Počet záznamů: 1
Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models
- 1.
SYSNO ASEP 0347865 Druh ASEP C - Konferenční příspěvek (mezinárodní konf.) Zařazení RIV D - Článek ve sborníku Název Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models Tvůrce(i) Kuběna, Aleš Antonín (UTIA-B) RID, ORCID Zdroj.dok. Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010. - České Budějovice : University of South Bohemia, 2010 / Houda M. ; Friebelová J. - ISBN 978-80-7394-218-2 Rozsah stran s. 337-380 Poč.str. 4 s. Akce 28-th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics Datum konání 08.09.2010-10.09.2010 Místo konání České Budějovice Země CZ - Česká republika Typ akce EUR Jazyk dok. eng - angličtina Země vyd. CZ - Česká republika Klíč. slova Concentration game ; pexeso ; perfect players Vědní obor RIV AH - Ekonomie CEP GD402/09/H045 GA ČR - Grantová agentura ČR CEZ AV0Z10750506 - UTIA-B (2005-2011) UT WOS 000287979900064 Anotace Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with ”stalemate” (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero. Pracoviště Ústav teorie informace a automatizace Kontakt Markéta Votavová, votavova@utia.cas.cz, Tel.: 266 052 201. Rok sběru 2011
Počet záznamů: 1