0156128 - NHU-N 20033052 RIV CZ eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Engelmann, Dirk
Risk aversion pays in the class of 2 x 2 games with no pure equilibrium.
CERGE-EI Working Paper Series. č. 211 (2003), s. 1-15. ISSN 1211-3298
Grant CEP: GA AV ČR KSK8002119
Klíčová slova: risk aversion * mixed strategy equilibria
Kód oboru RIV: AH - Ekonomie

Simulations indicated that, in the class of 2 x 2 games which only have a mixed equilibrium, payoffs are increased by risk aversion compared to risk neutrality. In this paper I show that the total expected payoff to a player over this class in equilibrium is indeed higher if this player is risk averse than if he is risk neutral provided that all games are played with the same probability.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0053595