dromologie – Víra ĚLost in Terrapolis. Anthropology – Dromology – FaithěĽ in KrakówĽ 2012. These can be considered four differentĽ but equally inspiring introductions to postmodernism. Published study is part of his forthcoming book called Paul Virilio: Empire of Speed and Philosophy of Technology. Ladislav Hohoš, doc., CSc. Ladislav Hohoš is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of ArtsĽ Comenius UniversityĽ BratislavaĽ Slovak Republic. He works in collaboration with the Centre of Global Studies by Czech Academy of Sciences and Charles University in Prague as well as with the Institute of Political science of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He is concerned with normative issues of 1Ř7 About authors contemporary political philosophy and theory of justice as well as with future studiesĽ e.g. post-crisis scenarios of globalization. His recent papers include: Globalization and a normative framework of freedom In: Human Affairs 2007Ľ vol.17 and Globálna nerovnosť: Spravodlivosť a právo v podmienkach globalizácie. ĚGlobal Inequality: Justice and Law in the Globalization Era) In: Filozofia 03/2008. Participated as an author and co-editor on publishing of academic research volumes Svet v bode obratu. Systémové alternatívy kapitalizmu. Koncepcie, stratégie, utópie. ĚWorld at the Turning Point. Systemic Alternatives of Capitalism. Conceptions, Strategies, Utopias.) Bratislava: VEDA in 2011Ľ Revoluce nebo transformace? ĚRevolution or Transformation?) Praha Ŕ Bratislava: Filosofia Ŕ VEDA in 2014. He is the chairman of Futurological Society in Slovakia. Marek Hrubec, PhDr., Ph.D. Since 1řř6Ľ Researcher in the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Since the same yearĽ he has also taught social and political philosophy and political sociology at Charles University in Prague. Since 2001Ľ Head of the Department of Moral and Political Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. Since 2006Ľ Director of the Centre of Global StudiesĽ a joint centre of the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and Charles University in Prague. Since 2014Ľ Rector of East Africa Star UniversityĽ a new university for students from post-conflict and conflict countries of East Africa. He has published on social and political justiceĽ recognitionĽ development and the poor in the global and inter-cultural context. His main publication is Od zneuznání ke spravedlnosti. Kritická teorie globální společnosti a politiky ĚFrom Misrecognition to Justice. A Critical Theory of Global Society and Politicsě. Prague: FilosofiaĽ published in 2011. Andrea Javorská, Ph.D. A teacher at the Department of PhilosophyĽ Faculty of Arts of Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra. She specializes on the phenomenologyĽ philosophical anthropology and philosophy of M. 1ŘŘ About authors HeideggerĽ J. PatočkaĽ H. Arendt and F. Nietzsche. She is an author of a number of works and studies on phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. Her publication contains a book Dejiny a dejinnosť v diele Martina Heideggera ĚHistory and Historicality in the work of Martin Heideggerě Bratislava: IrisĽ published in 2013. Klement Mitterpach, Ph.D. Works at the Department of PhilosophyĽ Faculty of Arts of Constantine the Philosopher University in NitraĽ SlovakiaĽ where he teaches and writes mostly on Heidegger s philosophyĽ with special concern for the nature of the philosophical explicationĽ rhetorical situatednessĽ placeĽ as well as prospects of the philosophical engagement in analyzing the ontological background of our beliefs and the purpose of their articulation. He published several studies and articles on different aspects of Heidegger s thought as well as a book Bytie, čas, priestor v myslení Martina Heideggera ĚBeing, Time, Space in the Thought of Martin Heideggerě Bratislava: IrisĽ in 2007. Jozef Sivák, PhDr., CSc. Works at the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences ĚSAVě as a Researcher and Grant Director. He specializes in the history of contemporary philosophyĽ including the French philosophy and in Husserl's phenomenology as well as in social and political philosophy. He is the author of monographs Husserl a Merleau-Ponty, Porovnanie dvoch fenome-nologických techník ĚHusserl and Merleau-Ponty. Comparison of two phenomenological techniquesěĽ VEDA: BratislavaĽ in 1řř6Ľ Dejiny filozofie 20. storočia. Niekoľko postáv súčasnej kontinentálnej filozofie ĚThe history of the Philosophy of the Twentieth Century. Some Figures in Contemporary Continental PhilosophyěĽ Aloisianum: BratislavaĽ in 1řř7Ľ translator of Vol. 2 of Ricoeur´s Temps et récit ĚTime and Narrativeě published in Slovak as Čas a rozprávanie in 2004. In additionĽ he published dozens of segmentsĽ studies and articles. CurrentlyĽ he is completing the trilogy entitled The Notion of Metaphysics by HusserlĽ the Vol.1 ĚEidetic or existential ontologyě is prepared to be published in French in VEDA ĚSAVěĽ Bratislava. 1Řř About authors Richard Sťahel, Ph.D. Head of the Department of PhilosophyĽ Faculty of Arts of Constantine the Philosopher University in NitraĽ SlovakiaĽ where he teaches Philosophy of 20th CenturyĽ Political PhilosophyĽ Philosophy of LawĽ Theory of State and Law and Rudiments of Politology. He has done research in political philosophyĽ philosophy of lawĽ philosophy of state and environmental philosophy. His research is focused on the reciprocal conditionality of socialĽ economicĽ political and environmental crises tendencies of the global industrial civilizationĽ with dozens of studies and articles on these topics. As an author and and co-editor he participated on publishing of international academic research volumes Historické a súčasné podoby myslenia a komunikácie ĚHistorical and Contemporary Forms of Thinking and CommunicationěĽ Bratislava: IrisĽ in 200ŘěĽ Idenitita – Diferencia ĚIdentity – DifferenceěĽ Bratislava: SFZ by SAVĽ in 2010 and Filozofia a umenie žiť ĚPhilosophy and the Art of LivingěĽ Bratislava/Nitra: SFZ by SAV/IrisĽ published in 2014. 1ř0 PHILOSOPHICA 14 Rendering Change in Philosophy and Society Authors: ubomír DunajĽ Tomáš HauerĽ Ladislav HohošĽ Marek HrubecĽ Andrea JavorskἠKlement MitterpachĽ Jozef SivákĽ Richard S ahel Editors: Mgr. Andrea JavorskἠPhD. Mgr. Klement Mitterpach, PhD. Mgr. Richard S ahel, PhD. Editorial Board: PhDr. Marek HrubecĽ PhD. ĚCGS pri FÚ AV ČR a FF UK PrahaĽ Czech Republicě Mgr. Andrea JavorskἠPhD. ĚFF UKF v NitreĽ Slovakiaě Doc. Erika LalíkovἠPhD. ĚFF UK v BratislaveĽ Slovakiaě Doc. PhDr. Vladimír MandaĽ CSc. ĚFF UKF v NitreĽ Slovakiaě Mgr. Klement MitterpachĽ PhD. ĚFF UKF v NitreĽ Slovakiaě Doc. PhDr. Peter NezníkĽ CSc. ĚFF UPJŠ v KošiciachĽ Slovakiaě Doc. PhDr. Jelena PetrucijovἠCSc. ĚFSS OU v OstraveĽ Czech Republicě Mgr. Richard S ahelĽ PhD. ĚFF UKF v NitreĽ Slovakiaě Doc. PhDr. Dušan ŠpirkoĽ PhD. ĚFF UKF v NitreĽ Slovakiaě Lada V. TsypinaĽ PhD. ĚSt. Petersburg State UniversityĽ Russiaě Mgr. Martin VašekĽ PhD. ĚFF UKF v NitreĽ Slovakiaě Publisher: Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra (Slovakia) Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy Edition: Year of publication: Number of copies: Number of pages: Print: ISBN EAN - - - first 2014 150 190 Equilibria, s.r.o. - Journal Philosophica is a reviewed international academic research volume. The contents is focused on expert and scholarly papers in philosophy and relative disciplines. Philosopica contains original contributions as results of authorial research or as contributions to proposed themes announced on the Philosophica webpage. Papers are published in Slovak, Czech, Russian, Polish, English and German languages. The editors welcome papers send electronically, written in WORD to ajavorska@ukf.sk or rstahel@ukf.sk. Journal Philosophica is published by Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra (Slovakia). Journal Philosophica is freely available on the web at: http://katedra ilozo ieffukf-eng.weebly.com/philosophica1.html ISBN 978-80-558-0714-0