Logically Incorrect Arguments

0460750 - FLÚ 2017 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Svoboda, Vladimír - Peregrin, Jaroslav
Logically Incorrect Arguments.
Argumentation: an international journal on reasoning. Roč. 30, č. 3 (2016), s. 263-287. ISSN 0920-427X. E-ISSN 1572-8374
Grant CEP: GA ČR(CZ) GA13-21076S
Institucionální podpora: RVO:67985955
Klíčová slova: argumentation * logical form * incorrect argument * correct arguments
Kód oboru RIV: AA - Filosofie a náboženství
Impakt faktor: 0.689, rok: 2016

What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong (and is such for purely logical reasons). In this paper, we show that pinpointing this stronger sense is much trickier than one would expect; but eventually we reach an explication of the notion of (strong) logical incorrectness which we find non-trivial and viable.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0260768