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Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining
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SYSNO ASEP 0423393 Druh ASEP J - Článek v odborném periodiku Zařazení RIV J - Článek v odborném periodiku Poddruh J Článek ve WOS Název Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining Tvůrce(i) Celik, Levent (NHU-C) RID
Karabay, Bilgehan (NHU-C) RID
McLaren, J. (US)Zdroj.dok. Journal of International Economics. - : Elsevier - ISSN 0022-1996
Roč. 91, č. 2 (2013), s. 179-190Poč.str. 12 s. Forma vydání Tištěná - P Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. NL - Nizozemsko Klíč. slova trade policy ; multilateral legislative bargaining ; political economy Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie CEP GAP402/12/0666 GA ČR - Grantová agentura ČR Institucionální podpora NHU-C - PRVOUK-P23 UT WOS 000329268800001 EID SCOPUS 84888310104 DOI 10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001 Anotace In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. Pracoviště Národohospodářský ústav - CERGE Kontakt Tomáš Pavela, pavela@cerge-ei.cz, Tel.: 224 005 122 Rok sběru 2015
Počet záznamů: 1