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Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
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SYSNO ASEP 0472319 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players Tvůrce(i) Zápal, Jan (NHU-C) RID Zdroj.dok. Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0899-8256
Roč. 98, July (2016), s. 235-242Poč.str. 8 s. Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. US - Spojené státy americké Klíč. slova dynamic decision-making ; endogenous status-quo ; spatial bargaining Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie Institucionální podpora NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000381955100014 EID SCOPUS 84978230436 DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013 Anotace The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav - CERGE Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2017
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