The ideal free distribution as an evolutionarily stable state in density-dependent population games

0345902 - BC 2011 RIV US eng J - Článek v odborném periodiku
Cressman, R. - Křivan, Vlastimil
The ideal free distribution as an evolutionarily stable state in density-dependent population games.
Oikos. Roč. 119, č. 8 (2010), s. 1231-1242. ISSN 0030-1299. E-ISSN 1600-0706
Grant CEP: GA AV ČR IAA100070601
Výzkumný záměr: CEZ:AV0Z50070508
Klíčová slova: density-dependent population games
Kód oboru RIV: EH - Ekologie - společenstva
Impakt faktor: 3.393, rok: 2010

This article focuses on the habitat selection game where fitness depends on the population density that evolves over time. We show that evolutionary stability does not require that residents use the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) at every population density; rather it is the combined resident–mutant system that must be at an evolutionary stable state.
Trvalý link: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0187074