Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

0348753 - NHÚ 2011 RIV NL eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Engelmann, Dirk - Normann, H.-T.
Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game.
Experimental Economics. Roč. 13, č. 3 (2010), s. 249-259. ISSN 1386-4157. E-ISSN 1573-6938
Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z70850503
Klíčová slova: minimum-effort game * coordination game * experiments * social capital
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie
Impakt faktor: 1.868, rok: 2010

We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0189190